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ABSTRACT
We consider using passive RFID technology beyond its traditional purpose,
namely, identification. Instead we consider passive tags being densely dis-
tributed in space, providing the infrastructure for distributed, physical in-
formation systems. These systems form the basis for continuous pervasive
spaces. In such a space, a user perceives services with full continuity. That
is, tags are densely distributed in the space. The granularity is so high that
a user does not perceive the discreteness. As users equipped with interroga-
tors move through the space, they interact with the tags by reading from and
writing to their storages. As a result, information flows through the tags.
The resulting services are continuously presented to the user in space-time,
since the tags themselves are pervasive.
RFID tag multiplicity is a necessary component, and it is the unique sup-




CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Thesis: Exploiting Tag Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Pervasive Computing and Continuous Pervasive Spaces . . . . 1
1.3 Thesis Reiterated: Exploiting Tag Multiplicity . . . . . . . . . 7
1.4 Motivating Application Domains and Related Work . . . . . . 7
1.5 Supporting and Related Technologies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.6 Work Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.7 Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
CHAPTER 2 TRACKING PROTOCOLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1 Space-Time Correlations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Forest Search and Rescue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Continuous Pervasivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2.4 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.5 Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
CHAPTER 3 STORAGE ACCESS PROTOCOLS . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.1 Efficient Access Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.2 Random Access Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.3 Tag Storage Lifetime and Tag Granularity . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.4 Continuous Pervasivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
3.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.6 Figures and Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
CHAPTER 4 DISTRIBUTED PASSIVE RFID COMPUTING . . . . 109
4.1 Local Computations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.2 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
4.3 Simulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.4 Continuous Pervasivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.5 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.6 Figures and Table . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
iii
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.1 Summary of Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
5.2 Continuous Pervasivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
5.3 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149




In this work, we consider using passive RFID (radio frequency identification)
technology beyond its traditional purpose, that is, identification. Instead,
we consider this technology giving rise to distributed physical information
systems.
1.1 Thesis: Exploiting Tag Multiplicity
Given existing science and technology trends, passive RFID is a necessary
component for, and the unique supporting solution that enables, the design
and implementation of continuous pervasive spaces. In particular, we argue
that a large number of tags, that is, passive RFID tag multiplicity, allows us to
design and deploy robust, distributed physical information systems, achieving
this particular goal of pervasivity.
In the following, we unpack this thesis statement, explaining what are
continuous pervasive spaces and distributed physical information systems.
1.2 Pervasive Computing and Continuous Pervasive
Spaces
Many years ago, Mark Weiser coined the term ubiquitous computing [1].
Today, pervasive computing is often used as well. Pervasive computing is
concerned with bringing computation to the real physical world, and even-
tually relieving the everyday user from the awareness of the technology itself
[1].
One particular area of pervasive computing is pervasive spaces. The au-
thors in [2] introduce an active space as a physical area where human users
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interact with intelligent devices, thereby augmenting human thought and ac-
tivity. (We prefer the term pervasive space since it draws from pervasive
computing.) The physical area could be in the home, office, or a public
space. Heterogeneous devices are networked in a distributed fashion. The
entire system thus provides users with a pervasive computing environment.
The authors in [2] provide a middleware platform called Gaia, that coordi-
nates the services between devices and human users. In other words, Gaia
enables the design and deployment of pervasive spaces. The authors in [3],
[4] refine Gaia to individuals. That is, Mobile Gaia is focused on personal
pervasive spaces. It provides services such as automated bootstrapping of a
personal space when smart devices are physically near each other. This clus-
ter management service thus coordinates discovery, addition, and removal of
devices and applications. At the other end of the spectrum is Super Spaces
[5]. The authors here provide a distributed architecture to enable multiple
pervasive spaces to interact with each other. We thus see that pervasive
spaces are focused on the interaction between human users and devices. De-
vices increasingly also refers to sensors and sensor-embedded devices. This is
a natural evolution of pervasive spaces since a system knowing the physical
environment can provide a richer experience to the user.
1.2.1 Device-Centric View
Three key ingredients in these pervasive spaces are (1) communication and
data flow, (2) data storage, and (3) computation. (Note that sensing uses
all three of these ingredients.) We explain these ideas in further detail later.
But for now, consider how different devices fall into a space-time spectrum
of these three combined ingredients. That is, more communication in space-
time means higher volume of data flowing over a larger period. More data
storage in space-time means greater storage capacity, with that capacity
maintained over a larger period. And more computation in space-time means
increased processing over larger areas and over a larger period. Figure 1.1
shows devices in a space-time spectrum. Note that we consider devices work-
ing individually, or at most in small quantities. When devices (homogeneous
or heterogenous) are networked together, the resulting systems are located in
different places on the space-time spectrum. In Figure 1.1, NFC (near field
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communication) is placed at the bottom left. NFC is a short range passive
technology [6]. Active interrogators can only scan NFC tags at a range of
a few centimeters, and very little storage is possible in an NFC tag. The
communication throughput is also low, operating on the order of hundreds
of kilobits per second. Passive RFID technology is of course the main fo-
cus of this work. We detail RFID later. Its greater communication range
(up to tens of meters) and storage capability allow it to be situated higher
in the space-time spectrum, compared with NFC. An active RFID [7] tag
has an on-board battery, allowing it even greater communication, storage,
and computation abilities. To be activated, they still have to be scanned
by interrogators, so they are still considered RFID. This is in contrast to
active sensors (motes), which can initiate their own communications, and as
a result, are often continuously part of a sensor network. Passive sensors
have to harvest their own energy to sense, and maybe even communicate.
They may be attached to RFID tags to alleviate the communication energy
burden. At the other extreme of the spectrum, we have smart mobile devices
and full-fledged devices with sophisticated communication, data storage, and
computation capabilities. Interestingly, there is a significant gap in the spec-
trum, which we believe is inherently caused by the economics of the various
technology industries involved with these devices.
1.2.2 Environment-Centric View
Despite the focus on smart environments in pervasive spaces, existing systems
still must take devices into account. Supporting software services have to
enable devices to interact with each other. Furthermore, human users are
still aware of the presence and heterogeneity of devices, often resulting in
added cognitive load, resulting in confusion. For example, a user is very much
aware if she is using a small screen mobile device, a medium screen tablet, or
a large screen mounted computer. To truly approach an environment-centric
view of pervasive spaces where users just live, and not interact directly with
devices, there needs to be an increased granularity in the three key ingredients
of pervasive spaces. Technology is still inherently discrete (and will remain
so for the foreseeable future). This technology discretization leads to an
unfulfilled pervasive experience for the human user, since the real physical
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world is continuous. For example, while watching a video, if a user switches
between devices, she is entirely aware of this, especially if the devices are
different screen sizes, and even more so if she has to actively re-start the
video in the new device. To be truly pervasive, the video could follow the
user instead, perhaps being projected onto surfaces such as tables and walls.
This shows that although technology is discrete, the user experience can still
be continuous. We believe that this can be achieved if the discretization is so
highly granular that the user perceives continuity. In Figure 1.2, we consider
the space-time granularity spectrum of the key ingredients in systems for
pervasive spaces. We see that Super Spaces from [5] are not very granular
at all, since they focus on coordinating the interactions between multiple
pervasive spaces. Mobile Gaia from [3], [4] is focused on personal pervasive
spaces. They are aimed at enhancing the user experience at an individual
level. However, the user is still very much aware of the presence and use
of devices. We argue that passive tag-based information systems provide
the highly sought after granularity, enabling what we now call continuous
pervasive spaces, leading to a environment-centric view, instead of a device-
centric view of pervasive spaces.
1.2.3 Characteristics of Continuous Pervasive Spaces
We consider several characteristics of continuous pervasive spaces. Achieving
these characteristics in a system is tantamount to arriving at a continuous
pervasive space. (1) Continuous pervasive spaces provide a set of rich services
for users. These services enhance the user’s life, rather than introduce addi-
tional complexity. In that sense, they are transformative, allowing a user the
flexibility to do things otherwise not possible, in a highly productive fashion.
(2) The rich services are elastic in their availability and integrity, according
to the availability of resources. This includes the availability and integrity
of system data. (3) The user is minimally distracted from the technology.
Often these distractions arise from the discretization of the user experience,
due to the discrete nature of technology itself. (4) The system supporting the
continuous pervasive space is distributed and scalable. (5) It is fault-tolerant.
(6) It is energy-efficient and cost-efficient, as well as cost-flexible.
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1.2.4 Competing Systems and Technologies: Not Sufficiently
Continuous
We discuss how passive RFID is a necessary component for continuous perva-
sive spaces, from the negative. That is, we show how competing technologies
cannot achieve continuity in the absence of passive RFID. Note that in many
cases, depending on the particular service or environment, we do need these
technologies for pervasivity. However, on their own, they lack the inherent
continuity that RFID provides.
NFC is a very cost-efficient solution for identification and authentication,
often providing security applications such as physical real-world access con-
trol. NFC is also used to bootstrap communications between two devices,
since it is a quick way to trade credentials. Subsequent communication takes
place using a higher throughput technology. Therefore, we see that the short-
range and limited throughput nature of NFC hinders its ability to communi-
cate effectively, especially in comparison to RFID, which has greater range,
throughput, and storage capability in its tags.
Active RFID is a more sophisticated technology. Active RFID tags have
significant storage capability, can transmit further, and can perform more
complex computations. However, this means that an active RFID tag is more
expensive, is larger in size, and also requires an on-board battery. Although
quite useful, these tags therefore cannot be cost-effectively deployed densely
in physical spaces. If such tags fail, or their energy supplies are depleted,
they quickly become a burden to replace.
Active sensors also suffer from the energy requirements of active RFID.
Deploying motes densely in a physical space and networking them together
wirelessly would indeed provide a powerful pervasive system, but only in the
short run. It would not be cost-effective to maintain such a system, since over
time it would require replacing relatively expensive motes that have failed or
that have depleted batteries.
Passive sensors have to harvest energy to sense, and maybe communicate.
(Some passive sensing systems use an active entity to collect sensing data
at relatively large periodic intervals. But this fails the high time granularity
requirement of continuous pervasive spaces.) As a result, sensing and commu-
nication are extremely limited, subject to the energy harvesting method and
fluctuating conditions, such as absorbing solar energy during unpredictable
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weather patterns. This violates the requirement of having a high granularity
in the key ingredients of a continuous pervasive space.
Finally, smart mobile devices and full-fledged computers have maximum
communication, data storage, and computation capabilities, by definition of
the current limits of associated device technologies. However, in isolation,
they are very poor in capturing the continuous physical environment and
servicing the human user in a continuously pervasive sense. Deploying them
in large quantities may help, but this is obviously cost-prohibitive.
1.2.5 Passive Tag-Based Distributed Physical Information
Systems: Unique Enabler of Continuous Pervasive
Spaces
Passive RFID technology can be used to uniquely enable continuous pervasive
spaces. In particular, we introduce distributed physical information systems
based on RFID tags. In such a system, many tags are spread densely over
space and time. Furthermore, interrogators actively scan the tags, interact-
ing with them. We use the word physical to emphasize the very hands-on
nature of our technology. A user perceives herself holding or touching digital
information. For example, consider an Internet user who only has a vague
notion of where the web pages she is reading come from. She knows the
daily news is not stored on her computer. But she may not have a clear idea
where the actual digital files originate. However, if she downloads a video
file of the current day’s new stories for later consumption, she knows that
the information is stored locally. Furthermore, if she transfers the file to a
USB flash drive, she can actually hold the information in her hand. Simi-
larly, tags are also very tangible. But whereas the USB drive merely stores
information, we consider RFID systems that operate on the data itself. That
is why we use the term information systems, as opposed to storage systems,
Finally, distributed refers to tags being spread over space-time. That is, we
consider systems where large numbers of rewriteable tags are deployed in a
large physical space. In general, tags are mobile (though we only largely
consider the static case). They are attached to objects, or people, or in the
more permanent physical infrastructure of a space, such as in the floors or
walls. Users are equipped with RFID interrogators. As they move through
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the physical spaces, they scan the tags, reading from and writing to them,
thus allowing for a dynamic and interactive system. For terseness, we re-
fer to a distributed physical information system based on tags as a tag-based
information system.
1.3 Thesis Reiterated: Exploiting Tag Multiplicity
So we now reiterate our thesis. Passive RFID is a necessary component for,
and the unique supporting solution that enables, the design and implementa-
tion of continuous pervasive spaces. Competing technologies cannot achieve
this goal apart from RFID. In particular, tag multiplicity allows us to design
and deploy robust, distributed physical information systems. These tag-
based information systems are the enablers of continuous pervasive spaces.
That is, tag multiplicity creates many design and implementation opportu-
nities that are otherwise not available.
We demonstrate our thesis through practical implementations as well as
theoretical considerations in general system models. We evaluate our results
in the context of the characteristics of continuous pervasive spaces, as out-
lined in Section 1.2.3. In particular, we study user tracking protocols and
information storage protocols. If we view our tag-based information system
concept as a platform for a variety of different applications, tracking and
storage are key enablers. We also approach our ideas from a distributed
computing perspective, allowing us to further understand the overall system
characteristics. These three aspects form the main contributions of this work.
1.4 Motivating Application Domains and Related
Work
To motivate our work, we consider several application domains that emerge
from our framework of tag-based information systems, or heavily coincide
with it. These are at various stages of ideation, research, and implementation
in the community.
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1.4.1 RFID in Pervasive Computing
As we have already discussed, and as we remark in [8], pervasive computing
is still very much centered around individual people. We believe that in the
future, tag-based information systems will push this granularity even further,
extending to tagged everyday objects. RFID will hide the intricate software
mechanisms away from users. Instead of users interacting with each other
using personal devices (which is becoming the norm today), tagged objects
(belonging to possibly different users) will interact with each other. They will
be self-aware and context-aware, on many space-time scales. The Internet
of Things [9] and the Web of Things [10] are significant steps (and possibly
even new paradigms) in this direction, networking these everyday tagged
objects together using software technologies inspired by the Internet and the
World Wide Web. In this broad sense, all the following application examples
fall under the umbrella of pervasive computing. In this work, we focus on
continuous pervasive spaces, where tags are not only affixed to everyday
objects, but are also located in the physical spaces themselves, for example
on the walls, floors, and in the furniture.
1.4.2 Supply Chain Management and Smart Manufacturing
Supply chain management and other related systems leveraging RFID have
been well studied in the literature because they traditionally have been the
main business and technology drivers of RFID itself. We highlight these
systems because today they have evolved to do much more than just inven-
torying through tag identification. Significant business intelligence is built
into these systems. These include product tracking [11], warehouse manage-
ment [12], and asset management [13].
In [14], the authors use RFID for smart parts manufacturing. As automo-
bile parts affixed with tags move through the production line, interrogators
scan the tags to ensure the processes are correct. For example, a particular
process may require certain safety components to be present. Also, as these
smart parts move between different domains (such as plants, automobile
dealers, and repair shops), interrogators can scan them for service histories.
Storing information inline in the tags themselves is helpful, since it may
be difficult for these different domains to access a centralized information
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database. In this way, we can affix more tags to more parts or subcompo-
nents, or even affix multiple tags to a single part for redundancy. The number
of tags quickly increases, and therefore managing the multiplicity of tags in
these systems becomes very important.
1.4.3 Tracking and Localization
Localization is the estimation of the positions of mobile entities (such as
people or objects) to a required level of accuracy. Tracking is determining
these positions over time, either in real time or after the fact (historically).
We review literature related to these areas that leverages RFID.
The authors in [15] track conference attendees using a system called Intel-
liBadge. Attendees are each assigned a uniquely identifying RFID tag upon
registration, and can access a variety of applications at web kiosks. The au-
thors in [16] use RFID to locate objects in a 3D space, such as a shipping
container.
In [17], the authors use RFID interrogators and active tags (serving as
reference points), to locate passively tagged objects. The active tags serve to
increase the accuracy. However, our view of tag-based information systems
uses inexpensive, commodity passive tags. That is, we rely not on hardware
but software for good performing systems. In [18], [19], the authors use
mobile robots that move through a large space, such as inside a building.
The robots are equipped with interrogators, and scan fixed passive tags as
they proceed through the area. They localize the tags and simultaneously
form a map. This is called simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM).
The robots use other hardware (typically found in these mobile robots) to
help in the process, such as laser range senors and wheel shaft encoders.
These strategies are effective at creating maps, which can even be shared
over a network, allowing newly arriving robots (or people) to use the tracking
and localization information. In our work, we do not assume a network is
readily available or that users can directly communicate with each other.
Rather, we consider tags as being storage devices distributed over a large
area. Tracking and localization information is thus stored inline, within the
tags themselves. Users read from and write to the tags, thereby learning
information from previous users, and providing information for future users.
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The authors in [20], [21] propose a super-distributed tag infrastructure.
They envision deploying tags in space over large areas in a highly dense
and redundant fashion. Vehicles may leave traces by writing IDs to tags.
The path can be retraced by other vehicles, and overwritten slowly in time.
These ideas are very similar to our own. The authors focus on designing
the hardware and software platforms to make such super-distributed tag
infrastructures possible. They prototype their ideas with a robot and use a
simple tracking algorithm that involves storing increasing sequence number
paths in tags. This is just one possibility. We investigate different situations
and elaborate in greater detail with a variety of schemes. In general, our
work focuses on a more dynamic scenario where multiple readers are sharing
storage among multiple tags.
Search and rescue can be viewed as a specific case of localization and
tracking, since we want to locate people as quickly as possible, bringing them
to safety. Tracking is a secondary goal that is only beneficial (which is often
the case) if it aids in the primary goal. For example, safety authorities in
Texas provide wristbands with passive tags to evacuees in times of emergency
[22]. The evacuees are tracked (officials scan them) as they move into and
out of emergency reception centers. If an evacuee is lost, SAR can begin in
the last known scan point of that evacuee. In Virginia, patients suffering
Alzheimer’s (or similar diseases) wear wristbands, each with an active RFID
chip emitting a unique identifier [23]. If a patient wanders away, searchers
use RFID readers tuned to the patient’s identifier to quickly locate her.
Search and rescue for forest hikers is addressed in [24], in a system called
CenWits (Connectionless Sensor-Based Tracking System Using Witnesses).
In CenWits, a hiker in a forest wears a sensor containing a GPS receiver
and a radio transmitter. When hikers come in contact with each other, they
become location witnesses for each other by exchanging location information
(retrieved from the GPS receivers). Dedicated access points are distributed
throughout the forest, with connections to a processing center. When a
hiker passes by an access point, she can upload her accumulated location
information accordingly. If a hiker becomes lost at a later time, responders
can be deployed to rescue the hiker using location information previously
uploaded by the lost hiker and/or her witnesses. The authors in [25] provide
optimizations to CenWits. We also investigate forest search and rescue.
However, we use a tag-based information system instead of a GPS-based
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system. We detail how our system differs from CenWits in Section 2.2.1.
In [26], the authors propose RFID for indoor search and rescue. Tags are
fixed in position and store location information, as well as other building-
related information. As first responders move through a building during or
shortly after a disaster, this information is collected to aid in the search and
rescue process, such as mapping and/or tracking. The work is a focused,
vertical study of indoor search and rescue. In particular, they are interested
in firefighting scenarios. Our work is more general in nature, and we seek
system and algorithmic characterizations instead.
1.4.4 Storage and Collaboration
In [27], the authors develop a system to collect information in a post-disaster
scenario. RFID tags are deployed at disaster sites, after an earthquake for ex-
ample. After authorities analyze the damage at a site, the results are stored
in the tags. At a later stage, information can be easily aggregated since it
is stored at the sites themselves. This is important, since a communications
system may be unavailable. As well, we can further generalize using tags in
these situations. For example, first responders can deploy tags at various key
strategic locations, such as the ground zero location(s), medical tents, emer-
gency shelters, and parking lots. People read and write to the tags, as well as
carry them between these locations. This creates an ad hoc communications
network for people to share messages, such as rescue status updates, food
and medical supplies availability, and any other pertinent information. In
essence, we can view the dynamic systems of tags as digital whiteboards.
We argue that tag multiplicity allows us to design and deploy robust, dis-
tributed physical information systems. In particular, we envision that these
include systems for data storage and collaboration among a large number of
users. We consider these ideas in later sections.
1.5 Supporting and Related Technologies
We discuss several technologies related to passive RFID. Some of these are
being developed in a tagging and identification context. Others are more
theoretical, and pre-date the current manifestations of RFID, but are now
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being adopted by RFID researchers. We consider them since they support
and form an integral part of our tag-based information systems.
Before we detail our ideas, we briefly explain the basics of passive RFID,
available in many sources, such as [28].
1.5.1 Passive UHF RFID Technology and Supply Chain
Management
The basics of passive RFID are available in many sources, such as [28]. RFID
consists of tags and interrogators. We focus on passive UHF RFID. UHF is
860 to 960 MHz. An RFID interrogator is an active device. An interrogator
detects the presence of a passive (batteryless) tag by scanning it. That is, the
interrogator emits a wireless UHF signal, modulating a carrier wave. The tag
absorbs the energy from the carrier, powering its chip. This allows the tag
to receive the transmitted signal, do minimal processing, and possibly send
a signal back to the interrogator (called backscattering). The interrogator
needs to transmit the carrier wave during this whole time to power the tag.
In particular, the backscattered signal from the tag to the interrogator is
transmitted on this same carrier.
Today, EPCglobal maintains standards for the EPC (Electronic Product
Code), an implementation of passive RFID, designed to replace barcodes [29].
In particular, Walmart uses EPC for inventory control [30]. That is, Walmart
crates and even individual items are affixed with tags. They are continuously
scanned by interrogators as they move through the supply chain from supplier
to point-of-sale, allowing for accurate, efficient, and real-time monitoring of
inventory. Fine-tuned business decisions and operations can then be executed
as a result. Being a globally large retailer, Walmart’s adoption of EPC has
pushed many companies in the entire supply chain to use EPC. Thus, supply
chain management (including warehouse management systems and inventory
control systems) has been the main business and technology driver of RFID.
In this work, we move beyond the identification use of RFID (and thus move
beyond its namesake).
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1.5.2 Passive RFID Storage
Our tag-based information systems rely on tags having sizable storage space
(in addition to the default 96 bits used for storing the EPC [29]). In the
past, passive tags had very little space, since they were primarily used for
identification. A tag only needed to store an EPC. However, recently many
different industries are starting to use passive RFID, and many of them have
created a demand for high storage, allowing for more flexibility in a variety
of use cases. Tag manufacturers have responded accordingly. The Higgs-3
tag by Alien [31] and the Monza 4 tag by Impinj [32] both have 512 bits of
storage. The Hibiki tag by Hitachi [33] has 1.5 kilobytes = 12288 bits. The
TegoChip by Tego [34] has an astounding 32 kilobytes = 262144 bits.
1.5.3 Tag Singulation
To detect the presence of a passive tag, an interrogator scans the tag, pow-
ering it. The tag responds by backscattering a unique identifier. The most
popular standard for passive UHF RFID is EPC (Electronic Product Code)
[29]. (The EPC is designed to replace the UPC (Universal Product Code)
barcode; thus the name.) However, when an interrogator scans multiple
tags to detect their presence (by attempting to learn their respective EPCs),
there needs to be a smarter scheme, since all tags responding at the same
time results in a collision. These schemes are called tag singulation algo-
rithms. In other words, tag singulation algorithms are essentially wireless
collision avoidance and resolution protocols. Tag singulation schemes are di-
vided into two main categories: tree-based schemes [35], [36], [37], [38], [39]
and aloha-based schemes [40], [41], [42]. In tree-based schemes, the interroga-
tor successfully sends longer bit strings, which we call query prefixes. If a
tag’s EPC prefix matches, it responds with its entire EPC. A collision occurs
when two or more EPCs match the same prefix. Since the query prefixes
become longer, eventually one tag responds, and it is singulated. In aloha-
based schemes, the interrogator broadcasts a query, instructing each to tag
to randomly choose a time slot in which to reply. A collision occurs when
two or more tags choose the same slot. A tag is singulated if it is the only
tag responding in that slot. This is repeated until all tags are singulated.
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1.5.4 Mobile Interrogation
In tag-based information systems, mobile users are equipped with RFID in-
terrogators. After many years, NFC (near field communications, a short-
range wireless technology) will finally be integrated in many smart mobile
devices within this calendar year. We envision that RFID will follow a simi-
lar path to adoption, as RFID becomes a key driver in pervasive computing.
In particular, RFID radios are already being integrated into existing hand-
held barcode scanners, such as the Motorola MC9090 mobile computer [43].
Nokia researchers have prototyped an UHF interrogator into one of its hand-
sets [44]. The authors in [45], [46] consider interrogator software for mobile
devices.
1.5.5 Networking
We are concerned with networking technologies, since the tags, interrogators,
and users in a tag-based information system form a network. However, it is
different from other well-researched network systems we consider here.
In wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [47], [48], researchers are concerned
with tracking and monitoring physical phenomena. Active wireless sensor
nodes are typically dispersed over a large physical area, continuously collect-
ing sensing data. The networked nodes aggregate and process the data, and
transfer the results to a system user. One large research concern is optimizing
the battery life of sensor nodes, since this determines the lifetime of a WSN.
This can be accomplished through periodic sensing, or more sophisticated
networking, to conserve energy. In contrast, in our tag-based information
systems, we forgo the use of active nodes and node-initiated connectivity.
Rather, passive tags are batteryless storage devices. The tags themselves
form a network, and communicate with each other indirectly when interroga-
tors read from and write to them. Multiple users equipped with interrogators
also form a network. We assume that a user is usually mobile and interacts
with the tags in a limited amount of time, before leaving. (Therefore, we
can assume a user’s interrogator has sufficient energy during that period.)
In a WSN, sensor data is processed locally, aggregated, and transmitted to a
particular location in the network. In tag-based information systems, we also
focus on local, inline processing of data. However, aggregation and transmis-
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sion of data is more difficult since tags are passive. We discuss the related
issue of message ferrying below.
Delay tolerant networks (DTNs) [49] are characterized by sparse connectiv-
ity between nodes, due to various space-time physical phenomena. Research
in this area is concerned with protocols that can squeeze as much information
transfer as possible through the network, even under these harsh conditions.
Strategies include buffering packets at relay nodes and opportunistic routing
based on physical, and even social interactions [50], [51], [52], [53], [54]. Our
tag-based information systems are similar since passive tags also have sparse
connectivity in general. Like DTNs, the interactions between tags (nodes)
can change dramatically, due to tag dynamics, tag failures, or the unpre-
dictability of interrogator scanning. However, our systems are not primarily
concerned with information transfer in the traditional network routing sense.
Rather, we are more concerned with local interactions between tags and with
the distributed applications arising from that model.
To cope with the the sparse connectivity in a DTN, and ease the data
transfer in a WSN (which may be a DTN itself), researchers consider using
mobile entities to deliver information between nodes. That is, a data MULE
(Mobile Ubiquitous LAN Extension) [55], [56] or message ferry [57], [58], [59]
collects information from the nodes at a particular location. The transfer is
still wireless of course. But the wireless distances are relatively small. The
message ferry then travels a relatively long distance to another location, and
delivers the information to another set of nodes. There are many variations
to this scheme. However, the basic idea is that digital bits are physically car-
ried over a significant distance, rather than being delivered over a traditional
transmission medium (that is, wireline or wireless). In tag-based informa-
tion systems, interrogator-equipped mobile entities (usually people) may be
viewed as message ferries, since they allow data to be transferred between
tags separated by relatively large distances. However, we view these entities
as users themselves, rather than just supporting the system. In data mule or
message ferrying systems, all the nodes (both relatively stationary and rela-
tively mobile nodes) are usually active. The authors in [60] instead consider
placing active RFID interrogators at strategically chosen locations. Mobile
entities (such as animals) are tagged and move through the system. The
passive tags interact with an interrogator if they come within its range. We
consider the opposite scenario, where tags are stationary and interrogators
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are mobile. Deploying and maintaining active interrogators across a large
physical space is difficult and not necessarily sustainable. By contrast, we
can distribute passive tags over a large area easily, and they do not have to
be maintained.
1.6 Work Outline
In Chapter 2, we consider two scenarios to study tracking protocols in tag-
based information systems. In the first, we assume tags have infinite storage
space, and we study space-time correlation functions. In the second, we
assume tags have finite storage space, and we investigate replacement algo-
rithms. In this case, digital trails from multiple users share the limited tag
storage space.
In Chapter 3, we study storage access protocols in a tag-based information
system. Again we study two scenarios. In the first, we assume a dense
tag deployment. Interrogators scan many tags, and therefore we require
efficient storage access protocols. We achieve this efficiency using constrained
access protocols. In the second scenario, we assume a more moderate tag
deployment. We consider traditional random access protocols in this case.
We also study tag storage lifetime and tag granularity.
In Chapter 4, we consider a tag-based information system as a distributed
computing system. We focus on several computing metrics in a simulation
study. We investigate these ideas on both a local and a system level.
In Chapter 5, we conclude our work by aggregating all our ideas. In par-
ticular, we demonstrate how tag multiplicity enables tag-based information



























We consider two scenarios to study tracking protocols in tag-based informa-
tion systems. We call the first one space-time correlations, and this applies
to a variety of situations. The second scenario is a specific search and rescue
system in a forest setting. In the first scenario, we inherently assume that
tags have infinite storage space, while in the second, we assume tags have
finite storage space.
2.1 Space-Time Correlations
Consider passive tags distributed densely in space. Users equipped with
interrogators move through the tag field, continuously scanning the tags. As
a user moves, stationary tags enter and exit her scan range (relative to her
position). A subset of tags are said to be space-time correlated with respect
to the user’s trajectory. The correlation value is high if the tags are close
together in space and are scanned by the user close together in time. The
correlation also has a direction, indicating the movement of the user in that
space-time locality. This correlation value and direction form a virtual arrow.
Consider two tags being scanned. The value (arrow weight) is stored in either
or both of the two tags, and the direction is stored by writing the second tag’s
ID into the first tag (and possibly vice versa). These weighted arrows form a
digital path of the user for localization and tracking. This general scenario is
applicable in many different situations. For example, tags can be embedded
beneath the floor tiles or inside the walls of a large office building. As people
equipped with interrogators move through the building, they can leave digital
paths, as well as follow paths of other people. In another example, robots in a
warehouse or factory can both leave digital paths and follow them. Therefore,
we see that the sizes of the potential pervasive spaces for this situation are
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similar to Super Spaces in [5].
In this section, we consider several methods of forming these digital paths.
We perform experiments to actually create them. We study the paths from
a tracking perspective as well as a search and rescue perspective.
2.1.1 System Model
Consider a large set of passive tags, T , distributed in space. Each tag has
position pi, where i ∈ T . We assume each tag has a large storage memory
(relative to the application requirements). (The TegoChip has 32 kilobytes
[34].) That is, our system is not storage-limited.1 Each tag is identified by
a unique ID ui, which is stored in the tag itself. The position pi may also
be stored in the tag. Users, each equipped with an RFID interrogator, move
through the tag field and scan the tags, reading from and writing to them.
The set of users is R.
2.1.2 Correlation Functions
Users exploit the space-time correlations of scanned tags as they move through
the tag field according to various trajectories. For example, if a user with a
small scan range scans two tags within a short time period, they are highly
correlated to each other in both space and time (with respect to that user
at that point in her trajectory). We can then store a virtual arrow with a
large weight in the two tags, pointing from the earlier scanned tag to the
later scanned tag. At a later time, if another user encounters this arrow, she
can confidently guess that the previous user moved in the arrow’s direction
at this position in the past.
The positions of tags may be stored in the tags themselves. Or, users may
have a map M : ui → pi. In either case, users can determine a tag’s position
by scanning its ID. If the positions are unavailable, a user may estimate
relative tag positions pˆi (distance between tags), for example, using her scan
range. Alternatively, tag positions may not be used at all. Assuming users




i,r be the times when tag i
1In Section 2.2, we consider a system where tags are storage-limited. Users thus may
choose to replace existing information in a tag. We investigate replacement algorithms in
this later section.
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enters and exits the scan range of user r during her trajectory, respectively,
where r ∈ R. Note that tags are assumed stationary, and users are mobile.
So entering and exiting are with respect to the user’s frame of reference.
Envisioning tags moving into and out of users’ scan ranges provides greater
insight to the situation. (For simplicity, we assume a user encounters a tag
only once in her trajectory. Otherwise, we would require enter and exit times
for each encounter.) In general, user r progressively acquires these space and




i,r ) as she moves, which can be mapped
through a correlation function f , into weighted directions (arrows). These
arrows are stored in the tags, to be queried later possibly by other users.
This general setup allows for a large class of correlation functions. That is,
a user can use her entire history of tag scans to calculate many different
correlations. However, for practical implementation’s sake, we consider six
correlation functions, where at time t, user r only uses the set of tags being
currently scanned, T (t). (That is, these are the tags within her current scan
range.) There are three possible weightings and two possible directions for
the correlation functions. The weightings are
w(equ) = 1, (2.1)










Weighting w(equ) gives equal weight to all arrows, w(num) gives more weight
to arrows when more tags are being scanned, and w(inv) gives more weight to
arrows when the tags being scanned are closer in time. (That is, the weight
is inversely proportional to the maximum entrance time difference of tags
currently being scanned.) Intuitively, these latter two weightings put more
emphasis on arrows when tags are relatively denser in space and time. The
directions are
d(new) = pk − pl (2.4)
and


















That is, d(new) points from the oldest tag to the newest tag in T (t) that
entered the user’s scan range. Intuitively, this estimates the instantaneous
direction of the user’s trajectory. However, since new tags encountered by the
user may not be directly on her trajectory, d(cen) provides another estimate of
the instantaneous direction. d(cen) points from the oldest tag to the centroid
of tags (spatial average). The six correlation functions are
f1 (t) = w
(equ) d
(new)




f3 (t) = w
(num) d
(new)




f5 (t) = w
(inv) d
(new)




(The directions are normalized to have unit length so that the weight of each
correlation function comes only from Equations (2.1), (2.2), or (2.3)).
In general, a user can continuously calculate correlations in time as she
moves along her trajectory, and write them to tags. This is difficult to
implement and requires heavy computing resources (such as memory in the
interrogator and large storage in tags). Our correlation functions allow us to
discretize the problem to a smaller dimensionality and provides a practical
implementation method. In particular, every time a tag enters or exits a
22
user’s scan range, she calculates a correlation (represented by an arrow) and
writes it to the tags. Specifically, the arrow weight is written to at least one of
the tags. For d(new), the arrow direction can be stored by writing tag IDs in
the appropriate tags. In the simplest case, if the arrow is pointing from tag i
to tag j, where i, j ∈ T (t), then the user can store uj in tag i. Note that this
eliminates the need for an explicit coordinate system. Implementation-wise,
this means pi, ∀i ∈ T does not need to be known by users at all, and can be
fully eliminated from the system. However, d(cen) does require some notion
of tag positions in order for the user to calculate the spatial centroid of tags.
2.1.3 Experimental Evaluation
Experimental Setup
We perform experiments using an Alien ALR-9650 RFID interrogator [61]
with an ALR-9611-CR external antenna, and ALL-9650-02 passive tags.
These are UHF EPC Gen 2 compliant hardware. Our RFID field consists of
135 tags positioned on the vertices of an 8 feet by 14 feet grid, as shown in
Figures 2.1 and 2.2. We move the interrogator through the grid according to
one of three trajectories shown in Figures 2.2(a), 2.2(b), and 2.2(c), while it
continuously scans tags and records scan times.
We take the first and last scan time of a tag as the entrance and exit
time, respectively, as explained in Section 2.1.2. For each trajectory, we use
three RF power levels readily available on the Alien interrogator. P3 is the
maximum power, P2 = P3 − 2 dB, and P1 = P3 − 4 dB. (The interrogator
outputs a maximum of 4 W EIRP. The external antenna is circularly polar-
ized with maximum gain of 6 dBi. The 3 dB beamwidth is 40 degrees.) For
each of these nine configurations (trajectory and power level), we repeat the
experiment five times.
Experimental Results
To evaluate the tracking effectiveness of our system, we first measure the
average weight-normalized error of an arrow with respect to the originating
user’s trajectory. That is, we first calculate the arrows in each experiment
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run. For each point on each arrow, we find the closest distance to the trajec-
tory (perpendicular distance). We then integrate this distance over the entire
arrow. This is the arrow error. We average this over all arrows using the ar-
row weights (normalized), and then average it again over the five experiment
runs. Results are shown in Figure 2.3 for the six correlation functions in
Section 2.1.2. With larger scan powers, the arrows easily extend outward, off
the trajectory. Therefore, we see the average weight-normalized arrow errors
are generally larger for larger powers. In all three trajectories, f2, f4, and f6
(corresponding to d(cen)) all perform better than f1, f3, and f5 (corresponding
to d(new)). Direction d(new) points from the oldest tag to the newest tag in
the user’s scan range, while d(cen) points from the oldest tag to the centroid of
tags. Thus, we see that the latter strategy gives a more accurate estimate of
the instantaneous direction of the user. At low and medium powers (P1 and
P2), f2, f4, and f6 perform similarly. But at high power (P3), we see that f6
gives the best performance. Thus, using the inverse of the maximum entrance
time difference is a good strategy for weighting the arrows. For the former
strategy corresponding to d(new), again the inverse of the maximum entrance
time difference (f6) gives the best performance. Also note that in almost all
the cases, w(equ) is better than w(num). That is, assigning more weight when
more tags are being scanned is not necessarily a good scheme. This may
be too aggressive and confuse the system. In contrast, using w(equ) (which
is essentially no weight) is a more conservative approach, providing better
results. Note that overall, trajectory 3 gives the greatest weight-normalized
error, with the largest error at about 2.6 feet. This is rather large, since
adjacent tags are 1 foot apart. This large error is attributed to the chang-
ing directions of the trajectory, confusing the correlation functions. This is
opposed to trajectory 2, where the largest error is just over 1.6 feet. In this
trajectory, the direction does not change. Furthermore, since the direction
is diagonal with respect to the tag grid, the closest tags that are not directly
on the trajectory are at a perpendicular distance of only
√
2/2 = 0.71 feet
away from the trajectory. Compare this with trajectory 1, whose direction
also does not change. But in this trajectory, the closest tags that are not
directly on the trajectory are at a perpendicular distance of 1 foot away from
the trajectory. Therefore, we see the curves for trajectory 1 are in general
higher than that of trajectory 2.
Another performance measure is how effective arrows are at pointing to-
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wards the trajectory. For each arrow, we calculate the change in error (per-
pendicular distance to trajectory) from the arrow tail to the arrow head,
normalized by the arrow tail error. This is averaged over all arrows using
weights (normalized) and the five experiment runs. Note that a positive
value means that arrows are moving away from the trajectory on average
and a negative value means that arrows are moving towards it. Thus, the
lower (towards negative infinity) the change in error, the better the arrows
are at guiding later users to track the original user’s trajectory. Results are
shown in Figure 2.4 for the six correlation functions in Section 2.1.2. We see
again that in all three trajectories, f2, f4, and f6 all perform better than f1, f3,
and f5. This is due to the omnidirectional nature of the RFID interrogator
antenna. In other words, as a user moves, she encounters more tags off of her
trajectory (line of motion) than on her trajectory. Thus, since d(new) points
from the oldest tag to the newest tag in the user’s scan range, many of the
arrows point away from the trajectory. Conversely, since d(cen) uses a spatial
average of scanned tags, the arrows point toward a better estimate of the
user’s trajectory. (In fact, if the antennas were not only omnidirectional, but
highly isotropic, using the spatial average would give a very good estimate
of the user’s trajectory.) On the average, arrows are usually pointing away
from the trajectory. (The plot points are mostly positive.) Only in the sec-
ond and third trajectory, at high power (P3), are the arrows pointing toward
the trajectory on average. Also, in many of the cases, w(equ) is better than
w(num). That is, assigning more weight when more tags are being scanned
is not necessarily a good scheme, similar to the average weight-normalized
arrow error metric situation above. Also, note that trajectory 1 has a very
large average weight-normalized arrow error change compared to the other
two trajectories. Since the trajectory is pointing in one unchanging direction,
the arrow heads can drift away from the trajectory due to the omnidirectional
antenna. Furthermore, arrow tails are likely to be near the trajectory (less
error). Since the metric is normalized by this small arrow tail distance, it
results in a large value. Trajectory 2 has smaller average weight-normalized
arrow error change values, since tags are generally closer to the trajectory,
reducing the error overall. Finally, trajectory 3 has the smallest values. This
is due to larger arrow tail errors, and therefore there is room for the arrows
to point back to the trajectory.
We also evaluate our correlation functions using visualizations. We create
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an arrow field by drawing the arrows on the tag grid. For simplicity, we
ignore the correlation weights and focus only on the correlation directions
d(new) and d(cen). (Thus, all arrows are weighted equally.) The arrow fields
for d(new) with the medium power level are shown in Figure 2.5. The arrows
start and end at tag locations, corresponding to vertices on the grid. (But
the arrow lengths have no meaning, since we ignore correlation weights.) The
arrow fields for d(cen) are shown in Figures 2.6, 2.7, and 2.8. Since our goal is
to estimate the user’s trajectory accurately, we want a dense arrow field that
surrounds the trajectory tightly. Direction d(new) in Figure 2.5 is poor since
the arrow fields are fat, agreeing with the average arrow error and average
normalized arrow error change discussions above. Direction d(cen) is thus the
better choice. (However, as noted before, d(cen) requires some notion of tag
positions in order for the user to calculate the spatial centroid of tags, while
d(new) does not need any explicit coordinate system.) At low power (Figure
2.6), the interrogator is not able to scan enough tags. Thus, the arrow field
is too sparse. At high power (Figure 2.8), the interrogator scans many tags,
resulting in a dense arrow field. However, the interrogator range is too large,
resulting in the arrow field being too fat. Medium power (Figure 2.7) gives
an interrogator range that results in an arrow field that is both dense and
narrow. (Some of the arrow fields are slightly shifted linearly away from the
trajectory. This is due to the error of not following the trajectory exactly
when performing the experiments.)
For search and rescue, the goal is to locate the lost person as quickly as
possible. The goal is then different from that of accurately estimating a user’s
entire trajectory. Rather, we want the digital path left by a lost user (the
arrow field) to be dense and fat. This allows searchers to quickly locate the
digital path, follow it, and locate the user. That is, we do not care about
where the user was exactly at specific points in space. We just want to locate
and stay on the path as efficiently as possible. Therefore, d(new), as shown in
Figure 2.5 is a better choice than d(cen). However, to create an even denser
arrow field, we can modify d(new) and d(cen). In d(sar,new), every time a tag
enters or exits a user’s scan range, create |T (t)| − 1 arrows, where the ith
arrow points from the ith non-newest tag ∈ T (t) to the newest tag ∈ T (t),
where i = 1, . . . , |T (t)| − 1. In d(sar,cen), every time a tag enters or exits a
user’s scan range, create |T (t)| arrows, where the ith arrow points from the
ith tag ∈ T (t) to the centroid of T (t), where i = 1, . . . , |T (t)|. Results are
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shown in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. We see that d(sar,new) is fatter, and d(sar,cen)
is denser. Therefore, d(sar,new) is better for searchers to find and enter the
vicinity of the trajectory, while d(sar,cen) is better for searchers to remain in
the vicinity of the trajectory.
Another goal of search and rescue is to minimize the search time required
to locate the lost person, which is directly proportional to the area searched.
Consider a generic search algorithm where a lost person has left behind a
set of ordered discrete markers in space. Starting at a given position, the
searcher progressively expands her circular search range (starting from zero)
until a marker is found. She then repositions herself at the new marker and
repeats the expanding search range until the next higher in order marker is
found. This is repeated until she finds the lost person. This search algorithm
can model an RFID interrogator progressively increasing its scan range, or
a searcher physically moving in a spiraling motion between markers. The




i , where ri is the i
th search range
and N is the number of markers. As N becomes large, and if the markers
are distributed approximately uniformly so that ri ≈ LN for some fixed L,
we have A → 0. Intuitively, we want more markers to minimize the search
area. In our case, we take the starting position as the start point of the
trajectory and the lost person’s position as the end point of the trajectory.
We take arrow heads as the markers. They are ordered according to how the
arrows themselves are created, according to Section 2.1.2. We calculate the
cumulative search areas when using d(new) and d(cen). (Note that d(sar,new)
and d(sar,cen) give the same results as d(new) and d(cen), respectively, since
they introduce additional arrows for the same arrow head position.) These
are averaged over the five experiment runs. Results are shown in Figure
2.11. Direction d(cen) provides better performance than d(new), since the
arrows stay closer to the original user path, and thus the distances between
arrow heads are generally smaller. At low powers, the number of scanned
tags is small, resulting in large distances between consecutive found tags
in the search algorithm. This results in a larger average cumulative search
area. Direction d(cen) improves in performance as the power level increases.
However, for d(new), performance actually may degrade at high powers. This
is because the large scan range may create arrows pointing far away from the
trajectory, resulting in large search areas in the vicinities of these particular
arrows. In contrast, this does not happen for d(cen).
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2.2 Forest Search and Rescue
We consider a search and rescue system using a tag-based information sys-
tem. However, many of the ideas here can be generalized for tracking. In
particular, while the previous section assumed infinite tag storage sizes, we
focus on different replacement algorithms that are necessary when overwrit-
ing tags with finite storage.
Despite navigational tools such as maps, compasses and GPS (global posi-
tioning system) devices, untrained forest hikers often become lost. Also, in a
highly wooded area, a GPS device may not function. Even if a hiker can use
a mobile phone, she may still not know her coordinates or be able to commu-
nicate those coordinates to a search team. We propose a search and rescue
system for lost hikers in a forest. We deploy passive RFID tags throughout
the forest by embedding them in trees. As a hiker moves through the forest,
she uses an RFID interrogator (potentially integrated into her mobile phone)
to write a unique identifier (ID) and increasing sequence numbers (SNs) to
nearby tags, creating a digital path. We call these (ID, SN) pairs. (For
ease of exposition, we define the “less than” relationship between two (ID,
SN) pairs as follows: (a, b) < (x, y) if a = x and b < y.) Note that hikers
generally do not know which particular trees have tags. (For example, a tag
may be embedded inside a tree bark, hidden from view.) That is, a hiker’s
interrogator can periodically scan for nearby tags, automatically interact-
ing them, even if the hiker is oblivious to the RFID communications as she
progresses through the forest. If the hiker becomes lost, searchers equipped
with interrogators follow the digital path by scanning for increasing (ID, SN)
pairs left by the lost hiker. (Searchers of course do not need to follow the
digital path exactly. Some (ID, SN) pairs may be skipped depending on how
searchers cover the area.)
If we use the search times for lost hikers as a performance measure, our
system improves or degrades gradually, according to marginal changes in the
spatial density of tags. For example, if we start out with a sparse deployment
of tags, searchers may have difficulty following the digital path of a lost hiker,
since tags containing (ID, SN) pairs may be few and far between. Searchers
thus have to wander a lot when finding the next tag with a larger (ID, SN)
pair. We call this lack of continuity in a digital path a physical gap. As tags
are slowly added to the forest, searchers wander less, gradually improving
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performance. Conversely, tags may be damaged or removed by people or
animals, degrading performance. Barring any significant natural disaster,
however, this happens rarely in time and space. (In the event of a natural
disaster, hikers would not visit those areas anyway.) The performance also
depends on the number of hikers. Since tag memories are constrained, we
assume a hiker replaces an existing (ID, SN) pair in a full tag with her own
(ID, SN). As we add more hikers, more physical gaps in the digital paths
are created due to these (ID, SN) pair deletions, causing the same problem
as that of sparse tag deployment. This is illustrated in Figure 2.12, where
two hiker paths are shown. The polygons represent tags. The triangles and
squares are storing the digital paths of the hikers moving toward the left and
right, respectively. The filled pentagons are storing both paths. The stars
are empty. If a third hiker moves through the center area, and the pentagons
(tags) do not have any more storage, she may replace existing (ID, SN) pairs,
potentially creating physical gaps for the two original digital paths.
2.2.1 Related Work
Most of the related work is already discussed in Section 1.4. Therefore, here
we focus on the practical issues of tree tagging and we also contrast our
system with the CenWits system.
The feasibility of tree tagging is demonstrated in [62], where trees are
tagged as part of a tree tour. Tree-specific information stored in the tags
is extracted by people on the tour, using PDAs (personal digital assistants)
to scan the tags. Reference [62] also investigates the physical constraints of
embedding a tag in a tree. The tree is drilled and the tag is embedded below
the bark. The forestry and logging industries also use RFID [63]. Embedded
tags can be used to track the health of trees. Once a tree is chopped down,
an embedded tag supports tracking of the log as it moves through the supply
chain.
Search and rescue for forest hikers is addressed in [24], in a system called
CenWits (Connectionless Sensor-Based Tracking System Using Witnesses).
In CenWits, a hiker in a forest wears a sensor containing a GPS receiver
and a radio transmitter. When hikers come in contact with each other, they
become location witnesses for each other by exchanging location information
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(retrieved from the GPS receivers). Dedicated access points are distributed
throughout the forest, with connections to a processing center. When a hiker
passes by an access point, she can upload her accumulated location informa-
tion accordingly. If a hiker becomes lost at a later time, responders can be
deployed to rescue the hiker using location information previously uploaded
by the lost hiker and/or her witnesses. The authors in [25] provide opti-
mizations to CenWits. We note the salient differences in our infrastructure
compared to CenWits. Our system is based on hiker paths instead of specific
location information. As a result, we do not require GPS (or any other ex-
plicit location determination mechanism). CenWits uses access points, which
are expensive to deploy and maintain in a forest. Futhermore, they can only
be installed at fixed and well-known positions. Each additional access point
incurs an additional significant cost. Conversely, we use tags to collect in-
formation in our scheme. We can deploy tags densely throughout the forest.
The maintenance cost of tags is merely the cost of replacing damaged tags.
Tags can be placed at any location where feasible. Their locations do not even
have to be known after deployment. Marginally adding tags only marginally
increases costs. Since a dense deployment of access points in CenWits is not
possible, information flowing to access points and eventually reaching the
processing center relies on witnesses trading information. If, however, there
are few hikers, less information is garnered for a specific hiker, making search
and rescue for her, if necessary, difficult. In contrast, having fewer hikers does
not hurt our system. Finally, CenWits relies on a processing center external
to the in-forest components (access points, hikers, and sensors) to aggregate
information and compute search patterns. In our system, an external agent
is not necessary for information aggregation. As well, any other computation
is completely distributed.
2.2.2 Replacement Algorithms
We detail four replacement algorithms. Hikers move through the forest.
Every time a hiker scans a tag, she writes her next (ID, SN) pair. If there is
remaining space in the tag, the hiker writes to an empty memory slot. If an
(ID, SN) pair belonging to the hiker is already in the tag (from a previous
scan), she replaces it with the new (ID, SN) pair (thus, increasing the SN).
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Otherwise, the hiker chooses an existing (ID, SN) pair to delete, according
to one of the following four replacement algorithms.
Oldest Selection (OS)
In Oldest Selection (OS), if necessary, the hiker deletes the oldest (ID, SN)
pair. This may require hikers to include timestamps when writing (ID, SN)
pairs to tags, thereby increasing the storage requirements of tags. Conversely,
if the storage contents in a tag can be ordered, in a first-in first-out queue
for example, then the additional storage is not necessary. OS assumes older
hikers have left the forest, and thus gives priority to newer hikers.
Random Selection (RS)
In Random Selection (RS), if necessary, the hiker randomly deletes an (ID,
SN) pair without any bias. That is, the random choice is uniform. RS
aims to minimize the chance a hiker deletes the same ID in consecutive tag
encounters.
Highest Frequency Selection (HFS)
In Highest Frequency Selection (HFS), if necessary, the hiker deletes the (ID,
SN) pair associated with the ID that she has seen the most in previous tag
encounters. Intuitively, HFS avoids deleting lower frequency IDs, since this
potentially creates gaps. Each hiker bears the cost of maintaining a list of
ID frequencies in HFS.
Lowest Delete Frequency Selection (LDFS)
In Lowest Delete Frequency Selection (LDFS), if necessary, the hiker deletes
the (ID, SN) pair associated with the ID that she has deleted the least in pre-
vious tag encounters. Similar to HFS, LDFS avoids potentially creating gaps.
However, the approach is different. While HFS observes the ID frequencies
(and thus hiker frequencies) in the field of tags, LDFS tries to spread out its
effects of (ID, SN) deletion evenly among all hikers. Each hiker has the cost
of maintaining a list of ID delete frequencies in LDFS.
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Example
We illustrate the four algorithms through a simple example. Suppose a hiker
scans a tag and reads from it the following five (ID, SN) pairs:
(2, 13), (100, 12), (15, 99), (41, 6), (75, 92) (2.11)
The hiker plans to write her next (ID, SN) pair to the tag. Consider six
cases. In the first case, the tag can store T = 6 (ID, SN) pairs. The hiker
has ID = 21, and her next SN is 24. That is, she has (ID, SN) = (21, 24).
Since there is one remaining memory space, the hiker writes (21, 24) to the
tag. In the second to sixth cases, the tag can store T = 5 (ID, SN) pairs. In
the second case, the hiker has (ID, SN) = (15, 106). This means the hiker
scanned this tag previously. The hiker thus updates (15, 99) to (15, 106) in
the tag. In the third case, the hiker has (ID, SN) = (21, 24) and uses OS.
Assuming the (ID, SN) pairs in the tag are ordered newest to oldest from top
to bottom, (75, 92) is shifted out of the tag to make room for (21, 24). In the
fourth case, the hiker has (ID, SN) = (21, 24) and uses RS. The existing (ID,
SN) pair (41, 6) is randomly chosen and replaced with (21, 24). The first four
cases are shown in Table 2.1. The first column shows the (ID, SN) pairs in
the tag immediately before the hiker scans it. The other columns show the
(ID, SN) pairs in the tag after the new (ID, SN) is written to it.
In the fifth case, the hiker has (ID, SN) = (21, 24), and uses HFS. Suppose
the hiker has seen other hikers’ IDs in previous tag encounters with the see
frequencies in Table 2.2. Of the hiker IDs in the tag, 15 has the highest see
frequency. Therefore, (15, 99) is replaced with (21, 24). In the sixth case, the
hiker has (ID,SN) = (21, 24), and uses LDFS. Suppose the hiker has deleted
other (ID, SN) pairs in previous tag encounters with the delete frequencies
in Table 2.3. Of the hiker IDs in the tag, 41 has the lowest delete frequency.
Therefore, (41, 6) is replaced with (21, 24). The last two cases are shown in
Table 2.4.
2.2.3 System Analysis
We first study a geometrical version of the system analytically. Consider a
line segment L of length L, with tags distributed along that line segment
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with linear density ρ (u) tags/m that depends on the position u. Suppose all∫
L ρ (u) du tags are already full from previous hikers writing information to
them. In particular, suppose there is one particular path that is stored in
all the tags on that line segment. We wish to know how that path erodes
as later hikers now move past (intersect) the line segment. We consider only
the OS and RS replacement algorithms for ease of exposition.
First, we characterize how likely later hikers pass through that line segment
using a probability distribution function (pdf). Consider a circular disk of
radius L/2 centered at the origin, as shown in Figure 2.13. The line segment
is the y-axis portion of the disk (indicated by the arrow). We randomly
select points P1 : (x1, y1) and P2 : (x2, y2) from the left and right halves,
respectively. That is, first take x1 ∼ unif [−L/2, 0] , x2 ∼ unif [0, L/2] , and
y1, y2 ∼ unif [−L/2, L/2]. Then, if either P1 or P2 is not in the disk, discard
the outside point(s), and re-select, using the same distribution. The line
segment connecting P1 and P2 forms the path of a later hiker. In particular,






pdf of y, fy (u), is shown in Figure 2.14. This models a situation where the
middle of a forrest is a highly trafficked area. Thus, if the original hiker
moves through the middle of a forrest, she should expect her digital path to
erode quickly in the middle, as later hikers replace (ID, SN) pairs.
We now consider a generic pdf fy (u), so that the analysis applies for
a general setting, depending on the statistics of hiker movements and the
environment. The pdf fy (u) characterizes where later hikers are more or less
likely to pass through L. Since the tags on L are all full, (ID, SN) pairs
are deleted after one later hiker passes through L, according to OS (assume
the (ID, SN) pairs of the original hiker are the oldest). In particular, if the
scan range is small, and circular with radius ∆, then approximately ρ (u) 2∆
(ID, SN) pairs are deleted if the later hiker passes through at position u.
Therefore, the expected number of (ID, SN) pairs deleted after one hiker
passes through is




fy (u) ρ (u) du = E [ρ (y)] . (2.12)
If tags have T memory slots, then there is only a 1/T chance that the original
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hiker’s ID-SN pair is deleted for a given tag. Therefore,
E [number of (ID, SN) pairs deleted with RS]
≈ E [ρ (y)] /T. (2.13)
Next, we characterize how the digital path erodes as multiple hikers pass
through L. Again, consider a small scan range and OS. For  > 0 small, the
probability that an  region of L at position v has the (ID, SN) pairs of the
original hiker deleted is









≈ 1− (1− fy (v) )k (2.15)
≈ kfy (v) . (2.16)
For RS, we have
Pr ((ID, SN) pairs in [v − , v] are deleted after k hikers pass with RS)
≈ kfy (v) /T. (2.17)
Thus, we see that the original hiker’s digital path likely erodes as more hikers
pass through. In particular, the probability that (ID, SN) pairs are deleted
after k hikers pass, at position v, is proportional to k and is proportional to
fy (v).
2.2.4 System Simulation
To evaluate our system in a real-world environment, we consider a portion of
the Yosemite Valley hiking trails [64] of Yosemite National Park in California,
as shown in Figure 2.15. We focus on the trail sections shown in Figure 2.16,
where the section lengths are indicated. We assume the trails are 1 m wide.
The spatial tag density of the trails is ρ tags/m2. We therefore generate ρli1
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tags for the ith trail section, randomly located in that section according to a
uniform spatial distribution. Each tag has T memory slots for storing (ID,
SN) pairs. Each hiker is equipped with an interrogator with a circular scan
range of radius 1 m (which is typical of passive UHF RFID systems [65]).
Hikers choose one of the following six paths and move through them, walking
in the center of trail sections.
• Path 1: A, E, H, G, D
• Path 2: A, B, F, H, I
• Path 3: D, G, H, F, B, A
• Path 4: D, C, B, E, H, I
• Path 5: I, H, E, A
• Path 6: I, H, F, C, D
For each simulation run, the tags are initially empty. The first hiker selects
path 1 and moves through it, storing a digital path. Then, the next 24 hikers
successively each pick a path at random and move through it, storing their
digital paths, using the replacement algorithms if necessary. (That is, after
the first hiker, the next T − 1 hikers do not need to use the replacement
algorithms, since tags are guaranteed to still have space.) We want to know
how the first hiker’s digital path erodes as later hikers move through the
system. In these simulations, we consider hikers moving along the specified
park trails. If a hiker becomes lost, it is usually due to some unforeseen cir-
cumstance. For example, she may have mistakenly ventured off the trail. (In
this case, her device could even notify her that it is no longer scanning tags.)
Or, a hiker may have accidentally slipped off track and is now immobilized
in a location near the trail, waiting for help. In these cases, it is important
that the digital path does not erode quickly. That is, searchers can follow
the digital path and use the last known location of the lost hiker on the trail
(indicated by the end of the digital path) as a check point during searching.
Simulation Results
We consider the fraction of remaining tags (and thus, (ID, SN) pairs) in the
first hiker’s digital path as later hikers move through the system and delete
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the first hiker’s (ID, SN) pairs with the replacement algorithms. Results
are shown in Figures 2.17, 2.18, and 2.19, for ρ ∈ {1, 5, 10} tags/m2 and
T ∈ {3, 7}. The x-axis is the cumulative distance travelled by later hikers.
Therefore the spacing of points across the x-axis is non-uniform, since hik-
ers randomly pick different paths composed of trail sections with different
lengths. Results show that the fraction remains at 1 when little cumulative
distance is travelled. This corresponds to early on when the first T −1 hikers
do not have to replace any (ID, SN) pairs. Performance improves as we add
more storage to tags, as expected. As we increase the tag density, more tags
are part of the first hiker’s path, since the scan range remains constant. But
since other hikers also have the same scan range, the performance does not
improve significantly as we increase the tag density. OS is a lower bound
on the performance among the four replacement algorithms, since (ID, SN)
pairs of the first hiker will obviously be deleted first if necessary. However,
OS might be an attractive choice since it requires very little computational
resources in a tag. For T = 3, we see a fairly good separation among the four
algorithms at medium cumulative distances. That is, in terms of increas-
ing performance, the order is OS, LDFS, RS, and HFS. At higher distances,
HFS still performs well, while the other three algorithms drop below 0.05 for
the fraction of remaining tags. For T = 7, OS performs very poorly, even
worse than HFS with T = 3. It drops quickly at approximately 0.8 × 105
m cumulative distance travelled. LDFS and RS are similar and decrease
with approximately constant slope. Finally, HFS performs the best, espe-
cially when ρ = 10 tags/m2. In summary, HFS is the best choice, at almost
all regions of operation. However, HFS requires a hiker counting IDs from
previous encounters, which may become nontrivial for a handheld device if
hiker IDs are very long. OS does not require any difficult computations,
but has poor performance. A good compromise is RS, which provides decent
performance with minimal computational effort (only a random number gen-
erator is required). LDFS is the worst choice since it requires computational
resources similar to HFS, but its performance is on par with RS, if not worse.
We also consider the sum of next (ID, SN) pair inter-tag squared distances,
multiplied by pi. That is, of the remaining (ID, SN) pairs of the first hiker,
first order them according to increasing sequence numbers. Then, sum up
the squared distances between their corresponding consecutive tags and mul-
tiply the result by pi. For example, suppose the remaining (ID,SN) pairs are
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(1, 244), (1, 9), (1, 259), and (1, 43), corresponding to tag positions ra, rb, rc,
and rd, respectively. The ordering is thus (1, 9), (1, 43), (1, 244) and, (1, 259),
corresponding to rb, rd, ra, and rc. Then the metric is we consider is
Search metric = pi
(||rd − rb||2 + ||ra − rd||2 + ||rc − ra||2) (2.18)
This search metric reflects a cost that models a typical circular search pattern.
For example, when searchers are following the digital path, they want to find
the tag with the next higher (ID, SN) pair. They can use a circular search
pattern to achieve this. The search metric then is a measure of the search
time (which is naturally important in search and rescue). Alternatively, if
a searcher is equipped with a strong RFID interrogator with customizable
scan ranges, she can increase the scan range until the next tag is found. The
search metric then reflects the power consumed by interrogators. Results
are shown in Figures 2.20, 2.21, and 2.22, for ρ ∈ {1, 5, 10} tags/m2 and
T ∈ {3, 7}. We see again that OS has poor performance for T = 3. (ID, SN)
pairs are quickly deleted and thus the search metric becomes large. Indeed, if
we compare Figures 2.17, 2.18, and 2.19 with Figures 2.20, 2.21, and 2.22, the
search metric shoots up when the fraction of remaining (ID, SN) pairs drops
quickly. HFS for both T = 3 and 7 perform fairly well. The search metric
stays stable and low even as the cumulative distance travelled increases,
unsurprisingly, since HFS performs the best in Figures 2.17, 2.18, and 2.19.
Surprisingly, RS and HFS for T = 3 actually perform better than all four
algorithms for T = 7, when ρ = 10 tags/m2. In other words, too high a tag
density actually hurts the search metric. That is, having too many shorter
paths may increase the search metric. So a searcher can already sufficiently
follow a path without having the tags too close to each other. Therefore, for
ρ = 10 tags/m2, the smaller storage memory of T = 3 means that (ID, SN)
pairs are deleted sooner, thus effectively reducing the tag density, and thus
allowing for a lower search metric.
2.2.5 Proposed System Implementation Issues
Implementing this system requires deploying tags and developing hardware
and software. At one centralized extreme, the forest authorities are respon-
sible for embedding tags into trees and keeping an inventory of them. Tag
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locations are strategically chosen and new tags are deployed as necessary.
They also provide hardware and/or software to hikers, maintaining tight
control over tags. At the other distributed extreme, the forest authorities
exercise minimal control and restrictions on the system. Hikers buy special
tree-friendly tags from manufacturers directly. They embed them into trees
(through some safe and practical method provided by the forest authorities)
as they move through the forest, and remove them if desired. Hardware and
software and their supporting standards are developed through communities
apart from the forest authorities. We envision a realistic implementation falls
somewhere between these two extremes.
2.3 Continuous Pervasivity
We discuss how the ideas presented in this section relate to pervasive systems.
In particular, we gather and organize the results, showing how tag multiplic-
ity supports tracking (in particular, of human users) systems in continuous
pervasive spaces.
2.3.1 Quality of Tracking Services
There are two aspects or stages to the tracking systems we show. In the first,
users move through a tag field, leaving digital trails. In the second, other
users follow those trails, thus accomplishing tracking. The users leaving
digital trails are presented with a set of rich services. 1. The trails can be
of varying characteristics, adjustable by the user leaving the trail. In Section
2.1.3, we see that the arrow fields, which are actual physical manifestations
of trails, can be fat or dense, based on simple scan power and algorithmic
adjustments. Depending on whether the user wants to backtrack her trail,
allow another user to follow her, or provide a mechanism for potential rescuers
to find her, she can make the proper adjustment. We see in Section 2.2.2 that
a user can overwrite trail information using different replacement algorithms.
This provides her the opportunity to maximize her own tracking goals, given
her computational resources, while choosing to balance these goals against
system goals, if she wants to benefit other users. We also note that 2. our
tracking services are easily customizable, hiding as much functionality from
38
the user as deemed appropriate. That is, at one extreme, the user can have
fine-tuned control over parameters such as scan power, space-time correlation
function, and replacement algorithm. At the other extreme, the user can
be entirely oblivious to the underlying algorithms, and not even be aware
of any RFID activity, or the presence of tags themselves. That is, a user
can move through a tag field, with an interrogator (likely integrated into a
mobile device) interacting with tags, reading and writing trail information
automatically. The user in this case is truly released from the cognitive load
of leaving digital trails. This is only possible with tags densely deployed in
a physical area, forming a continuous pervasive space.
The other half of tracking systems involves the trackers. In the case of
search and rescue, these are the rescuers. They, too, are presented with a
set of rich services to track and locate users who have previously stored dig-
ital trails. For example, if a tracker knows the algorithms and parameters
that a previous user enabled, then 3. the tracker can adjust her own algo-
rithms and parameters accordingly. As well, just like the users who leave
digital trails, 4. trackers also have a spectrum with which to operate. At
one extreme, a tracker who has detailed knowledge of the RFID system can
control it at every step. At the other extreme, a tracker does not have to care
about the RFID activity or presence of tags at all. The tracker can hold an
interrogator-attached mobile device. As she moves around the tag field, the
interrogator automatically scans the tags, reading digital trail information
from them. The interrogator performs all the calculations and provides the
tracker (the human user) with just simple real-time feedback, such as turn-
ing or proceeding forward, not unlike a GPS interface. Again, this provides
minimal distraction for the tracker, a crucial goal in pervasivity.
2.3.2 Distributedness
The distributed nature of tag multiplicity for tag-based information systems
for tracking in this section plays a significant role in continuous pervasivity. In
particular, distributedness allows for the following pervasive characteristics.
5. Our tag deployment is elastic in many senses. Since each individual
passive tag is extremely inexpensive, we can deploy tags according to the
demand of the specific application, and according to the resources we have
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in acquiring and maintaining the tags. If that demand or our supply of tags
changes, we can react to meet that change. Therefore, granularity not only
applies to physical space-time, but also to the efficiency of the economics.
This elasticity also extends to system performance (as well as performance
focused on a specific space-time locality). That is, marginally increasing or
decreasing tag deployment leads to marginal increases or decreases in various
performance metrics. We call this a graceful elasticity. One important metric
is energy. More tags often results in more energy usage of interrogators
when they scan the tags. So the elasticity extends to the interrogators too,
resulting in energy efficiency. We see more of these ideas in Chapter 3.
Elasticity is important to the availability and integrity of services and data
in a continuous pervasive space. For instance, consider an office building
scenario where users can follow pre-defined digital trails to a conference room,
as an example of Section 2.1. If the tag deployment is weak, or the space-time
correlation functions are not chosen correctly, users may experience a delayed
route. However, users do eventually arrive at the conference room. If the
system administrator adjusts the tag deployment and algorithms, the users
can experience better performance. If these changes are rolled out correctly,
the users barely notice the change over time. Conversely, if resources become
constrained, the system administrator can reduce performance gracefully as
well. In other words, tag deployment elasticity hides small fluctuations of
availability and integrity of services and data in a continuous pervasive space.
As discussed above, tag deployment is elastic. 6. The resulting flexibil-
ity in tag density results in numerous benefits, from a continuous pervasivity
point of view. Tag density is directly related to spatial storage density. That
is, since each tag has digital storage as well as a nonzero range within which
interrogators can scan it, tags physically located near each together form a
spatial storage. Furthermore, since tags can sometimes fail, and since they
are activated only when interrogators scan them, we speak of a space-time
storage density as well. This is crucial, since high space-time storage den-
sity means more information can be stored in space-time, hiding discreteness
from users, allowing for continuous pervasive spaces. In particular, storing
more information locally in tags (that is, inline) provides interrogators to use
more sophisticated algorithms, which includes tracking, in this section. For
example, in Section 2.1.2, the centroid-based correlation functions require
knowing the average spatial center of a set of tags. This is not easily cal-
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culated in real-time if we assume an individual tag has no notion of its own
location. One strategy is for more powerful interrogators to approximate
tag locations and/or centroids, or relative versions of them (using various
locationing mechanisms), and for these results to be stored in the tags them-
selves. A later interrogator who does not have the ability to perform these
algorithms can read these previous location estimates from the tags in order
to calculate its own approximations for the tag locations. More estimates
yield better results. Therefore, we see that storage density is important.
From another viewpoint, tag storage forms a communications channel be-
tween interrogators. Since interrogators cannot be assumed to directly talk
to each other (because they may be from different operation domains, or just
not be near each other in space-time), the tag storage channel may be the
only opportunity for interrogators to talk to each other. In the case of search
and rescue in Section 2.2, earlier users leave digital trails by writing to tags.
Later rescuers scan those tags, learning the trails in order to find lost users.
Thus, tag storage forms a channel where interrogators communicate across
time.
7. The distributed nature of tag multiplicity also leads to a fault-tolerant
design. That is, there is no single point of failure. For example, if a tag
fails to be scanned occasionally, the systems presented in this section still
function correctly overall. Even if a tag fails permanently, the effect is mi-
nor. This is because tags are unlikely to fail randomly and without reason.
Small local errors are thus insignificant in a continuous setting. In Section
3.3, we study the the lifetimes of tags. In other words, it is very unlikely
that a non-negligible locality of tags fail permanently, without reason, since
tags fail independently of each other, and very rarely. Furthermore, if a local
effect (such as a forest fire in the context of Section 2.2) destroys some tags,
that macro-level event is quickly known by the system administrator, who
can then resolve the issue by deploying new tags at that locality. Other-
wise, tags independently fail uniformly over space, over a long time period.
The system administrator can thus periodically redeploy new tags uniformly,
without having to know or care about which tags have failed. In fact, she
does not even need to keep track of any deployed tags in the first place.
The maintenance of a tag-based information system can therefore be very
minimal. As interrogators move through the space, they report an estimated
spatial tag density, calculated from how many tags they scan over the areas
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they traverse. These values can be monitored by the system administrator,
who replenishes tags as appropriate. Another source of error is interrogators
making incorrect scans or missing tags during singulation. Again, this is a
rare event, and does not effect the overall system performance. In a con-
tinuous pervasive space, system or local faults are hidden from the user and
therefore do not distract her.
8. Tags and interrogators are distributed agents. This contrasts sharply
with the search and rescue system in [24], called CenWits. CenWits is based
on explicit location information, concentrated at a few centralized agents,
namely individual hikers and access points. If just one of these agents fails,
a significant portion of the system may be compromised. In our search and
rescue system in Section 2.2, location information is implicitly stored in a
distributed fashion throughout physical space in the tags. Failures do not
significantly harm our system, as already discussed previously. Furthermore,
the infrastructure in CenWits is expensive, precisely because it does rely on
relatively few access points and GPS. Each new access point is a big invest-
ment. If an access point is damaged early in its lifetime, the cost to the
system becomes very high. The access points also have to be installed at
strategically chosen locations. Our system, in comparison, improves or de-
grades gracefully, according to tag deployment. That is, each additional tag
incurs a marginal cost, resulting in a marginal performance improvement.
They can be easily deployed anywhere, and maintenance is minimal, as ex-
plained previously. Note also that computation and information flows are
centralized to a few space-time coordinates in CenWits. In our system, com-
putation and information truly flow through the tags in the forest, forming
a truly continuous pervasive space.
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, we consider two scenarios to study tracking protocols. In the
first, we inherently assume that tags have infinite storage space. We consider
several methods of forming digital paths using correlation functions. We
describe experiments to characterize the paths in a grid of tags. We study
the paths from both a tracking as well as a search and rescue perspective.
We learn that to estimate the instantaneous direction of a user, the centroid
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is an effective method since it effectively smooths out the transitions of old
tags disappearing and new tags appearing in the user’s scan range. As a
result, the arrows stay tighter to the original user’s trail, resulting in better
tracking and less search effort for search and rescue.
In the second scenario, we assume tags have finite storage space. We intro-
duce a tag-based information system for forest search and rescue. We provide
four replacement algorithms that hikers can use to share the constrained tag
storage memories. We evaluate the system through analysis and simulations
in a realistic setting using the trails from a national park. Results indicate
that HFS performs well, but requires hikers to remember the number of ID
encounters in the past, for each hiker ID.
We also organize our results in the context of continuous pervasive spaces.
We highlight the quality of tracking services and distributedness, as two
factors arising from tag multiplicity that lead to strong continuous pervasive
characteristics.
2.5 Figures and Tables
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Figure 2.1: RFID tag field.
















(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.





























































































(c) User trajectory 3.
























































































































(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.4: Average weight-normalized arrow error change.
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(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.5: Arrow field with d(new) from one experiment run. Antenna
power = P2.
















(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.6: Arrow field with d(cen) from one experiment run. Antenna
power = P1.
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(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.7: Arrow field with d(cen) from one experiment run. Antenna
power = P2.
















(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.8: Arrow field with d(cen) from one experiment run. Antenna
power = P3.
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(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.9: Arrow field with d(sar,new) from one experiment run. Antenna
power = P3.
















(a) User trajectory 1.
















(b) User trajectory 2.
















(c) User trajectory 3.
















































































































(c) User trajectory 3.
Figure 2.11: Average cumulative searched area.
Figure 2.12: Hiker digital paths stored in RFID tags.
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Figure 2.13: The field where hikers can move. L = 1. The original hiker
path is shown by the arrow.














Figure 2.14: Probability density function of where later hikers intersect L.
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Figure 2.15: Yosemite Valley hiking trail.











Figure 2.16: Yosemite Valley hiking trail sections.
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RS, T = 3
OS, T = 3
HFS, T = 3
LDFS, T = 3
RS, T = 7
OS, T = 7
HFS, T = 7
LDFS, T = 7
Figure 2.17: Fraction of remaining tags with (ID, SN) pairs of the first
hiker. ρ = 1 tag/m2.





























RS, T = 3
OS, T = 3
HFS, T = 3
LDFS, T = 3
RS, T = 7
OS, T = 7
HFS, T = 7
LDFS, T = 7
Figure 2.18: Fraction of remaining tags with (ID, SN) pairs of the first
hiker. ρ = 5 tags/m2.
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RS, T = 3
OS, T = 3
HFS, T = 3
LDFS, T = 3
RS, T = 7
OS, T = 7
HFS, T = 7
LDFS, T = 7
Figure 2.19: Fraction of remaining tags with (ID, SN) pairs of the first
hiker. ρ = 10 tags/m2.






















Cumulative Distance Travelled (m)
 
 
RS, T = 3
OS, T = 3
HFS, T = 3
LDFS, T = 3
RS, T = 7
OS, T = 7
HFS, T = 7
LDFS, T = 7
Figure 2.20: Search metric. ρ = 1 tag/m2.
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RS, T = 3
OS, T = 3
HFS, T = 3
LDFS, T = 3
RS, T = 7
OS, T = 7
HFS, T = 7
LDFS, T = 7
Figure 2.21: Search metric. ρ = 5 tags/m2.

























RS, T = 3
OS, T = 3
HFS, T = 3
LDFS, T = 3
RS, T = 7
OS, T = 7
HFS, T = 7
LDFS, T = 7
Figure 2.22: Search metric. ρ = 10 tags/m2.
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Table 2.1: (ID, SN) pairs in tag, Cases 1 to 4.
Before Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 (OS) Case 4 (RS)
(2, 13) (2, 13) (2, 13) (21, 24) (2, 13)
(100, 12) (100, 12) (100, 12) (2, 13) (100, 12)
(15, 99) (15, 99) (15, 106) (100, 12) (15, 99)
(41, 6) (41, 6) (41, 6) (15, 99) (21, 24)
(75, 92) (75, 92) (75, 92) (41, 6) (75, 92)
(21, 24)















Table 2.4: Table: (ID, SN) pairs in tag, Cases 5 to 6.
Before Case 5 (HFS) Case 6 (LDFS)
(2, 13) (2, 13) (2, 13)
(100, 12) (100, 12) (100, 12)
(15, 99) (21, 24) (15, 99)
(41, 6) (41, 6) (21, 24)




We study storage access protocols in a tag-based information system. These
algorithms provide a black box interface for users. That is, a user equipped
with an interrogator can interact with a system of tags, oblivious to the
physical layer communications and storage constraints. She does not know
the number of tags present, and does not need to access tags on an individual
basis. In this sense, our algorithms are a form of middleware for RFID tag
storage.
We consider two scenarios to study storage access protocols. In the first,
we assume the system has a dense tag deployment, and an interrogator scans
many tags, thereby requiring efficient storage access protocols. We choose
to achieve this efficiency by reading from and writing to tag storage in a
constrained manner. In the second scenario, we assume the tag population
is more moderate. We consider random access protocols in that case. We
also study tag storage lifetime and tag granularity.
3.1 Efficient Access Protocols
We consider efficient storage access protocols. In particular, tag multiplicity
plays a defining role in the tag-based information systems we consider. That
is, in single-tag scenarios, or multi-tag systems with a small number of tags
(less than 50), we can use traditional means of tag access. That is, an
interrogator first singulates the tags, learning their IDs. Then, it reads and
writes information by querying the tags individually according to their IDs.
However, in this section, we consider an interrogator whose scan range is
powerful enough to encompass upwards of 1000 tags. (Equivalently, the
interrogator transmit power may be weaker, but the tags are positioned more
densely in space.) Therefore, in these scenarios we want algorithms that
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can quickly access the information of interest (instead of parsing a large
volume of data). In particular, we are often interested in reading the newest
information, because it is the most relevant. Symmetrically, if we are writing
information to an already full storage system and are forced to overwrite
something, we often choose to replace the oldest information. In this section,
we focus on these two ideas.
In this work, we borrow the two traditional RFID singulation schemes,
aloha [40], [41], [42] and query tree [35], [36], [37], [38], [39], to form our
access algorithms. Our query tree-based algorithms access tags faster, but are
not as robust as our aloha-based algorithms. We first study the static case,
where the tag population is fixed. In this scenario, our results indicate that
the better-performing algorithms progressively segment the tag population
at each round to find the newest information. In the dynamic case, tags
are continually arriving and departing. We anticipate that this will cause
information to quickly disappear. Therefore, we combat this by encoding
information, dividing the coded bits into multiple chunks, and spreading
them across multiple tags. This requires us to access a large number of
tags when reading information. Therefore, our results show that the better-
performing algorithms initially singulate all the tags, and then continually
query them individually for data chunks in order to recover information.
3.1.1 Static Case - System Model
We first consider the static case where there is a system of n passive RFID
tags fixed in a physical area. Each tag can store one message and an associ-
ated timestamp. Interrogators regularly arrive at the system, read from and
write messages to the tags (by scanning them), and then leave. In particular,
interrogator arrivals are modeled as a Poisson process with rate λI arrivals
per second. That is,




, k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. (3.1)
We assume that the tag access time (reading and writing) during each inter-
rogator’s stay is negligible compared to the interrogators’ inter-arrival times.
Therefore, there is at most one interrogator at the system at any given time.
(That is, we do not consider the interrogator collision problem [66].) During
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each interrogator’s stay, it writes X messages to X different tags, where X is
a non-negative geometric random variable with mean 1−p
p
, where p ∈ (0, 1),
and X is independent across stays. That is,
P (X = k messages written) = (1− p)k p, k ∈ {0, 1, . . .}. (3.2)
The interrogator first writes to any empty tags. Then, for any remaining
messages, it overwrites existing messages in the tags, starting with the oldest
one, and then the second oldest, and so on. When an interrogator writes a
message to a tag, it also writes a timestamp of the current time to the tag.
(Note that we say a tag is new or old if the timestamp it is currently storing
is large or small, respectively.)
3.1.2 Static Case - Storage Access Algorithms
Reading and writing require finding the newest or oldest messages, which
are symmetric processes in the following algorithms. Therefore, we only
focus on reading. In particular, when an interrogator arrives at a system
of tags already in steady state (all tags are full), these algorithms find the
up to m different tags (learn their unique IDs) containing the m newest
messages, where m ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Then, the interrogator queries each of
these up to m tags individually to recover the messages. The algorithms are
categorized into two classes, aloha-based and query tree-based. Aloha-based
algorithms include {aloha-normal, aloha-max, aloha-half}. Query tree-
based algorithms include {query tree-normal, query tree-max}.
Aloha-Based Algorithms
In aloha, the interrogator singulates n tags in multiple query rounds. In
each round, the interrogator first broadcasts N ∈ {16, 32, 64, 128, 256} to
all the tags, which is the number of tag response time slots. N depends
on the interrogator’s estimate of the tag population size. (Reference [40]
shows that N > 256 is not necessary.) The interrogator then listens for N
time slots. Each tag randomly (uniformly) chooses one of those time slots
in which to respond with its ID. The interrogator learns the ID of a tag
if no other tags respond in the same slot. (There are no collisions in that
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slot.) At each round, the estimate of n, which we call nˆ, changes in general,
and therefore N changes too. This repeats over multiple rounds until the
interrogator is confident that is has singulated 99% of the tags, as detailed
in [40]. In the first round, we initialize N to 16. In subsequent rounds,
we double N if all slots in the previous round have collisions. Otherwise,
we choose N according to nˆ, which we calculate with the following. First,
we need a lookup table (stored in the interrogator) with En0 , E
n
1 , and E
n
≥2,
which are the expected number of empty slots, expected number of single
occupancy slots, and expected number of collision slots, respectively, in the















Nn − (N − 1)n−1 (N + n− 1)
Nn−1
. (3.5)
Now, let s0, s1, s≥2 be the number of empty slots, single occupancy slots, and
collision slots, respectively, measured from the previous round. Then,
nˆ := argmin
n
∣∣∣∣(En0 En1 En≥2)− (s0 s1 s≥2)∣∣∣∣ . (3.6)
(Note that we use the En0 , E
n
1 , and E
n
≥2 values associated with the previous
round’s N in the above minimization.) The interrogator then chooses N
for the current round according to the ranges in nˆ, shown in Table 3.1 and
detailed in [40].
In aloha-normal, the interrogator first uses aloha to singulate all the
tags. Tags respond with their respective timestamps, in addition to their
IDs. The interrogator therefore learns all the tags’ IDs, and their associated
timestamps. It knows which tags are new. It then queries the up to m tags
containing the m newest messages.
For aloha-max, let T S be a set of timestamps. Initialize it to be T S :=
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{−∞}. Before each aloha round, first let tslargest := maxi T S, where i is
the index of the ith timestamp in T S. Then, during the aloha round, the
interrogator broadcasts N and tslargest to the tags. If a tag with timestamp ts
has ts > tslargest, it responds (by choosing one of the N time slots) with its ID
and ts. For each single-occupancy time slot in that round, the interrogator
learns an ID and an associated ts, and updates T S := T S ∪ ts. In this
way, with each round, tslargest increases, and the interrogator progressively
queries an effectively smaller proportion of the tag population. When tags
no longer respond to the interrogator’s broadcast, the interrogator knows
that tslargest contains the largest timestamp among all the tags. It then
queries that tag (using the ID associated with tslargest) to read the newest
message. To find the second newest message (the third newest, . . . , and
the mth newest), the interrogator first mutes the newest tag it just read from
(tells it not to respond anymore for this read session) and updates T S := T S
\ tslargest. The interrogator then repeats the above process. It becomes faster
to find each subsequent newest message, since T S contains increasingly more
timestamps.
Determining nˆ is more difficult in aloha-max than in aloha-normal, since
the effective tag population size (tags that should respond) changes with each
round. To keep track of the tag population, we first use the mean to estimate
the number of tags that are written to in a given period T .


















(Recall that we assume the tag access time (reading in this case) during each
interrogator’s stay is negligible compared to interrogators inter-arrival times.
We are interested in the above mean to guess at the number of tags that
were written to in the past.) Then, at each round, the interrogator doubles
N , if s0 and s1 are both zero in the previous round. Otherwise, it first
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estimates nˆ for the previous round using Equation (3.6). Then, it estimates
the time spread (of messages’ timestamps) of this previous round by taking
the difference between the maximum and minimum timestamps collected in
this previous round. We call this Tspread. From Equation (3.7), it estimates
1−p
p
λITspread as the number of tags written to in that particular time frame
(which is in the past). In the current round, the tags written to in that time
frame do not respond, since they are segmented out with the interrogator
broadcasting tslargest. The interrogator then updates the estimated number
of tags that respond in the current round to be nˆ := dnˆ− 1−p
p
λITspreade. (If
nˆ turns out to be non-positive, set it to 1.) N is then determined from this
new nˆ using the same ranges described above for aloha singulation. Note
that aloha-max requires an interrogator to know the statistics of previous
interrogators. Namely it has to know λI and p.
In aloha-half, we assume that the interrogator does not know the statistics
of previous interrogators. This makes it difficult to estimate the effective tag
population size dynamically (and therefore adjust N accordingly). So instead
of using tslargest as the cut-off time, the interrogator uses the median. That
is, a tag responds in the current round only if its timestamp is greater than
the median of the timestamps collected by the interrogator in the previous
round. Therefore, the tag population estimate is easily updated as nˆ := d nˆ
2
e.
(Again set nˆ to be 1 if it is non-positive.) In essence, the interrogator is
approximately halving the effective tag population in each round. When
only one tag responds to the interrogator’s broadcast, it knows that that tag
is the largest timestamp tag. Everything else is the same as aloha-max.
We summarize the communications of the aloha-based algorithms in a sin-
gle round in Table 3.2. I is the interrogator, tslargest is the largest timestamp
it has collected so far, and tsmedian is the median of the timestamps it col-
lected in the previous round. Tj is the j
th tag, with ID IDj, and tsj is its
stored timestamp, where j ∈ {1, . . . , n}. Tj responds in the kthTj time slot (if
necessary), where kthTj ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Query Tree-Based Algorithms
In query tree, the interrogator singulates the n tags in multiple rounds. In
each round, the interrogator broadcasts a bit string. A tag that has an ID
that prefix matches the bit string responds with its entire ID. If only one
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tag responds, then that tag is successfully singulated. Then the interrogator
chooses another bit string for the next round. Otherwise, multiple tags re-
spond, and there is a collision. The interrogator then uses a longer bit string
in the next round. Essentially, the interrogator walks through a binary tree
starting at the root (using either depth-first search or breadth-first search)
until it singulates all the tags. Note that not all nodes have to be visited.
For example, each node in Figure 3.1 has an associated bit string indicating
its position in the tree. The leaves indicate potential tags in the system.
Shaded leaves mean that that tag is not in the system. Non-shaded leaves
are tags in the system; their bits strings represent their IDs. When the bit
string 01 is queried, only the tag with ID 0110 responds, and therefore it is
singulated right away. Nodes 010, 011, 0100, 0101, 0110, 0111 are not visited.
(These bit strings are not queried.)
In query tree-normal, the interrogator first uses query tree to singulate
all the tags. Tags respond with their respective timestamps, in addition to
their IDs. The interrogator therefore learns all the tags’ IDs, and their asso-
ciated timestamps. It then queries the m newest tags individually according
to their IDs for the m newest messages.
In query tree-max, the interrogator progressively queries an effectively
smaller proportion of the tag population with each round, similar to aloha-
max. Initialize T S := {−∞}, as before. Before each query tree round, first
let tslargest := maxi T S, where i is the index of the ith timestamp in T S.
Then, the interrogator broadcasts a bit string and tslargest. If a tag with
timestamp ts has ts > tslargest, and an ID prefix match with the bit string,
it responds with its ID and ts. (Note that timestamps are in general not
in order according to IDs.) Each time the interrogator successfully receives
a tag’s response (no collision), it updates T S := T S ∪ ts. In this way,
tslargest increases, and the interrogator progressively queries an effectively
smaller proportion of the tag population with each round. When tags no
longer respond to the interrogator’s broadcast, or the query tree algorithm
is complete, tslargest contains the largest timestamp among all the tags. The
interrogator then queries that tag (using the ID associated with tslargest)
to read the newest message. The interrogator repeats the above process,
updating TS and muting tags, similar to aloha-max, to find the second newest
message, the third newest, . . . , mth newest.
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3.1.3 Static Case - Simulations
We simulate our algorithms. We are interested in themessage access time.
In particular, since reading and writing are symmetric (finding the newest
and oldest tags are effectively the same), we focus on reading. To compare the
different algorithms, we abstract out the wireless transfer bit rates between
the interrogator and tags. We only count the total number of simultaneous
bits that are transmitted through the air interface to find the IDs of the m
newest tags. (We say simultaneous, since multiple tags may respond at the
same time. Additionally, tags may not respond, but time may still elapse,
for the case of empty time slots in the aloha-based algorithms.) Note that
we are only measuring the time the interrogator uses to find the IDs of the
m newest tags carrying the m newest messages. Afterward, the interrogator
reads actual message data by querying these tags individually. Since this is
the same for all the algorithms, we do not include this message data transfer
time in our metric. In our simulations, we consider the UHF Class 1 Gen 2
passive RFID tag [29], which uses a 96-bit unique ID. Timestamps are chosen
to be 17 bits long, giving us a precision of seconds in a 24 hour period. N
requires 3 bits, since it can take on five different values. We summarize the
time (simultaneous bits transmitted) required for each query round of the
algorithms in Table 3.3.
We simulate the average message access time when the system is in steady
state, for λI = 1 arrival per second. We average over 100 simulation runs.
Results are shown in Figures 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, and 3.5. Figures 3.2, 3.3, and
3.4 plot access time (number of simultaneous bits transmitted) against the
number of tags, n. Figure 3.5 plots access time against m.
Figure 3.2 shows that aloha-normal and query tree-normal are naive schemes.
They require singulating all the tags initially, using many rounds, thus re-
sulting in a long access time. Query tree-normal increases linearly in n with
a large slope, while aloha-normal is even worse, increasing exponentially.
Aloha-max and aloha-half perform well. Figure 3.3 shows aloha-max is bet-
ter than aloha-half, even for different values of m. This is because aloha-max
is more aggresive in segmenting the tag population in each round. Of course,
the tradeoff is that aloha-max requires knowing the interrogators’ statistics,
while aloha-half does not. Figure 3.2 shows that query tree-max is the best
performing, since it segments the population, while performing query tree.
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The interrogator is effectively pruning the query tree with each round, allow-
ing it to quickly find the newest tag with the largest timestamp.
For aloha-max and aloha-half, we see that varying p changes the perfor-
mance very little, as shown in Figure 3.5. In particular, it may slightly
change how the tag population n is estimated in each round. The query
tree-based algorithms do not use p in their algorithms, and therefore their
performances are independent of p. That is, these algorithms just look at
the relative ordering of the timestamps.
Figure 3.5 shows how the access time varies asm increases. We see that the
marginal time to read each additional message is very small. That is, finding
the first newest tag takes the most time. Finding the second newest, third
newest, . . . , mth newest requires little additional time, since the interrogator
has already collected many timestamps, and thus has a head start in finding
subsequent newest tags.
We see that the query tree-based algorithms perform better than the aloha-
based ones. Both query tree and aloha do not require knowing the tag
population size. However, aloha does continually estimate the number of
tags with each round. Therefore, the aloha-based algorithms must pay this
cost of N (96 + 17) bits in the access time in each round, which is especially
wasteful in the initial rounds when the interrogator is still learning the tag
population size. However, aloha-based algorithms are in general more robust.
Even if the environment changes (such as obstructing objects changing the
wireless propagation characteristics) quickly within one interrogator access
session, aloha handles this gracefully, since in each round, the interrogator
scans all the tags it can and singulates them, whether or not those tags were
scannable in previous rounds. In contrast, suppose in the query tree-based
algorithms, the interrogator misses scanning a tag initially because of an
obstructing object. The algorithms may quickly prune out the segment of
the tree with that tag ID. Later when the obstruction is gone and that tag
is within the scan range, the interrogator cannot singulate it, even if the tag
carries the newest message.
In our algorithms, we use timestamps. In practice, there are difficulties
with this. First, we need to transmit the timestamps and store them in
tags, which requires storage overhead. Second, interrogators need access
to a synchronized clock, which is not necessarily trivial, depending on the
granularity of the timestamps. Instead of using timestamps, one may consider
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logical sequence numbers. But aloha-max and aloha-half cannot use sequence
numbers since they rely on the relative times of interrogator arrivals. The
other algorithms can use sequence numbers. With sequence numbers, the
problem of finding the newest message can become trivial. That is, if the
interrogator knows what the newest sequence number has been assigned so
far, it can use that right away to find the newest message. However, this
is not possible if interrogators do not communicate with each other or they
come from different domains. Additionally, if tags dynamically arrive and
leave (which we address in the next section), it becomes difficult to track
sequence numbers. Therefore, we argue for using timestamps, despite its
difficulties.
3.1.4 Dynamic Case - System Model
In the dynamic case, tags are continually arriving and departing, and there-
fore the tag population size changes dynamically. We model the situation as
an M/M/∞ queueing system. That is, tags arrive according to a Poisson
process at a rate of λT arrivals per second. Each tag stays for an exponen-
tial time with mean 1
µT
seconds, and then departs, independent of all other
tags. Therefore, at steady state, E [number of tags in system] = λT
µT
. (That
is, for the dynamic RFID system, we define steady state as when the queue-
ing system of tags is at steady state. Thus, there are likely to be non-full
tags in steady state, in contrast to the static RFID system.) Without loss
of generality, we take λT = 1. Then, we vary µT ∈ (0, 1). As 1µT increases,
the expected tag population size increases. Also note that if µT is large,
tags leave sooner, and therefore the lifetimes of messages in the system are
reduced. That is, a message is effectively destroyed if enough of the multiple
tags carrying it (using message encoding, explained below) are no longer in
the system.
Interrogators arrive according to a Poisson process at a rate of λI arrivals
per second. After an interrogator arrives, it reads and writes very quickly,
and then leaves. In particular, we assume this tag access occurs on a very
small time scale compared to the tag dynamics. Practically, it means we
can assume the tag population is fixed when an interrogator is accessing
tags. We are, nonetheless, interested in how the tag access time varies at
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this microscopic level. During each interrogator’s stay, it writes X messages,
where X is a non-negative geometric random variable with mean 1−p
p
, where
p ∈ (0, 1), and X is independent across stays. When an interrogator writes a
message to a tag, it includes a timestamp of the current time. If λI is large,
or if p is large, or both, more messages are written to tags. Ultimately, this
reduces the lifetimes of messages stored in the system, since they are quickly
replaced. That is, the turnover rate is high.
The lifetimes of messages are reduced if tags quickly leave and/or inter-
rogators come often and overwrite a lot of messages. Therefore, we use Reed
Solomon coding [67] to alleviate this problem. To store a k-byte message,
an interrogator first encodes it into a q-byte codeword using an RS (q, k)
code. The codeword is then divided into q one-byte chunks, and written to
different tags. To recover the message later, an interrogator must recover
at least any k out of the q chunks (reading from multiple tags), and also
know their respective positions in the codeword. Therefore, we associate a
sequence number with each of the q chunks. The sequence number thus re-
quires dlog2qe bits. When an interrogator writes a message chunk to a tag, it
includes the sequence number and a timestamp. The timestamp also serves
as a message ID, identifying which chunks belong to which message, since all
the chunks of the same message share the same timestamp, and each message
has a unique timestamp.
A tag’s storage is maintained as a first-in first-out (FIFO) queue with l
storage slots. That is, when a tag arrives at the system, it is empty. As
interrogators write message chunks to it (with associated sequence numbers
and timestamps), by inserting chunks at the back of the queue, existing
chunks are pushed through the queue. When the queue is full, the next
incoming message chunk forces out the oldest existing chunk in the tag. In
other words, the new chunks are at the back, and the old chunks are at the
front. To access (read) chunks from the queue, an interrogator specifies the
ith newest chunk in the queue, where i ∈ {1, . . . , l}.
When an interrogator wants to write q message chunks of a message (with
associated sequence numbers and timestamp), it first singulates all the tags.
It then writes to any empty storage slots in the tags’ queues first. If there
are qremain remaining chunks and n tags in the system, it writes to the
min{n, qremain} tags (inserting chunks at the back of their respective queues)
with the oldest timestamps. This is repeated until there are no more remain-
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ing chunks to be written. In essence, an interrogator spreads out the chunks
among the tags as much as possible, while at the same time replacing the
oldest information in the system. The interrogator can easily find the tags
with the oldest timestamps by examining just the timestamps of each of the
chunks at the front of each queue.
3.1.5 Dynamic Case - Storage Access Algorithms
In this work, we focus on reading messages. As before, the following algo-
rithms find the m newest messages stored in the tag system. Note that an
interrogator only has to recover k chunks of a message to reconstruct and
thus read it. If there are less than k chunks remaining in the system, that
message is effectively destroyed, and can no longer be accessed.
Aloha-Based Algorithms
Aloha-normal is similar to its counterpart in Section 3.1.2. In stage 1,
the interrogator uses aloha to first singulate all the tags, learning their IDs.
Then in stage 2, it queries tags individually, reading message chunks from
them. That is, it reads the newest chunk (and sequence number) from every
tag, and then the second newest from every tag, and so on. After each read,
the interrogator recovers as many messages as possible. That is, if at least
k chunks of a message are recovered, the message itself is recovered. The
interrogator stops reading chunks when it has recovered m messages. (These
being the m newest messages.) Messages in the system that have fewer than
k surviving chunks are considered destroyed.
Note that it is difficult to use the aloha-max and aloha-half algorithms
from before, because even if we know the interrogator statistics, we do not
know if the interrogator necessarily can spread message chunks evenly across
the tags, especially if there are very few tags. Tags arriving and departing
also add to the uncertainty, making these algorithms infeasible.
Query Tree-Based Algorithms
Query tree-normal is the same as aloha-normal, except that the interroga-
tor uses query tree in the initial singulation process of stage 1. Everything
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else in stage 2 is the same, with the interrogator querying tags individually
for their message chunks.
Query tree-max is similar to its counterpart in Section 3.1.2. As before,
initialize T S := {−∞}. In stage 1, the interrogator finds the largest times-
tamp among all message chunks in all tags. In each query tree round, first
let tslargest := maxi T S, where i is the index of the ith timestamp in T S.
Then, the interrogator broadcasts a bit string and tslargest. If a tag with its
largest (among all its chunks) unflagged timestamp ts, has ts > tslargest, and
an ID prefix match with the bit string, it responds with its ID and ts. Each
time the interrogator successively receives a tag’s response (no collision), it
updates T S := T S ∪ ts. In this way, tslargest increases, and the interrogator
progressively queries an effectively smaller proportion of the tag population
with each round. Stage 1 ends when tags no longer respond to the interroga-
tor’s broadcast, or query tree is complete. Timestamp tslargest is the largest
unflagged timestamp among all message chunks in all tags. In stage 2, we
focus on tsinterest := tslargest. First, the interrogator broadcasts a notifica-
tion, telling tags that have tsinterest to flag it (so that it will be ignored in
future iterations of stage 1). Then, the interrogator singulates these tags
that have tsinterest, using query tree on the IDs. If a tag has tsinterest (and an
ID that prefix matches the broadcast string), it responds with the associated
message chunk and sequence number (in addition to its ID). Stage 2 ends
when the interrogator has collected k chunks, or has completed the singula-
tion (in which case it may have collected less than k chunks and therefore
knows that the message is no longer alive in the system). To find the next
newest message, first update T S := T S \ tslargest. Then, the interrogator
goes through stage 1 and 2 again. This process repeats until the interrogator
has recovered m newest messages.
3.1.6 Dynamic Case - Simulations
We simulate our algorithms. We are interested in the measured message
lifetime per byte of a message in steady state. That is, a message is born
when an interrogator writes its q constituent chunks to tags. It is destroyed
when fewer than k chunks remain in the system, which may occur if chunks
are overwritten. This is the death time. However, the message may also be
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destroyed if tags leave. In that case, we take the death time to be when
the next interrogator arrives at the system. Thus, it is a measured lifetime,
because it is with respect to an interrogator discovering that the message is
no longer alive. We normalize the lifetime by dividing by k message bytes,
for a fair comparison of different coding schemes. We are also interested in
the message access time per byte, which is similar to that in Section
3.1.3. In this case we do include the actual message data transfer time in the
metric, since there are differences in message sizes.
As before, tags use a 96-bit unique ID. Timestamps are 17 bits long and
N requires 3 bits. We take q = 32 chunks, and vary k ∈ {16, 20, 24, 28}.
Therefore, chunk sequence numbers require log2 q = 5 bits. The actual mes-
sage data for each chunk is 1 byte = 8 bits. We use timestamps as unique
message IDs. Therefore, each chunk, along with the sequence number and
message ID, requires 8 + 5 + 17 = 30 bits. A typical tag (such as the Alien
Higgs-3 family [31]) has 512 bits of user storage. So we take each tag to have
space for b512/30c = 17 storage slots.
We simulate the average measured lifetime of a message per byte in steady
state. We plot this against the expected tag population size E [n] = λT
µT
.
We take λT = 1, and vary µT ∈ { 1100 , 1200 , . . . , 11000}. Results are shown in
Figures 3.6 and 3.7. As expected, as interrogators come more often (λI large),
message lifetimes are reduced, since chunks are overwritten more quickly. We
see that increasing k reduces the per byte lifetimes. That is, the coding buffer
per byte of q−k
k
bytes is reduced, and messages are destroyed sooner.
We simulate the average message access time per byte in steady state,
for λI = 0.2 and p =
1
2
. Results are shown in Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and
3.11. Increasing k improves performance. However, this is only when the
message is still alive. The plotted values only come from the average of
simulation iterations where there are still at least k message chunks in the
tags. (As already discussed above, the average measured message lifetime
per byte is small when k and λI are large.) In the most extreme case, when
k = 28, E [n] = 100, and m = 5, the message is not alive in 74% of the
simulation iterations. For k = 16, only the E [n] = 100 cases have a non-
zero percentage (and just less than 8%) of not being alive. In other words,
Figures 3.6 and 3.7 together with Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 together
show a tradeoff, summarized in Table 3.4. That is, we cannot have both
long per byte lifetimes and short per byte access times with the same system
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parameters.
We see in Figures 3.8, 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11 that query tree-max performs
the worst. It requires two stages to operate, and is thus slow. Aloha-normal
is better, and query tree-normal is the best. These two normal schemes are
bad in the static RFID system because they singulate all the tags initially.
However, in the dynamic system, since message chunks are spread over many
tags, it is actually advantageous to first find the IDs of the all the tags, and
then do message recovery. This is the key difference between the static and
dynamic cases. A similarity in the static and dynamics cases is that the
access time grows linearly in the number of tags for query tree-normal, and
grows exponentially for aloha-normal.
3.2 Random Access Protocols
In the previous section, we assume the system has a dense tag deployment,
and an interrogator scans many tags, thereby requiring efficient storage access
protocols. In particular, we choose to achieve this efficiency by reading newer
information and overwriting older information. In this section, we assume
the tag population is more moderate and remove any reading or writing
restriction. Instead, we consider a random access distributed file system and
associated random access protocols.
The system is similar to the previous section. We consider a physical space
with passive RFID tags distributed throughout. Users equipped with inter-
rogators read from and write to the tags. In particular, users have random
access to files stored in the tags. The tags are fully distributed and do not
directly communicate with each other. In the most general case, there are
multiple physical spaces, and an external communications system facilitates
user information being spread among different spaces. Furthermore, in this
most general case, tags enter and leave spaces over time, and even fail per-
manently.
In this section, we also focus on privacy. We do not consider securing the
communications aspect of RFID scanning. Rather, we are concerned with
securing the privacy of the stored information. Namely, an adversary should
not be able to easily retrieve information from the distributed file system.
In particular, if an adversary is physically in the system for a short period
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of time, he should not be able to get much information. The longer she is
present, the more information she obtains, but the more likely she is caught.
This model of RFID security is called practical minimalist cryptography [68].
3.2.1 Motivating Application Domains
We talked about applications previously in Section 1.4. But here we detail
applications that can fully leverage the storage capability of distributed tag-
based information systems.
Storage
Obviously storage, as the main function, has a variety of applications. We
consider two scenarios.
We consider small-scale storage systems being those which involve a small
number of users. That is, there is likely only one user interacting with the
system at any given moment. There is a single, small physical space, with
a population of RFID tags, likely numbering less than 1000. The tags may
be fixed, located inside a room. Or they may be mobile themselves, being
carried by a user. The user scans the tags, reading from and writing to them.
It can be used to conveniently store small amounts of temporary information,
or to physically give information to another person.
In a large-scale storage system, many users are interacting with many
tags, possibly in multiple physical spaces. The tags may be distributed
throughout a building, for example, or be physically transferred between
many different users. For instance, many workers may share the same stor-
age system in an office setting. In these situations, privacy becomes more of
a consideration.
Communications
We consider the communications aspect of applications using tag-based stor-
age systems as well.
One-way communications applications are used for disseminating infor-
mation. For instance, tags can be used in public spaces for advertisement,
entertainment, or public service announcements. NFC, a sister technology,
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is already being used in a similar fashion for smart posters in subway sta-
tions to provide route information [69]. RFID-based applications have many
more possibilities, given the greater storage capabilities, and longer wireless
ranges.
Two-way communications applications mean multiple users are interact-
ing with each other via a common set of tags, multiplexed in time, and
possibly even multiplexed in space, if the tags are themselves shuﬄed and
traded between users. For example, a collaborative whiteboard of tags can
be used to share ideas in an office setting. That same technology can be used
in a public setting, where different users can share movie reviews, on a movie
poster itself.
These applications have the benefit of inherent location. Online services
nowadays are quickly trying to bring a localized flavor to their experiences.
Implementing RFID in the physical location bridges that gap automatically.
For example, consider a food court setting. An online food review site may
set up food vendor pages specific to that food court. To create a localized
experience, the food review site may set up 2D barcodes and NFC tags at
the food court. Using their personal mobile devices, customers scan the
barcodes or tags, and connect to the review site. However, connectivity is
not yet available under all circumstances, for a variety of reasons. So instead
we propose using RFID tags in the food court. Customers can read and write
reviews by scanning the tags. The localization is essentially free. But the
availability of information disappears once a customer leaves the location.
We bridge that gap by considering local-online combinations.
Consider communications that have a local-online combination. We
can take oﬄine data from tags, and push them online. That is, take the
example application of the food court reviews, as before. Customers read
from and write to the tags. In particular, after interacting with the tags,
information is stored on a customer’s device. When the device has Internet
connectivity, the information is synchronized to the food review site. Con-
versely, customers who return to the food court can also synchronize online
data with the data stored in the tags. In this way, we have both an online
and localized experience.
72
3.2.2 Strategies for Privacy and Redundancy
We consider an overview of several strategies for privacy protection and re-
dundancy.
Trivial Encryption and Redundancy
We store information as files into tags. To write a file, singulate to find an
empty tag, and then write to it the encrypted file name and its associated
encrypted data. (This can be generalized to a large file by splitting it into
chunks.) To access the file later, query for the tag with the encrypted file
name, and then read the encrypted data from it. In this scheme, redundancy
is easily built in. We can store identical copies of the file in multiple tags.
When we want to access the file, we again query with the encrypted file
name. But we can stop right away once we learn the tag ID of one of those
tags with our encrypted data. This solution offers some privacy by virtue
of encryption. That is, an adversary can easily singulate tags, collecting
data from them. The data is encrypted, but some level of privacy is already
compromised. Overall, these are very trivial ideas. We seek schemes that can
better leverage the multiplicity dimension of tag-based information systems.
Adding Chaff
Adding chaff is essentially an effortless strategy to improve privacy. (There
are performance tradeoffs, but additional implementation effort is negligible.)
That is, we always store dummy data in the empty storage spaces of tags.
Suppose an adversary singulates a population of tags, learning their tag IDs.
She can query each tag, asking if it has data. With chaffing, every tag
responds positively, and the adversary does not know which tags to read data
from first to gain an advantage. Note that tags are modeled as dumb storage
devices. They have no knowledge of the data being stored. The data are
just bits. Interrogators reading from and writing to tags are responsible for
maintaining the chaffing. In particular, we can even implement a minimum
level of chaffing, even when there is data waiting to be stored. That is, we
artificially reduce the storage capacity of tags. This capacity is traded off to
increase privacy. We can adjust this tradeoff dynamically as well.
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Redundancy Encoding
Related to chaffing is redundancy encoding. That is, using a standard en-
coding scheme, we can add redundancy to a file and split it into n chunks.
Recovering any k of those chunks allows us to recover the original file. Now,
if we write those n chunks separately in up to n different tags, we introduce
redundancy and privacy, such that a legitimate user has a higher chance of
accessing the file, even if some tags fail. (The user needs some mechanism
to know which tags to read from, as we detail later.) At the same time,
an adversary randomly scanning tags is less likely to recover any given file.
More specifically, this scheme requires legitimate users to have longer access
times (both reading and writing) for a given file. However, that given file is
now more private. That is, we must use a baseline time for a fair comparison.
The baseline time for legitimate file access increases with more redundancy.
(Actually, writing increases linearly as we add more redundant chunks. But
reading may increase only sub-linearly depending on the singulation scheme
and the tag population size.) So for a fair comparison, we provide the ad-
versary this increased baseline time for random scanning. Therefore, the
adversary is able to scan more tags and read more data. But she is still less
likely to recover the given message (before she is caught, according to the
RFID security model in [68]). We consider Reed Solomon (RS) codes [67]
for redundancy encoding. RS codes perform well under erasure situations.
When a tag fails to be scanned, or just fails permanently, we model this as
an erasure.
Multi-space Distributed Systems
In multi-space distributed systems, there are multiple spaces of tags, where
spaces are significantly separated from each other. This separation require-
ment depends on the application scenario. Furthermore, although individual
spaces offer privacy and redundancy, as explained above, multiple spaces gen-
eralize these ideas further. For example, suppose a small business is entirely
located in an office building. Much of its data is stored remotely, perhaps
using cloud storage services. However, a small portion of that data is very
sensitive, and is stored inside the building. Nonetheless, we still want to
protect the data against unauthorized workers or visitors inside the build-
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ing. Furthermore, data stored in traditional systems may still be attacked.
Therefore, we split up the data into multiple chunks (also adding redundant
chunks), and distribute those chunks throughout the building in tags. That
is, when a user wants to store a file, it is encoded and split into multiple
chunks. A communication network transfers the chunks throughout different
parts of the building. The last mile of each transfer is an RFID interrogator,
which writes it to a tag. When a user wants to recover a file, the communi-
cation network queries the respective interrogators from before, asking them
to read the chunks from the tags. (Again, redundant chunks means only
a fraction of the chunks have to be recovered.) The chunks are combined
to recover the file for the user. Note that data is stored only in tags (and
not the communication network) to protect privacy. Adversaries trying to
steal information need to physically travel throughout the building, possibly
entering restricted areas, making it difficult for them to succeed. Further-
more, during off building hours, interrogators can be disconnected from the
network and powered down. This makes it difficult to steal information by
attacking the communication network and interrogators.
Structured Communication Network: In one scenario, the commu-
nication network is well-defined. That is, interrogators can be strategically
placed at specific locations throughout the building, such as certain office
rooms. As well, tags are also placed at dedicated locations, allowing in-
terrogators to scan them. The interrogators are connected to the building
network as well-known peers, with their locations also being well-advertised.
When a user writes a file, its composite chunks are automatically distributed
throughout the building. The system decides the distribution at run-time.
However, as mentioned above, that distribution is not stored in the network
itself, since it essentially forms the password. The distribution password for
a given file reveals where the file’s composite chunks are located. Therefore,
when a user wants to recover a file, she needs to provide the distribution
password to the communication network.
Ad Hoc Flat Architecture Communication Network: In another
scenario, the network is ad hoc, with all peers communicating on a flat ar-
chitecture. This is motivated by a pervasive computing view of the future,
where RFID tags are affixed to everyday objects. That is, tags not only
are embedded in the walls and floors of the building, but also in furniture,
equipment, devices, and other personal objects. These tags serve many other
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uses. But we envision them being leveraged for our private storage system.
Furthermore, radios are increasingly being integrated into personal mobile
devices. We believe this includes RFID. In other words, in the building, both
interrogators and tags are ubiquitous. Interrogators are embedded in con-
nected devices, and form the peers of our flat network. This system has the
advantage of being fully ad hoc and distributed. We have very minimal hard-
ware and software infrastructure to maintain. It also allows interrogators to
move around.
In this flat architecture, we rely on the active peers to provide location
information. The idea is rather general. But we illustrate with a particular
positioning mechanism. Consider again the single building scenario. Active
devices, such as computers, mobile phones, and other electronics are con-
nected to the building wireless network. Many of them also have embedded
interrogators. We assume that a device can measure a WiFi fingerprint [70]
of itself, representing its location. We provide an example of how our sys-
tem works. Suppose that after a meeting, an employee wishes to archive
the minutes. Her computer runs a simple application, connecting to a set of
interrogator-embedded devices via the network. (How the devices are cho-
sen is an implementation detail.) The minutes are encoded (and encrypted),
split into chunks, and distributed to the devices. The devices scan their re-
spective sets of nearby tags, writing chunks to them. Then, the devices each
measure a WiFi fingerprint, and send it back to the employees computer.
The distribution password in this case is the collection of WiFi fingerprints.
Later, when a user wants to recover the meeting minutes, she has to first have
the distribution password. Then, she queries for the fingerprints of available
interrogator-embedded devices. The fingerprints that best match the distri-
bution password are used. That is, the devices producing the best matching
fingerprints are closest to where the information was originally written. (And
in general, these devices are not the same as the ones that originally wrote
to the tags, especially if devices are moving around.) Therefore, the chunks
are recovered by those devices scanning their nearby tags and returning the
results back to the user. Undoubtedly, there is error in this algorithm. How-
ever, if we use enough redundancy, and use conservative search parameters in
the algorithm, and there is a sufficient distribution of tags and interrogators,




We provide the details of a system description. (In the next section, we
provide a more detailed experimental evaluation.) We implement part of
the system using the Motorola MC9090-G RFID handheld interrogator [43],
which uses the EMDK for .NET platform for software development. We use
passive Alien UHF RFID tags [31]. We do not use any tags with storage,
but instead simulate the storage in software. (Our hardware is constrained
to storage-less tags. However, our software can be easily extended to write
to actual tags.)
File Encryption and Encoding
We provide an example scheme here, but the numbers can be generalized.
The unit of information in our scheme is a file, which is 159 bytes. (Compare
this to a tweet, which is 140 characters. So the application scenarios would
be similar.) To write the file to a set of tags, we first encrypt and encode it.
That is, we use the simple XOR function with a secret key of also 159 bytes.
We take the encrypted file and encode it using a (255, 159) RS code, where
each symbol is a byte. The resulting codeword is zero padded with a zero
byte to form a 256 byte result. Then, we divide the result into 8 chunks,
with each chunk being 32 bytes. So to reconstruct file, we need to recover at
least 5 of the chunks (5× 32 = 160). Note to identify the chunk, we need 3
bits to serve as the chunk sequence number of a file.
File Name Encryption and Chunk Identifiers
In addition to file encryption and encoding above, we need to encrypt the
file name and produce chunk identifiers. That is, each file has a file name,
which is 31 bytes. We encrypt the file name into a 31 byte result. For each
file chunk, append a 1 byte sequence number (more than the required 3 bits
above) to the 31 byte encrypted file name. The resulting 32 bytes = 512 bits
is the chunk identifier. The block size of the SHA-1 hash function is 512 bits.
We use SHA-1 to hash the chunk identifier into a 160 bit = 20 byte result.
We take the first 12 bytes as the chunk tag key. So in summary, each chunk
is 32 bytes with an associated 12 byte chunk tag key.
77
File Writing
To write a file, first produce 8 chunks and 8 chunk tag keys. Then, the user
scans all tags, learning their EPCs. Each EPC is 12 bytes. For each chunk,
round its associated chunk tag key up to the nearest EPC available. That
chunk is written to the tag with that EPC. If the tag is already full, push out
the oldest existing chunk. We assume all tag EPCs are distributed uniformly
in a given space. So rounding provides automatic load balancing. That is,
the SHA-1 function hashes the chunk identifiers uniformly over the chunk
tag key space. Even if tags move around, load balancing is achieved overall,
on the average. We do not have to deal with any reassigning of pointers or
data in tags, simplifying the algorithm. Note that in practice, we might use
only a few bytes of the chunk tag keys and EPCs for rounding, since only
those bytes might be uniformly distributed. This occurs if there are fewer
tags present and they come from the same lot having some bytes of their
EPCs in common.
File Reading
To read a file, a user needs to know the file name. Produce the 8 chunk tag
keys as above. Then, we query the tags, asking them to respond with the
corresponding file chunks. Note that we cannot just broadcast a query to all
tags and ask which tag has the file chunk containing a particular chunk tag
key. This is too difficult for current passive RFID technology. We can only
expect a tag to operate or compare bits based on the tags EPC. The storage
contents of the EPC can be read from and written over. But we assume the
tag itself cannot access its storage for its own computations.
If tags move, to other spaces for example, we can generalize our scheme.
Provided that tags do not move very much, information will still be within
nearby spaces after a short period. Therefore, we can have the hash function
first map to a particular space, and then map to a particular chunk tag key.
When reading then, we might have to query a few more times in different
spaces if the information has travelled to a nearby space. If new tags have
entered a given space, it might disturb the rounding, so we might also need
to query a few more times within the same space to find the information.
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3.2.4 Experimental Evaluation
We perform experiments by scanning a set of tags, simulating reading from
and writing to them. We use 128 Alien UHF RFID tags [31] and pre-program
their EPCs to be {0, 2, . . . , 254}. They are placed on a board in four columns,
as shown in Figure 3.12. A Motorola MC9090-G RFID handheld interrogator
[43] is placed 24 inches away from the board and is aimed directly toward the
center of the board. The entire setup is 55 inches above the ground, relative
to the center of the board. This is shown in Figure 3.13. The interrogator
transmit power is set to 30 dB.
We perform our experiments in runs. In each run, we use different pa-
rameters. For the interrogator singulation algorithm, we vary its starting Q
value ∈ {6, 10, 14}.1 We take a file to have sizes ∈ {12, 20, 28} chunks, and
tags to each have storage sizes ∈ {4, 8, 16} chunks. Each file is encoded into
a codeword that is always 32 chunks. We take chunks to be 16 bytes each,
with 12 of the bytes being the chunk tag key, and 4 of the bytes being the
actual data. Therefore, we are using (128, 48), (128, 80), and (128, 112) RS
codes, where the units are bytes.
To simplify experimentation by saving time, before each experiment run,
the interrogator generates 10 EPC lists. To generate each list, the inter-
rogator scans the board 100 times, taking the union of all EPCs singulated
in each scan. We record the time to generate each list. This is dominated
by the actual physical RFID scan time. The algorithmic computation time
is negligible in comparison. The 10 EPC lists (and their associated times)
therefore represent random possible inventorying execution instances of the
interrogator. We call these 10 times the scan times. For each experiment
run, we do the following for 100 iterations.
1Q is a parameter in [29]’s implementation of aloha singulation. That is, during each
round, the interrogator first sends Q to all the tags. 2Q represents the number of slots
for tags to respond in. (N = 2Q in Section 3.1.2.) Each tag then generates a random
number from ∈ {0, . . . , 2Q−1}. Any tag that generates 0 responds with its tag ID. If there
are no collisions, that one tag is singulated. If there is a collision, the interrogator tells
the colliding tags to wait and respond in the next query round. Then all tags subtract
1 from their generated number, and again, any tag with 0 now responds. This repeats
until the end of the query round. Afterward, Q is dynamically changed according to the
interrogator’s estimate of how many tags still need to be singulated. It is evident that this
scheme is equivalent to the aloha singulation algorithm in [40].
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1. Generate File
We first consider a file, and use the iteration number ∈ {0, . . . , 99} as the
file name. (In plots, we indicate file numbers with {1, . . . , 100}.) We then
generate the file chunks. For each chunk, we generate a chunk tag key. We
hash the string formed by concatenating the file name and the chunk number
together. We use the SHA-1 hash function. We take only the first 12 bytes of
the hashing result and set it to be the chunk tag key since an EPC is 96 bits.
Note that we do not actually consider real file data since our experiments
deal only with the supporting mechanics of our system.
2. Write File
Next, we write the file by writing each chunk to the system, recording the
time to do so. We first simulate inventorying the tags by randomly picking
one of the 10 EPC lists, and increment the time counter (for writing this
file) by the associated scan time of that chosen list. The randomly chosen
list simulates the inventoried list of available tags known to the interrogator.
Then, for each chunk, we round its chunk tag key up to the nearest EPC
in the inventoried list, wrapping around if necessary. (We only use the first
byte of the chunk tag key to do the rounding, since we only have 128 tags.
In general, we should use the appropriate amount of bytes for rounding to
maintain a good load balancing on the average.) For each chunk, we then
simulate writing to the tag with with the EPC we have rounded to. This
involves simulating reading all the chunks in the tag (even if it is empty),
rearranging the chunks, possibly deleting one, and writing all the chunks
back to the tag. We need to do this because current RFID technology is
not powerful enough for a tag to examine its own data, or for a tag to shift
data dynamically. In this experiment, a chunk is written to tag. If the tag
is already full, the oldest chunk is pushed out to make room. Therefore, we
must read the entire tag, process the chunks, and write back to the tag. To
calculate the tag read and write times, we use 640 kbps and 128 kbps for
the tag read and write speeds, respectively [71], and perform the arithmetic
based on the corresponding chunk, file and tag storage sizes.
Therefore, the time to write the file is composed of the scan time associated
with the chosen EPC list, and the times to write file chunks (which are
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really tag read and write times). Note that if not enough chunks are written
(for recovery later), the file write has essentially failed. Note also that we
programmatically (virtually) keep track of which chunks are in which tags.
That is, data is not actually read from or written to tags.
3. Record System Utilization
Next, we record the system utilization. That is, we calculate the fraction of
all available chunk slots in all 128 tags that are currently storing a chunk.
4. Record Recovery Time Periods per Byte
We record the time to recover every file produced so far. That is, we assume
we are now a possibly different interrogator who wants to recover the data
in a file stored in the tags. We assume we have the file name itself (and can
thus produce the chunk tag keys). If the file is not recoverable (the system
has fewer chunks than the minimum for recovery, as determined by the RS
code), we assign the file a recovery time of zero. If the file is recoverable,
first produce its chunk tag keys. Then, try to recover the minimum number
of chunks to recover the file. To do this, we first randomly pick one of the
10 EPC lists, and then update the time counter by the associated scan time
accordingly. As before, this simulates inventorying the system and learning a
list of available tags (via their EPCs.) Then, for each desired-to-be-recovered
chunk, take its associated chunk tag key, and round it up to the nearest EPC
known currently. Read that associated tag to see if that chunk exists there.
(Also increase time accordingly according to the tag read time.) After trying
each unrecovered chunk, repeat by randomly picking one of the 10 EPC lists
again (and thereby likely expanding the list of known EPCs), and check for
unrecovered chunks. Update time accordingly. We do this for up to 5 times.
We record the time to recover each file. If not enough chunks are recovered
for a file, we assign a recovery time of zero to it. The recovery times are
normalized by the number of bytes in a file.
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5. Record File Lifetime Information Progression
We also record how a file decays over time. That is, when a file is first
stored in the system, likely most its composite chunks are written to tags in
a short period of time. We record these times. Then, each time one or more
chunks of the file disappear from the system (because they are overwritten),
we record that time. A file is essentially destroyed when not enough of its
composite chunks exist anymore, according to its RS code.
Experimental Results
Tag Scan Frequency: First, we show which tags are scanned more often.
That is, before each experiment run, we generate 10 EPC lists by scanning
the tags. Therefore, a tag is scanned up to 10 times. These scan frequencies
are shown in Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16. Each color in the stacked bar
chart represents one possible scan. The horizontal axis represents individ-
ual tags with EPCs ∈ {0, 2, . . . , 254}. In particular, we plot all possibilities
in the same graph. That is, suppose F is the file size in chunks and S
is the storage size in chunks. Then for the tag with EPC 12, we place the
plots for the (F = 12, S = 4) , (F = 12, S = 8) , . . . , (F = 28, S = 16) cases at
12.1, 12.2, . . . , 12.9 on the horizontal axis. Since F and S do not affect the
scan frequencies, we place these plots together as they are just multiple re-
sults of the same effective experimental parameters for this particular metric.
As expected, the scan frequency is high for the tags near the center of the
board, since they are on the direct line-of-sight path of the interrogator. The
positions of these tags are shown in Figure 3.12. Q is a dynamic parameter.
If Q is small, the query rounds in the singulation will be shorter with fewer
time slots. If Q is large, there will be more time slots. Depending on the
size of the tag population, Q too small will lead to many collisions, and Q
too large will lead to many empty slots. In either extreme, singulation will
be inefficient, and thus, fewer tags will be singulated for a given scan (which
actually consists of multiple rounds of singulation). The Q in our case is
actually the starting value. It dynamically changes with each subsequent
round of singulation. In particular, Figures 3.14, 3.15, and 3.16 show that
Q = 6 provides the best performance. In the Q ∈ {10, 14} cases, fewer tags
are scanned.
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File Write Time Period per Byte: The time to write each file, per
byte, is shown in Figures 3.17, 3.18, and 3.19. The file write time remains
very similar for different values of F and S, since the file is always encoded
into a 32 chunk codeword before being written. However, when we divide the
time by the actual bytes of useful information (which we care more about),
namely {48, 80, 112} bytes, respectively, we have different plots. Varying
S does not significantly change the results, since each chunk is written to
a selected tag, independent of other chunks. For larger Q, fewer tags are
scanned, and thus the singulation time is shorter. This in turn means that
tag write time is shorter as well, as shown in the figures.
System Utilization: System utilization is the fraction of tag chunk slots
that are currently occupied, as shown in Figures 3.20, 3.21, and 3.22. Since
we write subsequent files (represented with file numbers {1, . . . , 100}), the
horizontal axis can be viewed as time. We see that as time progresses, the
system settles to a peak utilization. This peak is essentially dictated by the
number of tags scanned. For Q = 6, more tags are scanned, and naturally,
data chunks are stored in more tags overall, and we have a higher peak
utilization. Note that the peak does not strongly depend on the amount of
storage in a tag. When tags have less room, peak utilization is reached more
quickly because the rate of data chunks being stored is constant. However,
as time progresses, utilization stabilizes to an approximately common value
for different values of F and S, since the fraction of tags that are scanned
is about the same. Also note that the curves do not depend strongly on F ,
since we are measuring chunk slot utilization, and each file is always encoded
into 32 chunks, independent of F .
File Recovery Time Period per Byte: The times to recover a file,
per useful information byte, are shown in Figures 3.23, 3.24, and 3.25. Each
stacked bar on the horizontal axis corresponds to one set of parameters for a
particular file. For example, for the 12th file, the (F = 12, S = 4) , (F = 12, S = 8) ,
. . . , (F = 28, S = 16) cases are located at 12.1, 12.2, . . . , 12.9 on the horizon-
tal axis. Each colored section on a stacked bar represents a different iteration
in which we have tried to recover a file. For example, after writing the 12th
file in the 12th iteration, we try to recover the first 12 files. Afterward, the
stacked bar representing the 1st file thus has up to 12 sections, with different
colors, representing the recovery time periods per byte for that file, for each
of the 12 iterations thus far. If a file cannot be recovered, it is assigned a
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zero per byte recovery time period. That is why the stacked bar has up to
12 sections. If an iteration results in a zero value, that section is not on the
stacked bar. (Note that there are actually 9 stacked bars associated with
each file, because of different parameters.) The colors range from blue for
the earlier iterations, to yellow for the middle iterations, and finally red, for
the later iterations. We see from the plots that the earlier files have only blue
colors. These files are quickly replaced because they are only recovered in
early iterations. The later files only have red colors because they obviously
did not exist in the system earlier. This also explains the ramping trend in
the graphs. The early files are quickly replaced, so they do not have a lot
of per byte recovery time periods. The later files are also replaced, but the
earlier ones are replaced before them, so they have more periods. However,
this trend reaches a peak, and then the growth stagnates. This corresponds
to when the system reaches peak utilization, and is verified by comparing
Figures 3.23, 3.24, and 3.25, with Figures 3.20, 3.21, and 3.22. For Q = 6,
more tags are scanned, and thus, it takes longer for tags to be read, and
files to be recovered. For larger F , files may quickly become irrecoverable,
since the length of the 32 chunk codeword is fixed, and therefore the relative
coding cushion is smaller.
File Lifetime Information Progression: The lifetimes of the 20th and
80th files are shown in Figures 3.26, 3.27, 3.28, 3.29, 3.30, and 3.31. The
x-axis represents the time during the experiment. Therefore, we see that
the 20th file plots start earlier and the 80th file plots start later. When a
file is first written to the tags, likely all 32 of its composite chunks (from
its codeword) are stored. As time progresses, the chunks are subsequently
replaced by other new incoming chunks of new files. As expected, when the
storage size of tags is small, the given file’s chunks are quickly replaced (and
we say that its lifetime is short). When Q is smaller, more tags are scanned,
and the effective system capacity is higher; thus, the lifetimes are generally
longer. We see that when F is smaller, the lifetimes seem longer, as shown in
Figures 3.26, 3.27, and 3.28. This is because there is a larger coding cushion.
Actually, they are only slightly longer. Figures 3.29, 3.30, and 3.31 show
that the entire lifetimes of the smaller F plots are shifted toward the right,
compared to their larger F counterparts. In our experiments, if a file is not
recoverable, that is, if there are no longer enough chunks in the system, then
we do not bother attempting to recover it. Therefore, the time that passes in
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that situation is zero. So for F = 28, after 4 chunks of a file are replaced in
the system, that file is not recoverable. Therefore, we see that the lifetimes
of these plots are very short, since no time is spent on recovering these files.
3.3 Tag Storage Lifetime and Tag Granularity
We present simple expressions to relate tag dynamics with tag storage. In
particular, these ideas give the system designer a guideline when building
a continuous pervasive space. As before, consider a physical area. The
mathematical model is similar to the M/M/∞ queueing system in Section
3.1.4, but the components are slightly different. Tags enter the area according
to a Poisson process at a rate of λ tags/s·m2. This can represent mobile
tags entering the system. However, we focus on the case where the system
administrator is continuously redeploying tags, according to rate λ. Note
that the unit of the tag deployment rate is per unit area. We assume that
the deployment is uniform, and so therefore we abstract out the area from our
model. Each tag has a lifetime according to an exponential distribution, with
mean 1
µ
. That is, a tag is fully functional when it is first deployed, and for
an exponential amount of time thereafter. Afterward, it fails permanently.
Effectively, it is no longer in the system, which obviously includes its storage.
So at steady state, the expected number of tags per square meter in the
system is λ
µ
, for λ ≥ µ. Now consider an interrogator having a scan range
of R meters. If we want the interrogator to capture an average of S tags for





If λ < µ, then the tags eventually all fail. New tags are still deployed, but
there are long periods of time during which no functional tags are present.
Conversely, if λ ≥ µ, there are a finite number of tags present on the aver-
age at steady state, which means that the S tags of storage scanned by an
interrogator have effectively infinite lifetime (though the data stored therein
may not always be preserved).
Since tag deployment is uniform, the tag granularity improves as tag den-
sity increases. That is, we want the distance between adjacent tags to be
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small, since this contributes to the illusion of continuity to the user, even
though the system is discrete. In particular, to increase tag density (and
thus, tag storage density), we increase λ. This in turn decreases the distance
between neighboring tags. But in particular, since tag storage density is per
unit area, the distance decrease is slower. That is, increasing λ by a multi-
plicative factor of N only changes the distance by a multiplicative factor of
1√
N
. Intuitively, if we are more concerned about granularity than tag storage
density, then we should deploy more tags with little storage capacity. Con-
versely, if we are more concerned with tag storage density, then we should
deploy fewer tags with more storage capacity. However, the tag density ob-
viously cannot be too small such that an interrogator does not capture any
tags.
Mathematically, we have the following formulation: λ tags/s·m2 is the rate
of tags arriving per unit area, and µ is the rate of tags that are failing perma-
nently. Now consider B bits/tag as the storage size in a tag. Furthermore,
we have the constraint
λB ≤ C, (3.9)
where C bits/s·m2 is the maximum rate at which storage bits can enter the
system. Given C, suppose we can choose λ and B. Rate µ is fixed. Note that




bits/m2 (at steady state). The tag density
is λ
µ
. Assuming a simple two-dimensional uniform grid deployment of tags,




. We define granularity
as the reciprocal of this distance. Therefore, we see that the granularity
grows as the square root of the tag density. In particular, to maximize both
the tag storage density and granularity, we can therefore take B∗ = 1, and




As previously, we discuss how the ideas presented in this section relate to
pervasive systems. We demonstrate how tag multiplicity supports storage
and storage access in continuous pervasive spaces.
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3.4.1 Quality of Storage Services
1. In a continuous pervasive space, we desire diversity in services, and even
within a particular service, such as storage. That is, users have different stor-
age needs and goals. Furthermore, a user should not be conscious of changing
storage systems. We use passive tags in both of the systems we study. The
supporting structure is merely interrogators scanning tags. Therefore, both
systems can be implemented in an overlapping fashion, with some tags be-
longing to both systems. In Section 3.1, since the tag deployment is dense,
interrogators scan many tags. Therefore, we design efficient storage access
protocols by reading newer information and overwriting older information.
The goal in this case is therefore fast access protocols, so that the user is not
aware of the underlying tag scan mechanisms. In Section 3.2, we assume a
more moderate tag deployment. Therefore, we consider a more traditional
random access distributed file system. The goal in this case is more flexibility
in the storage access, allowing the user to store data for longer periods of
time, in a robust manner. 2. Tag multiplicity allows storage to be associated
with multiple user-oriented features in a continuous pervasive space. That is,
if we associate storage with specific tags, this burdens the system design, and
ultimately the user. Instead, storage is associated with space-time localities.
A user easily comprehends storing information in a physical location for a
particular period of time. Beyond space and time, other features include
user access control, such as read and write privileges, or storage that is self-
documenting or self-aware. These features are enabled by tag multiplicity.
3.4.2 Distributedness
Distributedness of tag multiplicity for tag-based information systems allows
for the following pervasive characteristics in storage systems.
In Section 3.2.2, we discuss multi-space distributed systems, consisting of
multiple continuous pervasive spaces interacting with each other. We men-
tion both a hierarchal network, as well as a flat architecture connecting the
multiple spaces together. 3. That is, tag multiplicity provides different ways
to design large-scale tag-based information systems. In particular, this natu-
rally requires other active components and software systems, in addition to
tags and interrogators. But this is achievable since we can easily deploy more
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tags to additional physical areas, as required. The overhead is only in having
multiple spaces communicate with each other. For the flat architecture case,
interrogators from different spaces communicate with each other directly, and
therefore the additional overhead is very minimal. Furthermore, in Section
3.3, we show how we can modify the tag storage density and tag granularity
by adjusting the tag deployment rate, allowing us easily to scale up to larger
systems.
In Section 3.2.2, we discuss strategies for privacy. 4. That is, distribut-
edness from tag multiplicity creates many design opportunities for privacy.
In particular, a user should not be burdened with complicated password
systems. So instead, we present several designs that are based on tag dis-
tributedness. This includes the chaffing, redundancy encoding, and even
using location fingerprints. Essentially, by leveraging the distributed nature
of the storage, we are able to spread information physically across space-time,
making pervasive privacy possible.
5. Tag multiplicity also allows for many fault-tolerant designs in storage
systems. As we discussed previously in Section 2.3, there is no single point
failure even if tags can fail in multiple ways due to random errors in scan-
ning, erroneous tag reads and writes, or local environmental effects. In the
particular case of storage, we hide errors in different ways. In Section 3.1, we
focus on retrieving the newest information in a set of tags, and overwriting
the oldest information. In many applications, this makes the most sense,
especially if we want to have efficient storage access algorithms. These algo-
rithms are robust in that they approximate our goals, even if not perfectly
successful. For example, if the tag carrying the newest information is not
scanned, it is very unlikely that the tag carrying the second newest piece
of information is also not scanned, since random tag errors are independent
across tags. Therefore, it is always very likely that we retrieve a very fresh
piece of data. Likewise, it is always very likely that we are overwriting a very
stale piece of data when there is no more empty tag storage. In Section 3.1,
our algorithms are based on the traditional query tree and aloha singulation
algorithms. The query tree-based algorithms are less robust since they are
stateful within a singulation session. That is, an error introduced early in
the session may propagate throughout it. Conversely, the aloha-based algo-
rithms are stateless, so that errors do not propagate. Therefore, we prefer
aloha-based algorithms in continuous pervasive spaces.
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3.5 Concluding Remarks
We study storage access protocols in a tag-based information system in two
different scenarios using simulations. In the first, we use efficient access
protocols in a dense tag environment. In particular, we borrow the aloha
and query tree traditional singulation schemes. In the static case, the aloha-
based algorithms performed better, with aloha-max the being the best. But
this requires the system to know the statistics of interrogators. Therefore,
aloha-half, which does not require this knowledge and still provides good
performance, is better. In the dynamic case, the query tree-based algorithms
are better. However, since the aloha-based algorithms are still more robust,
we prefer them.
In the second scenario, we consider random access protocols for distributed
storage systems with a moderate number of tags, but possibly in multiple
spaces. We perform experiments by scanning a tag population on a large
board, and simulating tag reading and writing. We measured how long it
takes to perform basic tag access mechanisms. Furthermore, we studied how
redundancy, in the form of coding, provides protection against information
degrading due to tag scan errors and overwriting of data.
We also give a simple analysis of how the tag deployment rate affects the
tag storage density and tag granularity in a system where tags eventually fail
permanently.
We organize our results in the context of continuous pervasive spaces. We
highlight the quality of storage systems and services, as well as distributed-
ness, as two factors arising from tag multiplicity that lead to strong contin-
uous pervasive characteristics.
3.6 Figures and Tables
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Figure 3.1: Query tree singulation for a 4 bit tag ID space.































aloha−normal, m = 1
aloha−max, p = 1/2, m = 1
aloha−half, p = 1/2, m = 1
query tree−normal, m = 1
query tree−max, m = 1
Figure 3.2: Number of simultaneous bits transmitted for the static case.
m = 1.
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aloha−max, m = 1
aloha−max, m = 3
aloha−max, m = 5
aloha−half, m = 1
aloha−half, m = 3
aloha−half, m = 5
Figure 3.3: Number of simultaneous bits transmitted for the static case.
Aloha-based algorithms.





























query tree−max, m = 1
query tree−max, m = 3
query tree−max, m = 5
Figure 3.4: Number of simultaneous bits transmitted for the static case.
Query tree-based algorithms.
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aloha−max, p = 1/2
aloha−max, p = 1/6
aloha−half, p = 1/2
aloha−half, p = 1/6
query tree−max
Figure 3.5: Number of simultaneous bits transmitted for the static case.
n = 1000 tags and increasing m.





















k = 16 bytes
k = 20 bytes
k = 24 bytes
k = 28 bytes
Figure 3.6: Average measured message lifetime per byte. p = 1
2
and
λI = 0.2 arrivals per second.
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k = 16 bytes
k = 20 bytes
k = 24 bytes
k = 28 bytes
Figure 3.7: Average measured message lifetime per byte. p = 1
2
and
λI = 0.6 arrivals per second.



























aloha−normal, m = 1
aloha−normal, m = 3
aloha−normal, m = 5
query tree−normal, m = 1
query tree−normal, m = 3
query tree−normal, m = 5
query tree−max, m = 1
query tree−max, m = 3
query tree−max, m = 5
Figure 3.8: Average message access time per byte. p = 1
2
, λI = 0.2 arrivals
per second, and k = 16 bytes.
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aloha−normal, m = 1
aloha−normal, m = 3
aloha−normal, m = 5
query tree−normal, m = 1
query tree−normal, m = 3
query tree−normal, m = 5
query tree−max, m = 1
query tree−max, m = 3
query tree−max, m = 5
Figure 3.9: Average message access time per byte. p = 1
2
, λI = 0.2 arrivals
per second, and k = 20 bytes.



























aloha−normal, m = 1
aloha−normal, m = 3
aloha−normal, m = 5
query tree−normal, m = 1
query tree−normal, m = 3
query tree−normal, m = 5
query tree−max, m = 1
query tree−max, m = 3
query tree−max, m = 5
Figure 3.10: Average message access time per byte. p = 1
2
, λI = 0.2 arrivals
per second, and k = 24 bytes.
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aloha−normal, m = 1
aloha−normal, m = 3
aloha−normal, m = 5
query tree−normal, m = 1
query tree−normal, m = 3
query tree−normal, m = 5
query tree−max, m = 1
query tree−max, m = 3
query tree−max, m = 5
Figure 3.11: Average message access time per byte. p = 1
2
, λI = 0.2 arrivals
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Figure 3.13: Experiment setup.
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Figure 3.14: Tag scan frequency. F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and
Q = 6.





















Figure 3.15: Tag scan frequency. F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and
Q = 10.
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Figure 3.16: Tag scan frequency. F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and
Q = 14.


























F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.17: File write time period per byte. F ∈ {12, 20, 28},
S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 6.
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F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.18: File write time period per byte. F ∈ {12, 20, 28},
S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 10.


























F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.19: File write time period per byte. F ∈ {12, 20, 28},
S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 14.
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F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.20: System utilization. F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 6.






















F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.21: System utilization. F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and
Q = 10.
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F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.22: System utilization. F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and
Q = 14.
Figure 3.23: Recovery time period per byte. F ∈ {12, 20, 28},
S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 6.
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Figure 3.24: Recovery time period per byte. F ∈ {12, 20, 28},
S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 10.
Figure 3.25: Recovery time period per byte. F ∈ {12, 20, 28},
S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 14.
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F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.26: File lifetime information progression. File number = 20,
F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 6.


























F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.27: File lifetime information progression. File number = 20,
F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 10.
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F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.28: File lifetime information progression. File number = 20,
F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 14.


























F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.29: File lifetime information progression. File number = 80,
F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 6.
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F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.30: File lifetime information progression. File number = 80,
F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 10.


























F = 12, S = 4
F = 12, S = 8
F = 12, S = 16
F = 20, S = 4
F = 20, S = 8
F = 20, S = 16
F = 28, S = 4
F = 28, S = 8
F = 28, S = 16
Figure 3.31: File lifetime information progression. File number = 80,
F ∈ {12, 20, 28}, S ∈ {4, 8, 16}, and Q = 14.
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Table 3.1: Choice of N .
nˆ ∈ [1, 9] [10, 27] [28, 56] [57, 129] [130,∞)
N 16 32 64 128 256





For j ∈ {1, . . . , n},







For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if tsj > tslargest,






For j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if tsj > tsmedian,
then in kthTj time slot: I
IDj ,tsj
←−−−−−− Tj
Table 3.3: Simultaneous bits transmitted in each round.
Aloha-based
Aloha-normal
Interrogator query: 3 bits
Tag response: N (96 + 17) bits
Aloha-max
Interrogator query: 3 + 17 bits
Tag response: N (96 + 17) bits
Aloha-half
Interrogator query: 3 + 17 bits
Tag response: N (96 + 17) bits
Query Tree-based
Query tree-normal
Interrogator query: length(bit string) bits
Tag response: 96 + 17 bits
Query tree-max
Interrogator query: length(bit string) + 17 bits
Tag response: 96 + 17 bits
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Table 3.4: Performance tradeoffs in the dynamic case.
k Coding Buffer
Performance Metrics (per byte)
Message Lifetime Message Access Time
Small Large Long Long





We study computing in a tag-based information system, and in particular, we
consider its impact on continuous pervasive spaces. We use the word “com-
puting” loosely. That is, we focus on several metrics in a distributed system
that are related to computation ideas. In particular, as interrogators move
through a continuous space with a dense tag deployment, the services they
provide to users involve computations. We investigate these computation-
motivated metrics on both a local and system level, in a simulation study.
4.1 Local Computations
Before providing the details of our simulation study, we first study computa-
tions at a local level. Because of tag multiplicity leading to the distributed
nature of our tag deployments, these local computations have system-wide ef-
fects. So we first study the local effects. We provide simple expressions relat-
ing physical tag parameters to computing speed, in a small locality. In partic-
ular, assume computer instructions are stored in tags, with r bits/instruction.
Interrogators scan a set of tags, read the stored instructions, execute them,
and then overwrite the storage with other instructions. For simplicity, we
assume any data is stored as part of the instructions, so that we do not have
to account for a separate storage category. Consider a physical space with
tags. An interrogator is in the area, and scans m tags. Each tag has s bits of
storage capacity. We assume singulation is linear in the number of tags, with
a singulation rate of β tags/s. (This may not be realistic in all situations.
However, it suffices for us to generate a simple expression. Furthermore,
many interrogator manufacturers provide a singulation rate, which we can
easily apply to our expression.) The tag read throughput is γread bits/s, and
the tag write throughput is γwrite bits/s. These correspond to the speeds at
109
which the interrogator reads and writes data to a tag, respectively, once it
knows its ID. We now have all the components to calculate the number of
instructions executed (by the interrogator) per unit time. The number of
instructions executed in one session (scan, read, execute, and write) is s
r
m.
The time of one session consists of the scan time, the read time, and the
write time. We assume that the execution time is negligible, since the other
times are bits transmitting over the wireless medium, which dominates local
calculations. The scan time is 1
β





m, respectively. Therefore, the computing speed, σ, in number of
























The second part of Equation (4.1) is very intuitive, and can actually be
derived directly from a unit analysis. That is, 1
r
represents how many in-
structions can be represented in one bit of storage. (Obviously we need more
than one bit of storage/instruction. But this is a unit analysis.) As well, 1
β
is
the scan time/tag and 1
s









are the read and write times/bit, respectively.
Therefore, Equation (4.1) is interpreted as follows:
σ = number of instructions/s
=
number of instructions/bit
scan time/bit + read time/bit + write time/bit
. (4.2)
The number of tags, m, that is scanned by the interrogator is not part of
the expression. Even the tag storage size, s, is not part of the expression.
These are naturally abstracted out, since computing speed is a only a func-
tion of how fast the interrogator can transmit data from and to tags. The
units representing data quantities are normalized away. (Interrogator scan
range is not in the expression because it affects the number of scanned tags,
which is a data quantity.) Of course, this is true only when we assume a
fixed singulation rate and fixed data rates. Practically, within a controlled
range of interrogator scan powers, these rates may not vary much. There-
fore, even though within this scan power range the interrogator may be able
to capture different numbers of tags, the computing speed is still fairly con-
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stant. As a system administrator, thus changing the tag density (through
increases or decreases in tag deployment rate) may not significantly change
the performance of applications that rely on computing in small localities.
Consider instruction sets with r ∈ {32, 64} bits/instruction. Commodity
passive tags typically have s = 512 bits of storage. The singulation rates of
modern interrogators are usually rated at over β = 100 tags/s, and can be
as high as β = 1000 tags/s. Gen 2 UHF EPC technology has tag read and
tag write times of 640 kbps and 128 kbps, respectively [71]. Using Equation
(4.1), we see the range of computing speeds (in instructions/s) in Table 4.1.
Now we provide simple expressions showing energy consumption. Assume
the interrogator has scan power P associated with scan range R. Then,
P = αRδ, where α > 0 is a proportionality constant, and δ ≥ 2 is the path
loss exponent. Assume the spatial tag density is ρ. Therefore, the singulation
time (not the entire computation time) is ρpiR
2
β
. So the energy consumed in






. Note that the energy consumed
per tag scanned is αR
δ
β
. That is, as we increase the interrogator power, we
can scan more tags. However, the unit energy consumed increases.
4.2 System Model
Our physical space is a disk of radius r with n tags randomly located on it,
according to a uniform distribution. At any given moment, there is only one
interrogator in the disk. Interrogators each have a circular scan range of RI .
The interrogator dynamics are as follows:
1. The interrogator chooses a random starting location in the disk, ac-
cording to a uniform distribution.
2. The interrogator scans all the tags in its range (and records their IDs).
3. The interrogator does the following for m times:
(a) The interrogator moves to another random location in the disk
(according to a truncated Le´vy distribution, which we detail later).
(b) The interrogator scans all the tags in its range (and records their
IDs).
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(c) The interrogator stays at this location for a random period of
time (according to another truncated Le´vy distribution, which we
detail later).
4. The interrogator leaves the disk.
These steps are repeated by a total of N interrogators one after another.
That is, an interrogator starts at a random location, moves m times, and
then leaves the system. Afterward, another interrogator appears, and per-
forms the same steps, up to the N th interrogator. All probability distribu-
tions described above are mutually independent of each other, and generated
samples within the same distribution themselves are independent across time.
Our system uses multiple truncated Le´vy distributions. We outline the
Le´vy and truncated Le´vy distributions. A Le´vy random variable L has the
probability distribution function fL (l) and the cumulative distribution func-







, l ≥ 0, and (4.3)





, l ≥ 0, (4.4)






dt is the com-
plementary error function. A truncated Le´vy random variable is a Le´vy
random variable where all the probability mass after a given maximum value
l(max) > 0 is zeroed out, and the rest of the probability mass is rescaled ac-









, 0 ≤ l ≤ l(max) (4.6)
In the interrogator dynamics described above, each interrogator moves m
times. In particular, each time, a direction is first randomly chosen accord-
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ing to a uniform distribution in [0, 2pi]. Then, the distance to be travelled
is randomly chosen according to a truncated Le´vy distribution with scale
parameter αS and maximum value s
(max). The interrogator moves in the
chosen direction for the chosen distance. If the interrogator hits the disk
boundary, she bounces back and completes the distance. The angle of inci-
dence equals the angle of reflection, where the normal is perpendicular to the
tangent line supporting the bounce point. The wait time between each move
is also truncated Le´vy distributed, with scale parameter αW and maximum
value w(max).
We selected the truncated Le´vy distribution since it reflects human mobil-
ity, as demonstrated in [72]. The authors in [72] show that the way humans
walk can be closely approximated and parameterized by the truncated Le´vys.
They collect actual mobility data, and then use parameterized distributions
to match this data. In particular, the authors consider humans walking,
pausing, and then repeating this process. Both the walk lengths and the
pause times can be modeled as truncated Le´vys. We do the same.
4.3 Simulations
4.3.1 Interrogator Dynamics
We first consider the interrogator dynamics in our system. In particular, we
focus on the interrogator steps. We consider the pause time aspects in a later
section. We take the system radius r to be 50 units. That is, the system
diameter is d = 2r = 100. (For example, the lobby of a medium-sized office
building may be 100 meters across.) We want to determine an appropriate
value of s(max) that provides a reasonable range of simulations. In particular,
we plot αS against cumulative distribution function points, with the function





(4.4) (it has to be inverted), as shown in Figure 4.1. We want values of αS
in the range of 10 to 20, since as we will soon see, this provides a reasonable





is, when we generate truncated Le´vy samples later on, they will account for
half of the underlying untruncated distribution, which is a good simulation
setting. Therefore, our operating point is chosen to be s(max) = 0.5×d = 50.
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We plot the probability distribution function of untruncated and trun-
cated Le´vy distributions, as shown in Figure 4.2. The truncated version
is the distribution of the interrogator step lengths, with s(max) = 50, and
αS ∈ {10, 15, 20}. The untruncated version is the underlying distribution.
That is, one way to generate truncated Le´vy samples is to first generate un-
truncated Le´vy samples (using the inverse cumulative distribution function
method with Equation (4.4)). Then discard samples that exceed s(max). The
remaining samples follow the truncated Le´vy distribution. From Figure 4.2
we see that if αS is small, more of the probability distribution is concen-
trated at the smaller step length values, while if αS is large, the probability
distribution is stretched out further toward larger step length values.
We simulate our system model once for each of three different values of
αS and visualize the results. That is, we take N = 5 interrogators, and
m = 4 steps for each interrogator. We take αS ∈ {10, 15, 20}. The results
are shown in Figures 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5. Our simulation disk of radius r =
50 is centered at the origin. In each figure, there are five different sets
of shapes, connected by a dotted line. Each set of shapes represents the
trajectory taken by one of the 5 interrogators. That is, the shape locations
represent where an interrogator stopped, except for boundary points. That
is, since m = 4, there are 5 shape locations for each trajectory, except for
the case when the interrogator bounces off the disk boundary. In those
cases, we mark the bounce point on the boundary also with a shape, but
the interrogator does not actually stop there. In those cases, there are 6
shapes. The red star for each trajectory indicates the location of the starting
random location. The figures show that for larger values of αS, the step
lengths are generally larger, as expected, according to the truncated Le´vy
distribution. Consequently, for larger αS, more of the space is covered by
interrogators, since they move longer distances. That is, imagine an RI-
radius disk centered at each shape location. The disks then represent the
cumulative scan coverage of interrogators. However, even if αS is small, over
time, coverage is still achieved as interrogators move around. In particular,
since each new interrogator starts at a randomly chosen location, coverage
is achieved even if αS and m are small, as long as more interrogators are
introduced into the system.
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4.3.2 System Performance
We simulate our system with different parameters and observe how various
system performance metrics evolve over time.
System Connectivity
Consider two tags ti and tj that an interrogator scans in its trajectory. If
they are scanned simultaneously, the interrogator can transfer information
between the two tags. Even if they are scanned at separate times (and thus
are probably located far from each other), information from the first scanned
tag can be copied to the second scanned tag. Furthermore, attributes (such
as location, timestamps, storage availability, etc.) about one tag can be
stored in the other. In general, a connected link li,j is formed between the
two tags if the interrogator scans them both within its trajectory, with tag ti
being scanned first. That is, links are directed, with li,j and lj,i being two dif-
ferent links. A link can be leveraged immediately or at a later time for other
applications and services. We say that any two tags are connected together
(through the connected link li,j of lj,i) once an interrogator has scanned both
of them within its trajectory. Note that interrogators do not communicate
with each other in general. That is, though the system can contain con-
nected links formed by different interrogators, a connected link itself can
only be formed by one interrogator. Note also that we associate two possible
connected links for any two tags, corresponding to the two directions. If an
interrogator scans two tags ti, and then tj that are already connected through
li,j, the two tags are still associated with the same connected link, li,j . In
general, information from previous interrogators can of course be passed on
using tag storage. However, we do not consider this here. (We explore in-
terrogators trading information with each other in Chapter 2.) Rather, we
focus on how the system becomes increasingly connected as more interroga-
tors move through the system, and thus create connected links. Since there
are n tags, there are n2−n possible connections (connected links) between all
possible pairs of distinct tags. Therefore, we define the system connectivity
as the number of connected links divided by n2 − n.
We plot the system connectivity against time in our simulations. First,
we ignore pause times. (We analyze pause times in a later section.) Also,
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we assume unit velocity. Therefore, the current time, in these simulations,
is equivalent to the cumulative distance travelled by all the interrogators up
to the moment. As before, s(max) = 50. We take N = 10 interrogators
and m = 20 steps per interrogator. We consider n ∈ {100, 500} tags and
RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max). The system connectivity plotted against
time is shown in Figures 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, and 4.9. First, we see that increasing
n from 100 to 500 tags does not have a significant impact on the system
connectivity. All the simulations have the same number of interrogators
and steps per interrogator. But interrogator step lengths are different, since
they come from different truncated Le´vy distributions with different values
of αS. As expected, for smaller αS, the step lengths are smaller, and thus
the cumulative distances are smaller, and therefore the associated curves are
shorter. That is, they end earlier in time. We also see that for RI = 0.05×
s(max), the system connectivity remains effectively zero. This is because at
this small interrogator scan range, very few tags are actually scanned. A value
of n = 500 is slightly better than n = 100 since with more tags distributed in
a fixed space, the increased tag density means the likelihood of an interrogator
scanning a tag is increased. Naturally, a larger interrogator scan range results
in a larger system connectivity. But we also note that while the RI = 0.15×
s(max) plots increase linearly throughout the simulation, the RI = 0.25 ×
s(max) cases have two linear portions with different slopes, with the knee
occurring at about 1000 time units. That is, in the initial stages, the RI =
0.25 × s(max) plots increase faster, due to the large interrogator scan range.
Connected links are quickly established. However, as time is at about 1000,
many of the connected links have already been established. The interrogators
are now moving in areas of the simulation space that previous interrogators
have already passed through. Therefore, new areas are being covered at
a slower rate, and thus, new tags are being scanned at a slower rate, and
therefore the system connectivity increase slows down. Interestingly, the rate
of increase (the slope) for the RI = 0.25 × s(max) plots is approximately the
same as the RI = 0.15×s(max) plots, in this later stage. In Figures 4.8 and 4.9,
we zoom into theRI = 0.15×s(max) plots and observe some interesting results.
First, we see that the αS = 10 plots begin with larger system connectivities
than the other two cases, but then later on, it loses its lead. Initially, the
small αS allows the interrogators to capture (scan) small localities of tags,
since the interrogator step length is small. Each new interrogator captures a
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new small locality. This is effective since the possibility of overlap is small,
because a small number of small localities are unlikely to overlap with each
other. However, as time progresses, the localities will start to overlap with
each other, and no new tags are captured. In this later stage, to capture new
tags, it is effective instead for an interrogator to move in large steps. These
two effects counteract each other, and we see that αS = 15, the middle value,
provides the best performance.
We now look at system connectivity from a different perspective. For a
given value of system connectivity, we plot when the system first reaches
it. As before, s(max) = 50, N = 10 interrogators, and m = 20 steps per
interrogator. We consider n ∈ {100, 500} tags and take RI = 0.25 × s(max).
α ∈ {10, 15, 20}. Results are shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11. There is no
appreciable difference in the first reaching times, up to system connectivity
being 0.35. Afterward, αS = 20 provides the best performance (fastest in
reaching the given system connectivity). As discussed previously, there are
countering effects on system connectivity, so we cannot necessarily say larger
αS gives better or worse performance all the time. The plots also demonstrate
this by not showing a direct correlation.
Connected Links System Metrics
We consider system metrics that are based on connected links. First, consider
any two tags ti and tj in the system, and associate with them Di,j, which
is a set of distances. Di,j is initially empty. Each time an interrogator
scans two tags in its trajectory, we take the cumulative distance travelled
by that one interrogator between the two tags, and store that distance in
Di,j. For example, if the interrogator scans tags ti and tj simultaneously,
then we have Di,j := Di,j ∪ 0. If the interrogator scans ti, then moves two
steps, with step lengths d1 and d2, and then finally scans tj , then we have
Di,j := Di,j ∪ (d1 + d2). Note that according to our previous definitions, Di,j
is nonempty, if and only if there as a connection between tags ti and tj ,
denoted by the connected link li,j (that is, li,j exists).
We first plot the connected links minimum distances system average. That
is, every time an interrogator scans tags, we calculate the following. For each
connected link li,j in the system, we take the minimum distance inDi,j. Then,
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we average over all these minimum distances. That is, at a given time,
connected links minimum distances system average
= mean{{minDi,j}all(i,j)s.t.∃li,j}. (4.7)
The simulation parameters are s(max) = 50, N = 10 interrogators, m = 20
steps per interrogator, n ∈ {100, 500} tags, and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} ×
s(max). The results are shown in Figures 4.12, 4.13, 4.14, and 4.15. We
see that in general, as RI increases, the metric (which is a system average)
decreases. That is, if the interrogator scan range is larger, more tags are
scanned by interrogators during their respective trajectories, and thus more
distances are collected in the Di,j sets, for pairs of connected tags ti and tj .
Consequently, it is likely that the minimum of these sets is smaller on the
average. This is especially evident at later times in the simulations, when
new distances added to a given Di,j are unlikely to change its minimum
value. Therefore, we see the metric becoming fairly static after about 2500
time units. For the n = 100 tags case in Figure 4.12, we see that the behavior
is rather erratic early on, especially for the RI = 0.05 × s(max) cases. This
is due to a small number of connected links skewing the system average.
In particular, we see that for RI = 0.05 × s(max) and αS ∈ {10, 15}, the
metric starts off small. With these smaller αS values, the interrogator takes
small steps, and as a result, the connected links distances are small. There
are very few connected links since RI is small (shown by the small system
connectivity in Figure 4.6.) Therefore, the few connected links have small
distances, and therefore the resulting connected links minimum distances
system average is also small. For the RI = 0.05 × s(max) and αS = 20
case, we see the opposite skewing effect. The large interrogator steps result
in larger connected links distances. Again there are few connected links,
so the resulting metric is skewed high. As time evolves, more connected
links are established, and the metric approaches a steadier trend. For the
n = 500 tags case in Figure 4.13, there is no early erratic behavior. Since
the tag density is higher, many tags are scanned, and many connected links
are quickly established. Therefore, the average is over a larger number of
samples, resulting in a steadier metric. In Figures 4.14 and 4.15, we zoom
into the RI = 0.15×s(max) plots. The αS = 20 curves have larger metrics than
the other two cases, since the interrogator takes larger steps, and therefore
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the connected links tend to be longer in distance. Early on, the αS = 15
case has a larger metric than the αS = 10 case, since the interrogator takes
larger steps. However, as time evolves, the interrogators tend to scan the
same tags in these two cases, and therefore the curves start to merge. This is
especially apparent in the n = 500 tags case, where the tag density is higher,
thus leading to more of the same tags being scanned, and therefore many of
the connected links have very similar distances.
We also consider the connected links maximum distances system average.
Everything is the same as the minimum version above, except we take max-
imum distances. That is, at a given time,
connected links maximum distances system average
= mean{{maxDi,j}all(i,j)s.t.∃li,j}. (4.8)
The simulation parameters are s(max) = 50, N = 10 interrogators, m = 20
steps per interrogator, n ∈ {100, 500} tags, and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} ×
s(max). The results are shown in Figures 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, and 4.19. The
results are very similar to the minimum distances plots, but obviously with
the trends reversed. The reasoning behind the curve behaviors is essentially
the same. For large RI , more tags are scanned; more connected links are
thus formed, and therefore we have larger metrics. For the n = 100 tags
case in Figure 4.16, there is erratic behavior early on due to fewer connected
links being established, thereby skewing the results. As time evolves, more
connected links are formed, and the metric, which is a system average, be-
comes steadier. The erratic behavior is not evident in the n = 500 tags case
in Figure 4.17, since the high tag density results in a relatively high num-
ber of connected links early on. In the zoomed-in cases of Figures 4.18 and
4.19, we again see the αS = 20 cases having larger metrics, due to the larger
interrogator step lengths.
By viewing the plots of the minimum and maximum metrics together,
we see that the minimum metric curves settle to a range of approximately
(40, 120), while the maximum metric curves settle to a range of approximately
(100, 250).
We consider the connected links displacements system average. That is, for
every connected link, we take the displacement between its two associated
tags. Then, we average over all connected links. This is our metric. We
119
take s(max) = 50, N = 10 interrogators, m = 20 steps per interrogator, n ∈
{100, 500} tags, and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max). The results are shown
in Figures 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23. As before, the results follow the trends
of the minimum and maximum distances plots. For large RI , more tags are
scanned; more connected links are thus formed, and therefore we have larger
metrics. Again, there is erratic behavior early on for the n = 500 tags case
in Figure 4.21. In the zoomed-in cases of Figures 4.22 and 4.23, the αS = 20
cases have larger metrics, due to the larger interrogator step lengths. These
plots indicate that the connected links displacements system average is below
40, which is below the connected links minimum distances system average
from previous plots. In other words, the interrogator is establishing a large
number of connected links in which the interrogator is traveling significantly
farther than the shortest distance (the displacement) between two tags.
4.3.3 Single Interrogator Performance
We look at our system from the perspective of a single interrogator, and
observe related performance metrics over time.
Single Interrogator Connectivity
In Section 4.3.2, we look at system connectivity. This is the number of
connected links divided by the number of all such possible links. Therefore,
this metric is nondecreasing over time. Here, we look at single interrogator
connectivity. This is the number of connected links divided by the number
of all such possible links, but only for the current interrogator. It is as if the
connectivity resets when the current interrogator exits the system and a new
one enters.
We take s(max) = 50, N = 10 interrogators, m = 20 steps per interroga-
tor, n ∈ {100, 500} tags, and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max). The single
interrogator connectivity plotted against time is shown in Figures 4.24 and
4.25. As before, changing the number of tags (and thus the tag density)
from n = 100 to n = 500 does not significantly impact the connectivity. The
RI = 0.05 × s(max) cases result in effectively zero connectivity, since the in-
terrogator scan range is too small to establish any non-negligible number of
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connected links. Naturally, a larger scan range results in a larger connectiv-
ity, with values peaking above 0.2 for RI = 0.25 × s(max). The connectivity
resets are apparent in the plots. After each peak, the value drops back down
to zero, when a new interrogator arrives. In particular, this means the differ-
ences in αS play a lesser role, compared with the system connectivity metric
in Section 4.3.2, since there is only a m = 20 step window before the metric
is reset.
Connected Links Single Interrogator Metrics
Similar to the system case, we also look at connected links-based metrics
for the single interrogator case. In the system case, we first considered
minimum distances of connected links, and averaged over them. Here, we
consider summing the minimum distances of connected links that the cur-
rent interrogator has established so far. We take s(max) = 50, N = 10
interrogators, m = 20 steps per interrogator, n ∈ {100, 500} tags, and
RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max). The single interrogator summation of con-
nected links minimum distances is shown in Figures 4.26 and 4.27. As before,
larger RI results in a larger metric, since more tags are scanned, and more
connected links are established. Also, αS has less of an impact, since the
metric is reset every time a new interrogator arrives. The n = 500 case
results in higher values, since this is a pure summation and not an average.
Using the same parameters, we show the single interrogator summation of
connected links maximum distances in Figures 4.28 and 4.29. The results
are also very similar. Again using the same parameters, we show the single
interrogator summation of connected links displacements in Figures 4.30 and
4.31. Again the results are also very similar.
4.3.4 Time Utilization
We consider time utilization. That is, we want our system, and in particular
interrogators, to maximize their useful time. In our system model in Section
4.2, when an interrogator stops between steps, it pauses for a time duration
that is distributed according to a truncated Le´vy random variable. As already
mentioned, the authors in [72] demonstrate that walk lengths and pause
times of human mobility can be closely approximated using truncated Le´vy
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distributions. Let the pause time probability distribution be fTP (·). Let
the maximum pause time be T
(max)
P , and the scale parameter be αP . Now
consider that an interrogator performs various computations during each stop
between steps. The computations always take TC time. If the pause time TP
is shorter than TC for a stop, the computations are useless, and the entire
time of length TP is wasted. That is, we assume that the computations
are only useful if they are completed in their entirety. If TP is longer than
TC , then the time TP − TC is wasted. Furthermore, we assume that the
user is not aware of the computations taking place. That is, the user moves
normally according to her own natural dynamics. The interrogator is thus
attempting to adjust TC in order to maximize useful computation time. The
useful time utilization is therefore the fraction of pause time that is used
for computations. If the computation time exceeds the pause time, the time
utilization is zero. For fixed TC , we can calculate the average useful time
utilization, which we denote U1 (TC).






fTP (t) dt. (4.9)
Using Equation (4.5) and a mathematical program [73], we have the following
closed form equation.














































P = 15 time units (e.g. minutes), we plot Equation (4.10) against
TC for α ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30}. Results are shown in Figure 4.32. This
average utilization is of course nonzero for TC ∈ [0, 15]. That is, we need
a positive TC for any useful computations to be done. But if TC is greater
than T
(max)
P , then the computations are never completed and the utility is
thus zero. The maximum average utilization occurs somewhere in between.
The maximum value increases as αP increases, since TP is more likely to
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match TC . This is shown in Figure 4.33. The maximizing TC also increases
as αP increases. That is, as the pause time is biased toward higher values,
TC needs to be higher to match it. This is shown in Figure 4.34. Note that
the useful time utilization is only one possible goal. Suppose we have the
following utility function:
U2 (TC) = U1 (TC)T
k
C , (4.11)
where k is an exponent that determines how much weight we assign to TC
as it increases. For example, if doubling the computation time TC should
have a four-fold benefit in some sense, we could let k = 2. However, this
improvement is tempered by U1 (TC), which tells us that the benefit only
applies to a fraction of the interrogator stop time.
4.4 Continuous Pervasivity
We consider the ideas in this section in the context of continuous pervasive
spaces. In particular, we discuss how tag multiplicity is again the key enabler
of the pervasive characteristics in distributed passive RFID computing.
In Section 4.1, we consider local computations. That is, an interrogator
interacts with the tags in its scan range and performs computations involv-
ing the instructions and data stored in those tags. 1. Local computing is
important to distributed computing. That is, the performance must be strong
at the local level, before expanding to a system-wide level. In particular, we
see that it may be easy to deploy additional tags, increasing the tag storage
density. But the computing speed may not necessarily increase in that case.
Nonetheless, we see in Section 3.3 that increasing the tag density does in-
crease the tag granularity, which is favorable if we want the user to perceive
a continuous space-time experience, as discussed previously.
Local interactions and computations are extremely important for a con-
tinuous pervasive space. At any space-time, the user should have access to
a rich set of services that allows her to interact with the physical space per-
vasively, that is, with a very low cognitive load. However, as the user moves
in space-time, these local computations should extend to a system level. 2.
Tag multiplicity allows local computing to merge seamlessly into distributed,
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system-wide computing. This is a form of scalability. Rather than having
two discrete or distinct systems, local computing characteristics naturally
blend or evolve into system-wide ones. System connectivity in Section 4.3.2
allows data to flow through the tag-based information system, being carried
by active users who scan tags. They are oblivious to the data itself, and may
not be even carrying data directly related to them. As the system evolves
over time, users in the past are actually communicating with present users,
as these newer users examine the information stored by previous users. De-
pending on the application, this time sensitivity may not even have to be
revealed to the user if it provides no additional richness but instead adds
to the cognitive burden. Single interrogator connectivity in Section 4.3.3
is focused on a medium scale that is part way between local, small scale
computations and large scale ones. That is, a user can leverage the local
computations she has performed in the recent past (in the same trajectory)
to make better decisions at the current moment. Again, this shows that tag
multiplicity allows for a range of scales of computation. Note that in practice,
users can communicate directly with each other. But in this work, we do not
focus on this direct communication. Rather we assume that users might be
coming from different domains, or might not want or be allowed to talk to
each other. Naturally, a controlled user-to-user communication system can
be built on top of our framework. So that is why we choose this minimal
design.
3. Distributed passive RFID computing is fault-tolerant. We already dis-
cussed fault-tolerance, and in particular redundancy, in tag-based informa-
tion systems. Here, we focus on the computation aspect. In Section 4.3.2,
we study metrics related to minimum and maximum distances of connected
links, as well as displacements between tags. That is, even if users do not
travel efficiently between tags, establishing intended links, or even if there are
scans that are unsuccessful, there is redundancy in these links since they are
continually refined and re-established from different users. Thus, the system
is resilient to errors. For example, given a failure model, we can investigate
how seriously the connected links distances are affected. Displacements be-
tween tags pertain, again, to the granularity issue. While previously we spoke
of tag granularity relating to the space-time environment, here we speak of
granularity of computations. That is, if the computing instructions and data
come from tags densely located next to each other in space-time, then our
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computations are more accurate.
In Section 4.3.4, we study how efficiently a user computes in time. 4.
Tag multiplicity allows us to achieve efficient costs in computation. That is,
the metrics in Section 4.3.4 show how efficiently a user computes, given her
movement statistics. These statistics can be learned and the information can
be shared via the mechanisms in the aforementioned systems. Furthermore,
we can optimize for the best computation time, given the stored instructions
and data in the tags. In particular, we can leverage the computation speed
expressions in Section 4.1.
4.5 Concluding Remarks
We study distributed passive RFID computing in this section. We inves-
tigate local interactions first. Through simulations, we extend to a broad
distributed framework. We study both local and system-wide metrics, as
well as metrics arising from a single interrogator moving through the space.
We organize our results for pervasive systems, highlighting the importance
of tag multiplicity to achieve continuous pervasive spaces.
4.6 Figures and Table
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Parameter Behavior of Levy Distribution
 
 
s(max) = 0.25 × diameter
s(max) = 0.50 × diameter
s(max) = 0.75 × diameter
s(max) = 1.00 × diameter
Figure 4.1: αS behavior of interrogator steps.





















Levy and Truncated Levy Probability Distributions
 
 
Levy, αS = 10
Truncated Levy, αS = 10
Levy, αS = 15
Truncated Levy, αS = 15
Levy, αS = 20
Truncated Levy, αS = 20














Interrogator Trajectories, αS = 10
Figure 4.3: Interrogator trajectories. Number of interrogators = 5, number













Interrogator Trajectories, αS = 15
Figure 4.4: Interrogator trajectories. Number of interrogators = 5, number














Interrogator Trajectories, αS = 20
Figure 4.5: Interrogator trajectories. Number of interrogators = 5, number
of interrogator steps = 4, and αS = 20.















System Average Connectivity, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.6: System connectivity. Number of tags = 100 and
RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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System Average Connectivity, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.7: System connectivity. Number of tags = 500 and
RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).

















System Average Connectivity, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.8: System connectivity. Number of tags = 100 and
RI = 0.15× s(max).

















System Average Connectivity, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.9: System connectivity. Number of tags = 500 and
RI = 0.15× s(max).


















First Time Reaching System Connectivity, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.10: First time reaching system connectivity. Number of tags = 100
and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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First Time Reaching System Connectivity, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.11: First time reaching system connectivity. Number of tags = 500
and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).






















System Average Connected Link Minimum Distance, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.12: System connected links minimum distances average. Number
of tags = 100 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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System Average Connected Link Minimum Distance, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.13: System connected links minimum distances average. Number
of tags = 500 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).




















System Average Connected Link Minimum Distance, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.14: System connected links minimum distances average. Number
of tags = 100 and RI = 0.15× s(max).
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System Average Connected Link Minimum Distance, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.15: System connected links minimum distances average. Number
of tags = 500 and RI = 0.15× s(max).

















System Average Connected Link Maximum Distance, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.16: System connected links maximum distances average. Number
of tags = 100 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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System Average Connected Link Maximum Distance, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.17: System connected links maximum distances average. Number
of tags = 500 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).




















System Average Connected Link Maximum Distance, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.15 × s
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Figure 4.18: System connected links maximum distances average. Number
of tags = 100 and RI = 0.15× s(max).
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System Average Connected Link Maximum Distance, Number of Tags = 500
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Figure 4.19: System connected links maximum distances average. Number
of tags = 500 and RI = 0.15× s(max).
















System Average Connected Link Displacement, Number of Tags = 100
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Figure 4.20: System connected links displacements average. Number of tags
= 100 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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System Average Connected Link Displacement, Number of Tags = 500
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.21: System connected links displacements average. Number of tags
= 500 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).













System Average Connected Link Displacement, Number of Tags = 100
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Figure 4.22: System connected links displacements average. Number of tags
= 100 and RI = 0.15× s(max).













System Average Connected Link Displacement, Number of Tags = 500
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Figure 4.23: System connected links displacements average. Number of tags
= 500 and RI = 0.15× s(max).















Single Interrogator Connectivity, Number of Tags = 100
 
 
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.05 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.15 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 10
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 15
RI = 0.25 × s
(max)
, αS = 20
Figure 4.24: Single interrogator connectivity. Number of tags = 100 and
RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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Single Interrogator Connectivity, Number of Tags = 500
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Figure 4.25: Single interrogator connectivity. Number of tags = 500 and
RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
















Single Interrogator Summation Connected Links Minimum Distances, Number of Tags = 100
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Figure 4.26: Single interrogator summation of connected links minimum
distances. Number of tags = 100 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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Single Interrogator Summation Connected Links Minimum Distances, Number of Tags = 500
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Figure 4.27: Single interrogator summation of connected links minimum
distances. Number of tags = 500 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
















Single Interrogator Summation Connected Links Maximum Distances, Number of Tags = 100
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Figure 4.28: Single interrogator summation of connected links maximum
distances. Number of tags = 100 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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Single Interrogator Summation Connected Links Maximum Distances, Number of Tags = 500
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Figure 4.29: Single interrogator summation of connected links maximum
distances. Number of tags = 500 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
















Single Interrogator Summation Connected Links Displacements, Number of Tags = 100
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Figure 4.30: Single interrogator summation of connected links
displacements. Number of tags = 100 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).
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Single Interrogator Summation Connected Links Displacements, Number of Tags = 500
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Figure 4.31: Single interrogator summation of connected links
displacements. Number of tags = 500 and RI ∈ {0.05, 0.15, 0.25} × s(max).































Figure 4.32: Expected time utilization. αP ∈ {5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30}.
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Figure 4.33: Maximum expected time utilization.






































Figure 4.34: Maximizing required computation time.
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Table 4.1: Range of computing speeds (instructions/second).
β = 200 β = 400 β = 600 β = 800 β = 1000
r = 32 1632.65 2191.78 2474.23 2644.63 2758.62




5.1 Summary of Work
Passive RFID enables the design and implementation of continuous pervasive
spaces. We argue that tag multiplicity allows us to design and deploy ro-
bust, distributed physical information systems, achieving this pervasivity. In
Chapter 1, we explain continuous pervasive spaces, including several salient
characteristics. We also explain tag-based information systems as the unique
enabler of these spaces. We discuss applications and related work, as well as
supporting and related technologies.
In Chapter 2, we study tracking protocols in tag-based information sys-
tems. We investigate two scenarios. In the first, we consider space-time
correlations, which are functions stored inline in tags, indicating parts of a
digital trail stored by a previous user. Tags are assumed to have infinite
storage space. In the second scenario, we consider forest search and rescue.
Tags are deployed densely in space, and digital trails are again stored. How-
ever, we focus on replacement algorithms for the data stored in tags, since
we assume tags have finite storage space, and there are many digital trails
from many users.
In Chapter 3, we study storage systems in tag-based information systems.
In particular, we consider two scenarios. In the first, we assume a dense
tag deployment. An interrogator therefore scans many tags for a given scan
range. So we consider efficient storage access protocols to read from and
write to tags. We achieve this efficiency using constrained access protocols.
In the second scenario, we assume a more moderate tag deployment. In this
case, we consider more traditional random access protocols. We also study
tag storage lifetime and tag granularity.
In Chapter 4, we study computing in a tag-based information system. We
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consider several computing-based metrics and evaluate them in a simulation
study.
5.2 Continuous Pervasivity
Passive RFID tag multiplicity allows us to design and deploy robust, dis-
tributed physical information systems for continuous pervasive spaces. Here,
we aggregate many of these pervasive characteristics discussed in other sec-
tions. In particular, we frame the ideas within the characteristics outlined in
Section 1.2.3.
5.2.1 Service Richness and Elasticity
Tag multiplicity is a powerful concept, forming the foundation of service
richness and elasticity. In particular, a dense deployment of tags creates a
continuous pervasivity. That is, a user experiences space-time continuously
in the services she uses, creating a very rich environment. We see that these
services can be framed in a general manner by labeling them as “computing.”
In Section 4.1, we study local computing, where an interrogator scans a
set of tags and interacts with their stored instructions and data. This is
extended to distributed computing in a larger system in Section 4.2, where
multiple interrogators move around in a large physical area, scanning tags and
operating on them. We see that distributed computing-based metrics depend
on interrogator dynamics. So as we use more resources (such as increasing the
tag storage density and scan range of interrogators), these metrics improve
(such as system connectivity), and in turn, the services become more powerful
(such as communications). That is, service availability and integrity are
very elastic. Marginal increases in resources translate quickly to marginal
increases in service performance.
We also study more specific services for continuous pervasive spaces. In
Section 2.1, the digital trails stored for tracking can be fat or dense. This is
customizable based on changes in tag deployment or algorithmic adjustments.
The flexibility provides a rich range of services, such as a user backtracking,
trail following, or search and rescue. For the specific case of forest search
and rescue in Section 2.2, a user may choose to maximize her own possibility
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of successful rescue, or instead sacrifice some of this for other users. This
flexibility is achieved through choosing different replacement algorithms, and
is ultimately made possible through tag multiplicity.
In Chapter 3, we study storage systems in tag-based information systems.
In particular, we consider two scenarios. In the first, we assume a dense
tag deployment. An interrogator therefore scans many tags for a given scan
range. So we consider efficient storage access protocols to read from and
write to tags. We achieve this efficiency using constrained access protocols.
In the second scenario, we assume a more moderate tag deployment. In this
case, we consider more traditional random access protocols. We also study
tag storage lifetime and tag granularity. Storage naturally has a wide range
of application domains, and is indispensable to many of those. There are
many different needs and goals for these services. We support this richness
by considering different storage access protocols for tag-based information
systems. Furthermore, different protocols can even be implemented simul-
taneously. That is, sections of a tag’s storage can be assigned for different
purposes. Or we can even write to tags using one protocol, and then read
from those same tags using another. This may depend on the current wire-
less environment or interrogator resources. Storage access protocols are thus
elastic in their resulting availability, depending on the system conditions.
5.2.2 Minimum User Distraction
A defining characteristic of pervasive computing is that technology should
fade into the background, as perceived by a user. That is, a user should be
minimally distracted by the technology itself, and instead focus her cognitive
efforts on the task at hand, aided by the service provided by the system. This
is achieved in the case of continuous pervasive spaces through tag multiplicity.
Since tags are distributed densely in space-time, the resulting services feel
continuous to the user in space-time. That is, there is no gap, and as a result,
the awareness of the supporting technology eventually fades away.
One tradeoff in this respect is functionality versus minimum cognitive load.
If more features or customizations are made available to the user, it requires
more attention on her part. Conversely, if the system itself makes assump-
tions and adapts accordingly, the user is released from much of that cognitive
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load. Clearly, this depends very much on the service itself. Our systems can
operate at many points on this spectrum, achieving maximum service rich-
ness, for the maximum tolerable cognitive complexity. In Section 2.1, there
are many parameters and levels of complexity in the various tracking algo-
rithms. In the space-time correlation functions, we can allow the user to
specify the type of weighting function and direction. To hide some complex-
ity, we can allow the user to only choose between fat or dense arrow fields.
To further simplify, we can allow the user to select between backtracking,
trail following, or search and rescue modes. The interrogator automatically
makes the algorithmic and parameter adjustments accordingly. Similarly for
forest search and rescue in Section 2.2, the algorithms can be tailored to
maximize the personal benefit of being found, or the system benefit of other
users being found. Again, we can trade off user-defined functionality with
minimum cognitive load.
In Chapter 3, minimum user distraction is again possible because of tag
multiplicity. If tags are few and far between, users are burdened with inter-
acting with a small set of tags, or even individual tags for storage purposes.
Instead, our system allows a user to store in space-time localities. She does
not even need to be aware of the presence of tags. Rather, the storage medium
is purposely abstract. That is, rather than storing information in any set of
tags, she stores information anywhere in the continuous pervasive space. Fur-
thermore, there are storage features in addition to space-time coordinates.
Section 3.2.2 discusses many ways to protect privacy. Traditional password-
based mechanisms place a heavy burden on users. We discuss distributed
approaches that work automatically, lifting the cognitive burden from the
user. These distributed approaches are again based on tag-multiplicity.
In Chapter 4, similar to storage, we show that computing starts in space-
time localities, rather than at a per tag level. Though we can adjust tag
storage density and tag deployment granularity, the user should not be made
aware. With a sufficient tag density, we can achieve significant computing
speeds for various applications in a single interrogator scan. Furthermore,
as multiple interrogators traverse a space, the local computations become
distributed computations. And again, users are oblivious to this, to their
benefit. We also study computation time utilization. Interrogators can learn
the statistics of user dynamics, automatically adjusting the computation time
in order to maximize utilization. Users are not distracted, and not even made
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aware of the supporting computations.
5.2.3 System Distributedness and Scalability
Tag multiplicity is foundational to system distributedness and scalability in
continuous pervasive spaces. In particular, distributedness of tags provides a
high level of fault-tolerance. There is no single point of failure. The system
is essentially uniformly spread out in terms of infrastructure. If any single
part fails, such as a small locality of tags, the system still functions. In fact,
we expect tags to fail regularly. They have finite lifetimes. But since they
each fail independently, and we can assume their remaining lifetimes to be
memoryless, we do not need to keep track of individual tags. (In the case
of specific disasters causing premature tag failures, a system administrator
can easily locate the disaster and affected tags.) Therefore, we only need to
periodically deploy new tags, uniformly in the space. Interrogators moving
through the space can record tag storage density in different areas. But in
general, we do not need a detailed health report to maintain the system.
We only need to deploy new tags. Similarly, expansion is simple, leading
to a highly scalable design. In particular, our continuous pervasive space
is scalable in physical size, tag storage density, and tag granularity. Again,
to achieve these goals, we merely deploy additional tags, while requiring
minimal information to do so.
5.2.4 Energy-Efficiency and Cost-Efficiency
Passive RFID is inherently energy-efficient. That is, a passive tag has no
on-board battery. It is powered by the interrogator scanning it. Therefore,
energy (from any source) is only expended when it is being used. From that
perspective, there is 100% power efficiency. No energy is being wasted. Fur-
thermore, in Section 4.1, we show the energy consumption of tag scanning,
and in particular, singulation. We demonstrate that as we scan more tags,
the energy cost of each tag scan increases. Consequently, if we desire higher
tag storage density, we should use fewer tags, but each with more storage
capacity, in order to minimize energy consumption. However, as we see in
Section 3.3, to increase tag granularity, we need to deploy more tags. This
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gives us a smaller distance between tags, but of course the energy consump-
tion for singulation increases as a tradeoff. In any case, with the elasticity of
tag deployment, a system administrator can finely tune her system to achieve
the desired goals.
Cost-efficiency follows from energy efficiency, at least for the cost of energy.
However, other costs include system maintenance. As already mentioned,
system maintenance is remarkably simple. There is no need to tightly ob-
serve the system, monitoring which specific tags have failed. Rather, knowing
the average failure rates (lifetimes) of tags is often already sufficient. Further-
more, interrogators can also report to the system administrator about the
general health of tags deployed in the space. Therefore, the main cost (in
addition to energy consumption of interrogators) is tag deployment. Since
individual tags are very inexpensive, we can estimate how many tags are
necessary, and therefore accurately deploy the right quantity (for an initial
deployment or a maintenance deployment) to tightly match the demand with
the supply. Therefore, there is very little waste.
5.3 Final Remarks
In this work, we investigate how tag multiplicity is the key enabler for con-
tinuous pervasive spaces. In particular we can design and deploy robust,
distributed, physical information systems. Right now, passive RFID tech-
nology is becoming a mature business technology oriented for supply chain
and warehouse management systems. We are hopeful that the ideas here
help propel RFID beyond identification, toward more exciting application
domains, such as pervasive computing. There is much work yet to be done.
149
REFERENCES
[1] M. Weiser, “The Computer for the Twenty-First Century,” Scientific
American, vol. 265, no. 3, pp. 94-104, Sep. 1991.
[2] M. Roma´n, C. K. Hess, R. Cerqueira, A. Ranganathan, R. H. Campbell,
and K. Nahrstedt, “Gaia: A Middleware Infrastructure to Enable Active
Spaces,” IEEE Pervasive Computing, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 74-83, Oct. 2002.
[3] C. Shankar, J. Al-Muhtadi, R. H. Campbell, and M. D. Mickunas, “A
Middleware for Enabling Personal Ubiquitous Spaces,” in Proc. ACM
International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp), Not-
tingham, England, Sep. 2004.
[4] S. Chetan, J. Al-Muhtadi, R. H. Campbell, and M. D. Mickunas, “Mo-
bile Gaia: A Middleware for Ad-hoc Pervasive Computing,” in Proc.
IEEE Consumer Communications and Networking Conference (CCNC
2005), Las Vegas, NV, Jan. 2005, pp. 223-228.
[5] J. Al-Muhtadi, S. Chetan, A. Ranganathan, and R. H. Campbell, “Su-
per Spaces: A Middleware for Large-Scale Pervasive Computing Envi-
ronments,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Pervasive Com-
puting and Communications (PerCom), Orlando, FL, Mar. 2004.
[6] NFC Forum. NFC Forum Specifications. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nfc-forum.org/specs
[7] International Standards Organization. Information technology – Radio
frequency identification for item management – Part 7: Parameters for
active air interface communications at 433 MHz. [Online]. Available:
http://www.iso.org/iso/iso catalogue/catalogue tc/
catalogue detail.htm?csnumber=43892
[8] V. K. Y. Wu and R. H. Campbell, “Large-scale Distributed RFID In-
frastructures for Pervasive Computing,” in NSF Workshop on Pervasive
Computing at Scale (PeCS), White Paper, Seattle, WA, Jan. 2011.
[9] D. Uckelmann, M. Harrison, and F. Michahelles, “An Architectural Ap-
proach Towards the Future Internet of Things,” in Architecting the In-
ternet of Things. Berlin, Germany: Springer, May 2011, pp. 1-24.
150
[10] D. Guinard and V. Trifa, “Towards the Web of Things: Web Mashups
for Embedded Devices,” in Proc. International World Wide Web Con-
ference, Madrid, Spain, Apr. 2009.
[11] J. M. Ko, C. Kwak, Y. Cho, and C. O. Kim, “Adaptive Product Track-
ing in RFID-enabled Large-scale Supply Chain,” Expert Systems with
Applications, vol. 38, no. 3, pp.1583-1590, Mar. 2011.
[12] G. Liu, “Design and Implementation of Logistics Warehouse Manage-
ment System Based on RFID and WSN,” in Proc. International Con-
ference on Logistics Engineering and Management (ICLEM), Chengdu,
China, Apr. 2010, pp. 2500-2506.
[13] T. Inaba, “Value of Sparse RFID Traceability Information in Asset
Tracking during Migration Period,” in Proc. IEEE International Con-
ference on RFID (RFID), Las Vegas, NV, Apr. 2008, pp. 183-190.
[14] Z. Li, R. Gadh, and B. S. Prabhu, “Applications of RFID Technology
and Smart Parts in Manufacturing,” in Proc. ASME International De-
sign Engineering Technical Conferences (DETC), Salt Lake City, UT,
Sep.-Oct. 2004.
[15] D. Cox, V. Kindratenko, and D. Pointer, “IntelliBadge: Towards Provid-
ing Location-Aware Value-Added Services at Academic Conferences,”
in Proc. ACM International Conference on Ubiquitous Computing (Ubi-
Comp), Seattle, WA, Oct. 2003, pp. 264-280.
[16] C. Wang, H. Wu, and N.-F. Tzeng, “RFID-based 3-D Positioning
Schemes,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on Computer Com-
munications (INFOCOM), Anchorage, AK, May 2007, pp. 1235-1243.
[17] L. M. Ni, Y. Liu, Y. C. Lau, and A. P. Patil, “LANDMARC: Indoor
Location Sensing Using Active RFID,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom),
Dallas-Fort Worth, TX, Mar. 2003, pp. 407-415.
[18] D. Ha¨hnel, W. Burgard, D. Fox, K. Fishkin, and M. Philipose, “Mapping
and Localization with RFID Technology,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA), New Orleans, LA,
Apr. 2004, pp. 1050-4729.
[19] A. Kleiner, J. Prediger, and B. Nebel, “RFID Technology-Based Explo-
ration and SLAM for Search and Rescue,” in Proc. IEEE International
Conference on Intelligent Robots and Systems (IROS), Beijing, China,
Oct. 2006, pp. 4054-4059.
151
[20] J. Bohn and F. Mattern, “Super-Distributed RFID Tag Infrastructures,”
in Proc. European Symposium on Ambient Intelligence (EUSAI), Eind-
hoven, The Netherlands, Nov. 2004, pp. 1-12.
[21] J. Bohn, “Prototypical Implementation of Location-Aware Services
Based on Super-Distributed RFID Tags,” in Proc. International Confer-
ence on Architecture of Computing Systems (ARCS), Frankfurt/Main,
Germany, Mar. 2006, pp. 69-83.
[22] J. Burnell. (2008, Jan.). Texas Turns to RFID for Emer-
gency Evacuation System. RFID Update. [Online]. Available:
http://www.rfidupdate.com/articles/index.php?id=1513
[23] C. Swedberg. (2007, Jan.) Search Teams Put RFID to the Res-
cue to Help Find the Missing. RFID Journal. [Online]. Available:
http://www.rdjournal.com/article/articleview/3362/1/1
[24] J.-H. Huang, S. Amjab, and S. Mishra, “CenWits: A Sensor-Based
Loosely Coupled Search and Rescue System Using Witnesses,” in Proc.
ACM Conference on Embedded Networked Sensor Systems (SenSys),
San Diego, CA, Nov. 2005, pp. 180-191.
[25] P. Zhuang, Q. Wang, Y. Shang, H. Shi, and B. Hua, “Wireless Sen-
sor Network Aided Search and Rescue in Trails,” in Proc. ACM Inter-
national Conference on Scalable Information Systems (INFOSCALE),
Suzhou, China, Jun. 2007.
[26] J. R. Guerrieri, M. H. Francis, P. F. Wilson, T. Kos, L. E. Miller, N.
P. Bryner, D. W. Stroup, and L. Klein-Berndt, “RFID-Assisted Indoor
Localization and Communication for First Responders,” in Proc. Euro-
pean Conference on Antennas and Propagation (EuCAP), Nice, France,
Nov. 2006, pp. 1-6.
[27] A. Shibayama, Y. Hisada, M. Mirakami, M. Endo, S. Zama, O. Tak-
izawa, M. Hosokawa, and T. Ichii, “A Study on the Disaster Information
Collection Support System, Incorporating Information and Communica-
tion Technology,” in Proc. World Conference on Earthquake Engineer-
ing, Beijing China, Oct. 2008.
[28] D. M. Dobkin, The RF in RFID. Burlington, MA: Elsevier, 2008.
[29] GS1, “EPCglobal,” Sep. 25, 2008. [Online]. Available:
http://www.gs1.org/epcglobal
[30] Walmart Corporate, “Electronic Product Codes,” Mar. 3, 2009. [Online].
Available: http://walmartstores.com/270.aspx
152
[31] Alien Technology, “Alien Higgs-3,” May 11, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.alientechnology.com/tags/rfid ic.php
[32] Impinj, “Monza 4 RFID Tag Chips,” May 11, 2009. [Online] Available:
http://www.impinj.com/products/monza4tagchips.aspx
[33] Hitachi, “Hibiki RFID Tag,” May 11, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.hitachi-eu.com/mu/Products/Hibiki.html
[34] Tego, “TegoChip,” May 11, 2009. [Online].
Available: http://www.tegoinc.com/products/products tegochip.php.
[35] C. Law, K. Lee, and K.-Y. Siu, “Efficient Memoryless Protocol for
Tag Identification,” in Proc. ACM International Workshop on Discrete
Algorithms and Methods for Mobile Computing and Communications,
Boston, MA, Aug. 2000.
[36] K. W. Chiang, C. Hua, and T.-S. P. Yum, “Prefix-Randomized Query
Tree Protocol for RFID Systems,” in Proc. IEEE International Confer-
ence on Communications (ICC), Istanbul, Turkey, Jun. 2006, pp. 1653-
1657.
[37] J. Myung, W. Lee, and T. Shih, “An Adaptive Memoryless Protocol for
RFID Tag Collision Arbitration,” IEEE Transactions on Multimedia,
vol. 8, no. 5, pp. 1096-1101, Oct. 2006.
[38] N. Bhandari, A. Sahoo, and S. Iyer, “Intelligent Query Tree (IQT) Pro-
tocol to Improve RFID Tag Read Efficiency,” in Proc. International Con-
ference on Information Technology (ICIT), Bhubaneswar, India, Dec.
2006, pp. 46-51.
[39] C.-H. Hsu, C.-H. Yu, Y.-P. Huang, and K.-J. Ha, “An Enhanced Query
Tree (EQT) Protocol for Memoryless Tag Anti-Collision in RFID Sys-
tems,” in Proc. International Conference on Future Generation Commu-
nication and Networking (FGCN), Sanya, China, Dec. 2008, pp. 427-432.
[40] H. Vogt, “Multiple Object Identification with Passive RFID Tags,” in
Proc. IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man and Cybernetics
(SMC), Hammamet, Tunisia, Oct. 2002.
[41] B. Zhen, M. Kobayshi, and M. Shimizu, “Framed ALOHA for Multiple
RFID Objects Identification,” IEICE Transactions on Communications,
vol. 88-B, no. 3, pp. 991-999, 2005.
[42] X. Huang, “An Improved ALOHA Algorithm for RFID Tag Identifica-
tion,” in Proc. KES International Conference on Knowledge-Based and
Intelligent Information and Engineering Systems, Bournemouth, United
Kingdom, Oct. 2006, pp. 1157-1162.
153
[43] Motorola Solutions, “Mobile Computers,” Apr. 23, 2010. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.motorola.com/Business/US-EN/
Business+Product+and+Services/Mobile+Computers
[44] J. T. Savolainen, H. Hirvola, and S. Iraji, “EPC UHF RFID Reader:
Mobile Phone Integration and Services,” in Proc. IEEE Consumer Com-
munications and Networking Conference (CCNC), Las Vegas, NV, Jan.
2009, pp. 1-5.
[45] L. Pohjanheimo, H. Kera¨nen, and H. Ailisto, “Implementing TouchMe
Paradigm with a Mobile Phone,” in Proc. ACM International Confer-
ence on Smart Objects and Ambient Intelligence, Grenoble, France, Oct.
2005, pp. 87-92.
[46] A. Lo¨ﬄer, U. Wissendheit, H. Gerha¨user, and D. Kuznetsova, “GIDS -
A System for Combining RFID-Based Site Information and Web-based
Data for Virtually Displaying the Location on Handheld Devices,” in
Proc. IEEE International Conference on RFID (RFID), Las Vegas, NV,
Apr. 2008, pp. 312-319.
[47] I. F. Akyildiz, W. Su, Y. Sankarasubramaniam, and E. Cayirci, “Wire-
less Sensor Networks: A Survey,” Computer Networks Journal, vol. 38,
no. 4, pp. 393-422, Mar. 2002.
[48] J. Yick, B. Mukherjee, and D. Ghosal, “Wireless Sensor Network Sur-
vey,” Computer Networks Journal, vol. 52, no. 12, pp. 2292-2330, 2008.
[49] K. Fall, “A Delay Tolerant Network Architecture for Challenged In-
ternets,” in Proc. ACM Conference on Applications, Technologies, Ar-
chitectures, and Protocols for Computer Communications (SIGCOMM),
Karlsruhe, Germany, Feb. 2003, pp. 27-34.
[50] S. Jain, K. Fall, and R. Patra, “Routing in a Delay Tolerant Network,”
in Proc. ACM Conference on Applications, Technologies, Architectures,
and Protocols for Computer Communications (SIGCOMM), Portland,
OR, Aug.-Sep. 2004.
[51] Z. Zhang, “Routing in Intermittently Connected Mobile Ad Hoc Net-
works and Delay Tolerant Networks: Overview and Challenges,” in
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 24-37,
2006.
[52] E. P. C. Jones, L. Li, J. K. Schmidtke, and P. A. S. Ward, “Practical
Routing in Delay-Tolerant Networks,” in IEEE Transactions on Mobile
Computing, vol. 6, no. 8, pp. 943-959, Aug. 2007.
154
[53] E. M. Daly and M. Haahr, “Social Network Analysis for Routing in
Disconnected Delay-Tolerant MANETs,” in Proc. ACM International
Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing (MobiHoc),
Montreal, Canada, Sep. 2007, pp. 32-40.
[54] F. Fabbri and R. Verdone, “A Sociability-Based Routing Scheme for
Delay-Tolerant Networks,” in EURASIP Journal on Wireless Commu-
nications and Networking - Special Issue on Opportunistic and Delay
Tolerant Networks, vol. 2011, Jan. 2011.
[55] R. C. Shah, S. Roy, S. Jain, and W. Brunette, “Data MULEs: Modeling
a Three-Tier Architecture for Sparse Sensor Networks,” in Proc. IEEE
International Workshop on Sensor Network Protocols and Applications
(SNPA), May 2003, pp. 30-41.
[56] D. Jea, A. Somasundara, and M. Srivastava, “Multiple Controlled Mo-
bile Elements (Data Mules) for Data Collection in Sensor Networks,” in
Proc. IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing in Sen-
sor Systems (DCOSS), Marina del Rey, CA, Jun.-Jul. 2005, pp. 244-257.
[57] W. Zhao and M. H. Ammar, “Message Ferrying: Proactive Routing in
Highly-Partitioned Wireless Ad Hoc Networks,” in Proc. IEEE Work-
shop on Future Trends of Distributed Computing Systems (FTDCS), San
Juan, Puerto Rico, May 2003, pp. 308-314.
[58] W. Zhao, M. Ammar, and E. Zegura, “A Message Ferrying Approach
for Data Delivery in Sparse Mobile Ad Hoc Networks,” in Proc. ACM
International Symposium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing
(MobiHoc), Tokyo, Japan, May 2004, pp. 187-198.
[59] W. Zhao, M. Ammar, and E. Zegura, “Controlling the Mobility of Multi-
ple Data Transport Ferries in a Delay-Tolerant Network,” in Proc. IEEE
International Conference on Computer Communications (INFOCOM),
Miami, FL, Mar. 2005, pp. 1407-1418.
[60] Z. Yang and H. Wu, “Featherlight Information Network with Delay-
Endurable RFID Support (FINDERS),” in Proc. IEEE Conference on
Sensor, Mesh, and Ad Hoc Communications and Networks (SECON),
Rome, Italy, Jun. 2009, pp. 1-9.
[61] Alien Technology, “ALR-9650 Single-Antenna RFID
Solution,” Jul. 9, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.alientechnology.com/readers/alr9650.php
[62] S. Hoyt, D. St. John, D. Wilson, and L. Bushnell, “A Tree Tour with
Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) and a Personal Digital Assistant
(PDA),” in Proc. IEEE Annual Conference of the Industrial Electronics
Society (IECON), Roanoke, VA, Nov. 2003, pp. 2035-2040.
155
[63] Discover RFID, “In the Forest,” Nov. 19, 2009. [Online]. Avail-
able: http://www.discoverrfid.org/what-is-possible/work-better/in-the-
forest.html
[64] National Park Service, “Day Hikes in Yosemite
Valley,” Nov. 19, 2009. [Online]. Available:
http://www.nps.gov/yose/planyourvisit/valleyhikes.htm
[65] K. Finkenzeller, RFID Handbook: Fundamentals and Applications in
Contactless Smart Cards and Identification.West Sussex, England: Wi-
ley, May 2003.
[66] D. W. Engels and S. E. Sarma, “The Reader Collision Problem,” in
Proc. IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics
(SMC), Hammamet, Tunisia, Oct. 2002.
[67] S. B. Wicker, Error Control Systems for Digital Communication and
Storage. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1994.
[68] M. Langheinrich and R. Marti, “Practical Minimalist Cryptography for
RFID Privacy,” IEEE Systems Journal, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 115-128, Dec.
2007.
[69] H. Aziza, “NFC Technology in Mobile Phone Next-Generation Ser-
vices,” in Proc. International Workshop on Near Field Communication,
Monaco, Apr. 2010, pp. 21-26.
[70] J. Shin and D. Han, “Multi-Classifier for WLAN Fingerprint-Based Po-
sitioning System,” in Proc. World Congress on Engineering (WCE),
London, United Kingdom, Jun.-Jul. 2010, pp. 768-773
[71] J. Fisher, “An In-Depth Users Guide to Selecting and Deploying Gen2
Tags, Readers, and Infrastructure,” Reva Systems, White Paper, 2005.
[72] I. Rhee, M. Shin, S. Hong, K. Lee, and S. Chong, “On the Levy-Walk
Nature of Human Mobility,” in Proc. IEEE International Conference on
Computer Communications (INFOCOM), Phoenix, AZ, Apr. 2008, pp.
924-932.
[73] WolframAlpha. [Online]. Available: http://www.wolframalpha.com
156
